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“Insight is suddenly seeing the problem in a new way, connecting the problem to another
relevant problem/solution pair, releasing past experiences that are blocking the solution,
or seeing the problem in a larger, coherent context.”
Sternberg and Davidson
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Creativity, problem solving and insight have been studied through diﬀerent methods
by cognitive science, artiﬁcial intelligence and the new ﬁeld of computational creativity.
This thesis proposes to close this interdisciplinary gap by addressing the topic of creative
problem solving by cognitive systems. A cognitive theoretical framework (CreaCogs) for
types of knowledge organization which can support creative processes is proposed and
formalized, as to account for a wide set of creative processes in a uniﬁed manner. Pro-
cesses which use cognitive principles of similarity, association, structured representation,
re-representation and restructuring are supported by the type of knowledge organiza-
tion proposed in CreaCogs. Creative search and substitution mechanisms, together with
creative construction mechanisms are described in CreaCogs, in the context of various
creativity tasks.
Diﬀerent methods have generally been used in the literature for the evaluation of human
versus the evaluation of computational creativity. In the context of this framework, the
various prototype systems implemented are evaluated either in comparison to norma-
tive data from humans performing creativity tests, or analyzed with the same tools as
human answers would be analyzed across these tasks. Various prototype systems are
implemented to showcase the use of the CreaCogs framework.
One such system is comRAT, which computationally solves a human creativity test - the
Remote Associates Test. This comRAT-C system uses language data from the Corpus
of Contemporary American English which is organized and searched with associative
convergence principles posited in the CreaCogs framework. comRAT-C is evaluated
using normative data from human participants solving the compound Remote Associates
Test. The performance of comRAT-C can be successfully compared to human solver
counterparts: the system gives both plausible and correct answers, and its ability to
ﬁnd an answer correlates with human diﬃculty when solving the task. As no creative
test which can be given in diﬀerent modalities exists up to date, the formalization of the
Remote Associates Test made here is used to develop a visual variant for the test. Human
participants are subsequently given this task to solve; they also provide visual associates
for the cognitive knowledge acquisition of comRAT-V, a system which solves the visual
variant of the Remote Associates Test successfully. Early data analysis shows that the
correlation between the system’s ability to solve these queries and human performance
holds in the visual variant as well, showing promise for future cross-modal explorations
of the Remote Associates test from both the computational and empirical perspective.
Another prototype cognitive system for object replacement and object composition
(OROC) showcases another side of CreaCogs principles. Cognitive knowledge retrieval
and encoding are discussed in an object domain, and multi-feature similarity is explored.
Various results of object replacement and object composition queries are described, to-
gether with the types of queries which can be answered by OROC using a small set of
CreaCogs principles. OROC’s object replacement abilities are then used to answer a
human creativity test - the Alternative Uses Test. OROC’s performance is evaluated
with the same tools as human participants, including an evaluation of the Novelty, Lik-
ability and Usability of its alternative uses made by human participants. Think aloud
data and human answers to the Alternative Uses test show that OROC matches many
of the cognitive processes used by humans in such a task.
A set of classical and new practical object insight problems are described and given to
human participants in a think aloud protocol. The processes used by human participants
in such problems are encoded and shown to correspond to processes posited in the
CreaCogs framework. This work prepares the future modeling and computational solving
of such problems, and strategies for creating more of them as to further explore practical
insight in object aﬀordance domains.
Together, these experiments and data analyses show that the creative processes and
framework proposed here can account for a description of creative problem solving across
a variety of tasks. Furthermore, the prototype systems implemented here show promise
in generating creative tests of their own, which could be further used in the empirical
exploration of creative processes.
This work generally argues for adapting the deﬁnition of problem solving to allow for the
processes required for creative problem solving. Classical problem solving is shown to be
a subset of problem solving initiated after processes of interpretation and representation
of the problem have already been deployed.
The approach taken here, of seeking comparability of artiﬁcial cognitive systems and
their products to human solving of creativity tests is shown to be productive. This
approach opens computational creative systems to improvement via cognitive inﬂuence,
and turns such systems into useful adaptable tools for studying the human creative
process from a computational perspective. Both the goals of artiﬁcial intelligence and
cognitive psychology are thus served by this type of approach, in the interdisciplinary
spirit of cognitive science.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
When solving problems creatively, humans do more than search well deﬁned problem
spaces where they know for sure there is a solution to be found, with a speciﬁc goal
in mind. Humans create possible solutions, possible tools, new problems and new ways
of looking at old problems, new ways of looking at and using old tools, be it practi-
cal (objects) or abstract (concepts, heuristics). This is the productive side of human
cognition.
The subject of creative problem solving and productive cognition is a topic of great
interest to both Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Cognitive Science, and can also contribute
to the theoretical foundations of Computer Science and Philosophy of Information. For
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, the topic can set the foundations to enable the next generation of
creative assistive systems - systems which can make associations and propose solutions
or lines of enquiry which are easy to comprehend by humans and integrate in a normal
workﬂow. For Cognitive Science, systems and hypotheses in this direction might con-
tribute to the proposal of further cognitive models of creativity. AI and CogSci working
together have historically yielded many great achievements and ways of looking at the
core questions of what a mind is and what does it take to make one.
For Computer Science, the topic can set to explain how new (valid) information can
be created out of old information. Finally, for Philosophy of Information [46], the
topic might help us deﬁne limits of generative systems, and new ways of measuring
informativity.
Creativity [9] has been studied lately in more computational terms, with computational
creativity [25] systems being created. However, most such systems aim to implement
artistic endeavours - like poetry writing [23] and painting [21], with only a few tackling
creative problem solving [67]. Furthermore, most of these systems do not set to account
for the cognitive mechanisms producing these creative results, and are merely inspired
by the results of the creative mind rather than trying to elucidate its processes. Thus
1
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the diﬀerences between various creative processes are not accounted for, the special
status of some such processes - like insight [8] - are not investigated in the computational
creativity community (with some exceptions [67]), but mostly in the cognitive psychology
literature. Psychological hypotheses on the stages of such processes are not taken into
consideration, thus no further elaboration and investigation of these stages comes as a
result of designing such systems. Nor are such systems able to be tested with the same
tests which we give to humans [36, 101, 108].
To ﬁll this gap between cognitive psychology, AI methods and the new ﬁeld of compu-
tational creativity, this thesis will aim to design hypotheses and systems a) in line with
the existing cognitive science literature; b) at levels of description which are adequate
for cognitive science (discussing possible representation and processes) and c) on which
further cognitive models can be developed and empirical hypotheses of how such creative
processes work can be explored and tested. Furthermore, some of these systems and the
hypotheses on which they are constructed are evaluated using tests given to humans and
products of human creativity as a comparison. Some others, as a result of this work,
are put in a form which allows such evaluation in future work.
A main hypothesis of the following work is that knowledge organization is a key factor
when approaching creative problem solving. We posit thus that knowledge organization
approaches which can naturally and with ease support creative processes in compu-
tational systems need to be designed and reﬁned. Throughout this work, knowledge
organization is approached and implemented in ways which enable creative search, re-
representation of previous knowledge, combinatorial creativity, associativity with similar
terms and convergence upon solutions.
This is an issue of knowledge organization, not knowledge representation. The forms of
representation chosen in the framework and implemented in the various systems here
can be changed while maintaining similar results. However the organization of said
representations is a core principle, enabling the creative process to happen without high
computational costs, in the same way in which various data structures are better at
dealing with and representing various processes.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis has been written in an interdisciplinary spirit, proposing a uniﬁed frame-
work [115] for various creative problem-solving tasks, formalizing processes which can
be implemented in a variety of creative problem-solving domains, and helping the further
development of cognitive models and more sophisticated systems. The thesis makes the
following contributions:
1) A theoretical framework of the creative problem-solving process is proposed. This ad-
dresses various creative problem-solving capabilities in a uniﬁed manner, is cognitively-
inspired and aims to enable AI cognitive systems with a wide scale of creative problem-
solving capabilities.
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2) A formalization of the knowledge organization and processes for this theoretical frame-
work is made. A set of core creative mechanisms for search and composition is proposed.
Examples of how these processes can enable and describe creative problem solving in
various domains are given and discussed.
3) Prototype systems have been implemented using these principles, to show the breadth
of the theoretical framework and its principles of knowledge organization in diﬀerent
domains. Some of these systems solve tasks which are comparable to classical human
creativity assessment tasks, thus bridging the gap between computational creativity and
cognitive modeling. The systems are:
1. A compound Remote Associate Test computational solver (comRAT-C), which
oﬀers correct and plausible results to the human Remote Associate creativity test.
This has been compared to human normative data. The system can also generate
RAT queries, and be used to model hypotheses via predicting correct answers given
by humans.1
2. A computational solver for a visual version of the Remote Associate Test (comRAT-
V). This prototype was built to show the same principles can be used to solve RAT
queries in the visual domain.
3. A creative object replacement system which operates on a practical everyday ob-
ject domain (the OR part of the OROC system). The results of this system are
comparable to the human Alternative Uses test. This enables the future modeling
of various hypotheses on how humans solve the Alternative Uses test.
4. A creative object composition prototype (the OC part of the OROC system) which
operates on a practical everyday object domain, proposing what new objects can
be constructed out of the various objects in a particular environment.
The core principles of the framework are applied in these systems, with reﬁnements
relevant to the task domain being approached. The performance of the systems is
compared to human data, or appraised with similar tools as human performance would
be appraised in creativity tests.
4) Empirical data on human creative problem solving. This has taken diﬀerent forms:
1. comparability data between the comRAT-C system and normative human data;
2. the creation of an initial prototype of a visual variant of the human Remote Asso-
ciates test, and related data;
3. comparability data between the object replacement system and human answers to
the Alternative Uses test; data on property use in new answers to the Alternative
Uses test;
4. the creation of new practical object insight problems and a methodological outline
of creating such problems. Data on human problem solving of a set of insight
problems, and a set of think aloud codes to model the solving process.
1The system will be released in the public domain, to enable cognitive psychologists to model and
study various hypotheses on how humans solve this test.
Chapter 1. Introduction 4
1.3 Thesis structure
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a state of the art and theoretical
background of the various research threads which lead to this thesis: creativity and
creative problem solving from the perspective of creative cognition, artiﬁcial intelligence,
computational creativity, etc. The link between knowledge organization and the process
which it enables is explored in the light of creative processes. Main psychological tests
used for creativity assessment and evaluative tools from the computational creativity
community are also reviewed here. Chapter 3 details the theoretical framework proposed,
together with the ways in which it deals with various creativity tasks. Chapter 4 details
the formalization of the core creative processes in this framework, giving examples of
how such mechanisms can account for the accomplishment of various creative tasks.
Chapter 5 shows the applications of some of these principles in the buildling of a Remote
Associate Test (a test for human creativity) problem-solver, and an extension of this test
and solver to the visual domain. Chapter 6 applies the principles of the framework to a
household objects domain, yielding results relevant to creative object replacement and
object construction/composition. Chapter 7 examines the principles of the framework
using them to compose a set of codes and analyse a think aloud protocol for practical
object insight problem solving. A ﬁnal big picture discussion, conclusions and further
work are presented in Chapter 8.
Chapter 2
Theoretical background and
State of the Art
Problem solving and creativity are often addressed together [144] as higher level cognitive
abilities. Both have been held in high esteem and long considered to be human-only
abilities, and then proven to exist to a smaller yet still impressive extent in animals.
Other animals are capable of some creative tool use [84] and analogy-making [59], and
frameworks for the study of animal creativity have been proposed [5, 79]. However,
creativity and creative problem solving are at their pinnacle in human cognition.
Extraordinary leaps of thought have been an integral part of human history [65, 124, 161,
162], brought forth by individuals or groups. Nonetheless, creativity is encountered in the
everyday life of most people. Despite the universality and the diversity of levels creativity
takes, various diﬃculties relating to knowledge representation, common sense knowledge
and the amount of cognitive functions involved in higher level cognitive abilities stand
in the way of directly modeling such processes.
Both creativity and problem solving have been addressed in psychology, AI and cognitive
science, and can be conceived of as interdisciplinary ﬁelds of research. Diﬀerent kinds
of matters pertaining to these subjects have been studied, depending on the ﬁeld doing
the inquiry. Thus, a question formulated by cognitive psychology would be : “How does
a certain creative process function in humans? How can we model it?”. An Artiﬁcial
Intelligence type of question: “How can we deﬁne problem solving so that it is computable
by machines and that computation can be optimized?”. Questions relating to cognitive
science: “What kinds of representations and processes are necessary and suﬃcient to
have creativity in a cognitive system?”. An important question asked by the newly
emerging ﬁeld of computational creativity is “What are the required criteria to call a
system creative, and how can one evaluate such creativity?”. This question seems to
come loaded with the fact that new research shows that as soon as humans know by which
process the system is generating its creative products, they become much more reluctant
to call it creative. The ﬁeld of computational creativity is leading the applied work in
this ﬁeld, and has recently seen a boom of newly implemented creative systems, however
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it is somewhat lacking on the problem solving part, and on the cognitive implications
and comparability of these systems.
In the following, a large amount of literature from these various domains will be ap-
proached systematically by grouping these subjects in the following way:
• Creativity, Problem Solving and Insight (2.1) - This section describes rele-
vant theories of creativity, problem solving in its well structured and ill-structured
forms and insight - an empirically studied creative problem-solving process. The
section concludes drawing a possible relation between visuospatial intelligence and
creativity.
• Knowledge organization for creative problem solving (2.2) - The question
of what kinds of representation and processes are of use to implementing and
modeling is of importance to all the ﬁelds dealing with creative problem solving.
Various representations and processes relevant to creative problem solving will be
reviewed. The interplay between representation and process will be presented as a
motivator for knowledge organization with speciﬁc relevance to enabling processes
of creative problem solving
• Computational Creativity systems (2.3) - This section will review formal and
applied work on creative systems, presenting a selection of models and computa-
tional creativity achievements. This review can only oﬀer a selective taster of the
ﬁeld, and many other interesting systems have been realized in the last years.
• Evaluation of human and computational creativity (2.4) - In this section,
the latter work in evaluation of computational creativity is reviewed side by side
with psychology work on assessment of creativity in human participants. This
juxtaposition is meant to enable a fruitful comparison.
A Discussion which (i) sets up an outline of a new view on creative problem solving and
(ii) sets up some working principles for the factors an interdisciplinary creative problem
solving framework needs to take into account will take place in Section 2.5.
2.1 Creativity, Problem Solving and Insight
This section begins with the description of a few classical and modern theories of creativ-
ity (Section 2.1.1). Problem solving in its well structured and ill structured forms and
their relation to creativity are explained in Section 2.1.2. Insight is presented in Section
2.1.3 as an empirically studied process, representative of how ill-structured problems
can be solved. Further, neurological background work on understanding the process of
insight is brieﬂy presented (Section 2.1.4). The section concludes bringing forth current
literature which might be representative for a relation between visuospatial intelligence
and creativity (Section 2.1.5).
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2.1.1 Creativity
Boden [9] diﬀerentiates between the concepts of historical creativity (h-creativity)
and psychological creativity (p-creativity). In her taxonomy, historical creativity
is the creativity which is original on the scale of human history, while psychological
creativity yields contributions which are creative from the perspective of the individual.
She further diﬀerentiates between combinatorial and exploratory-transformational
creativity. Combinatorial creativity is a form of producing new, unusual combinations
or associations out of known ideas. Exploratory-transformational creativity is about
exploration of variations, and changes to/restructuring of the conceptual space. The
term conceptual space is, according to some [126, 165], vaguely deﬁned. This makes it
hard to compare to similar terms in the literature, for example the conceptual spaces
used by Ga¨rdenfors [52].
Another term relevant for the study of creativity is that of divergent thought. Guild-
ford [61] came up with the term divergent production in the Structure of Intellect. He
discusses both convergent and divergent productions, as complementary parts of the
cognitive productive capacity. Guilford builds a common model for convergent and di-
vergent productions, arguing that problem solving and creative production are the same.
Table 2.1 shows the diﬀerences posited by Guilford between divergent and convergent
productions.
Table 2.1: Diﬀerence between divergent and convergent productions,
according to Guildford [61]
Divergent productions Convergent productions
Loose and broad problem, Answer can be rigorously structured
or incomplete grasp of it at the agent level and forthcoming
Few restrictions Many restrictions
Broad search Narrow search
Vague and lax criteria for success Sharper, rigorous, demanding criteria
(stress variety and quantity)
The generative-exploratory model (Geneplore) by Finke, Ward and Smith [44] dif-
ferentiates between two phases of creative thought: generation and exploration. In
the generative phase, preinventive structures (which are mental representations) are
constructed by the individual. In the exploratory phase, these structures are used to
generate new ideas.
Gabora has proposed creativity to be a honing process [2, 50]. The honing theory
postulates that creativity is a process by which an individual hones, at multiple stages,
their world view. Thus creativity is seen here as a process of self-organization of a
worldview, which aims to solve inconsistencies between ideas, attitudes and knowledge.
The Explicit-Implicit interaction model (EII) [67] proposes a uniﬁed framework for un-
derstanding creativity in problem solving. The Explicit Implicit theory has been imple-
mented in the CLARION cognitive architecture and relies on the following principles:
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(a) the coexistence of and the diﬀerence between explicit and implicit knowledge;
(b) the simultaneous involvement of implicit and explicit processes in most tasks;
(c) the redundant representation of explicit and implicit knowledge;
(d) the integration of the results of explicit and implicit processing and
(e) the iterative (and possibly bidirectional) processing.
Other models of creativity have also been proposed [134, 145]. Other concepts of cre-
ativity, like concept blending, analogy and metaphor, will be discussed as processes in
Section 2.2.2.
2.1.2 Problem solving
Part of the diﬀerence between creativity and creative problem solving comes from what
the results of each are, and how those results are evaluated. Thus, when speaking of
creativity without the context of problem solving, one tends to generally consider the
processes of creating works of art or products which are original (the ﬁeld of computa-
tional creativity is not devoid of this bias). Such works can then be evaluated in terms
of their aesthetic qualities, their novelty compared to other works in the similar genre
or with other works of the author, or their novelty in terms of process1. Creative prob-
lem solving on the other hand has to satisfy problem constraints, and the usefulness of
the solution can as much be a factor in evaluation as novelty. The ﬁeld of creativity
gets closer to the ﬁelds of problem solving and reasoning when it deals with innovation,
scientiﬁc discovery and scientiﬁc reasoning [81, 91, 112].
In order to understand creative problem solving, one must thus revisit classical problem
solving deﬁnitions in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI), and aim to reﬁne them according to
creative problem-solving accounts in cognitive systems.
In AI, and later in computer science, problem solving in its classical form is deﬁned [116]
in terms of:
- An initial state
- Operators or successor functions which deﬁne reachable states f(x) from any state
x
- A state space, constituted of all the reachable states, based on applying the oper-
ators to initial states in whatever sequence
- Paths – sequences through the state space
- Path cost – a function used to evaluate the best heuristics
- Goal state or goal tests (to determine if the goal state has been reached)
- Heuristics which can be deﬁned based on their success and cost (optimality)
However, a diﬀerence can be made between well structured and ill-structured problems
[114]. Well-structured problems can easily be described in terms of the classical problem
solving deﬁnition, while ill-structured problems have ambiguous initial states, operators
1Ways of assessing computational creativity systems will be described in Section 2.4.2.
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or goal states. Meanwhile, ill-structured problems are more often encountered in real
environments [138].
The Gestalt psychologist Wertheimer [163] diﬀerentiates between productive and re-
productive thinking. He considers reproductive thinking to be a function of repetition,
conditionings, habit and familiar ways of thought. Meanwhile, productive thinking is
considered to produce new ideas and be insight-based. Applying this deﬁnition to prob-
lem solving, productive problem solving can be deﬁned as a process which brings about
new heuristics and new ways of looking at the problem, while reproductive problem
solving would mean applying the same known heuristics to the same types of problems.
In order to understand why certain ill structured problems are hard to solve and require
productive problem solving, the case of insight problem solving can be taken as as an
example.
2.1.3 Insight
The legend has it that Archimedes jumped out of his bathtub because an insight on how
to measure the volume of a crown while observing himself immersed in the water [155].
Watson told stories about his dream of spiral staircases helping him solve the problem
of the structure of DNA by settling on the double helix solution. Kekule´ recounted to
have day-dreamt an Ouroboros-like snake biting its own tail or a tibetan knot before
discovering the structure of benzene (Fig. 2.1) in a speech given at the German Chemical
Society.
Figure 2.1: A depiction of Kekule´’s day-dream: a) The benzene molecule; b)
Ouroboros symbol of a serpent eating its own tail; c) Tibetan knot.
To diﬀerentiate between the introspective account or anecdotical story and the empirical
study of insight [18], empirical tasks for the study of insight will be presented in section
2.4.1.5. In any case, implicit processing is assumed to have an important role in the
insight process, in both modern [67] and earlier accounts.
Helmholtz [68] and Wallas [157] put together the four step model to creativity and
insight, which involves the stages of preparation, incubation, illumination (or insight)
and veriﬁcation (or evaluation), in some taxonomies followed by elaboration. The core
four steps are described as follows:
1. Preparation The participant gets acquainted with the problem. Various attempts
are made at solving it, but they are unsuccessful.
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2. Incubation The participant stops trying to (consciously) solve the problem, di-
recting her attention to something else. This stage varies in length.
3. Illumination or Insight The participant has a sudden idea of how to solve the
problem, with all elements appearing at the same time as if “fully formed” in
consciousness.
4. Veriﬁcation or Evaluation At this stage, the participant tries to apply the
insight in the real world or on the problem, to check if it provides the desired
solution
Whether this model is entirely accurate is still debated in the literature, with some
assuming that insight problem solving is a gradual process, rather than involving an
actual ﬂash of insight, and some considering that it can be both [45, 137]. However,
inability of solvers to accurately predict their closeness to the solution [109] (unlike for
normal problem solving) is generally taken as support for this model.
Batchelder and Alexander [8] summarize the set of characteristics for insight:
1. They (insight problems) are posed in such a way as to admit several possible
problem representations, each with an associated solution search space.
2. Likely initial representations are inadequate in that they fail to allow the possibility
of discovering a problem solution.
3. In order to overcome such a failure, it is necessary to ﬁnd an alternative productive
representation of the problem.
4. Finding a productive problem representation may be facilitated by a period of non-
solving activity called incubation, and also it may be potentiated by well-chosen
hints.
5. Once obtained, a productive problem representation leads quite directly and quickly
to a solution.
6. The solution involves the use of knowledge that is well known to the solver.
7. Once the solution is obtained, it is accompanied by a so-called aha! experience.
8. When a solution is revealed to a non-solver, it is grasped quickly, often with a
feeling of surprise at its simplicity, akin to an aha! experience.
Not many models of insight have been implemented in the literature - exception being an
implementation using the CLARION cognitive architecture of the the Explicit-Implicit
interaction model - EII [67], which focuses on explicit and implicit processes and their
relation.
However, research in insight problem solving shows the role of the problem representation
as a productive or not productive structure to be essential. Arriving at a productive
representation can thus be seen as an exercise in productive thinking [163]. Restructuring
[98, 118, 119] and re-representation or representational change [77, 82] are assumed to
play an important role in arriving at such a productive representation. Performance
in solving insight problems has been shown to sometimes improve when given enough
practice [74].
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It is worth noting that the role of re-representation in creative problem solving might be
to transgress the boundary between ill-structured and well-structured problems. This
point will be discussed further in the context of knowledge representation and organiza-
tion (Section 2.2) and in the Discussion Section (2.5). Meanwhile, an overview of studies
in the neural correlates of insight will be presented.
2.1.4 Neural Correlates of Insight
In terms of neural correlates of insight, the right hippocampus and a wide area of cerebral
cortex (frontal, temporal, parietal and occipital) have been shown to be involved in
insight events [95]. In an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
experiment, participants were given 45 most interesting Japanese riddles (rated out
of a set of 300) to solve [95]. The 16 riddles which each participant found the most
interesting but could not solve where collected in a scanning session, and their answer
was shown to the non-solving participants, eliciting “Aha!” eﬀects. The authors posited
that it was the formation of novel associations between already existing conceptual
”nodes” that activated the hippocampus. The hippocampus has been previously shown
to have a role in the formation of associations [158], pattern completion and conjunctive
representations [129].
Another event-related fMRI study [97] presented participants with incomprehensible
sentences, followed by solution cues which triggered alternative interpretations of the
concepts in the sentences, thus triggering an “Aha!” reaction. Activation in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) and left lateral prefrontal cortical areas has been observed,
areas supposed to mediate cognitive conﬂict. Thus a mental impasse was assumed to be
broken with the presentation of the solution cues, redirecting the interpretation of the
participants in a productive manner.
In a high-density event-related potential (ERP) study [100], 120 Chinese riddles of two
degrees of diﬃculty were presented to the participants. After each riddle, the partici-
pants were given a cue which was consistent with the assumed initial direction of thought
of the participant, or which required changing the initial mental set (thus manifesting
“Aha!” eﬀects). Results concluded the ACC was involved in the breaking of the mental
set, with a peak latency of 380 msec (N380). The ACC was also observed to be more
involved in the condition in which the puzzles where hard to predict, than when puzzles
were constructed on similar structural principles [96].
In active solving of chinese logogriphs [125], dipole analysis localized a P200–600 in
the left superior temporal gyrus and parietotemporo-occipital cortex areas (thought to
be involved in initial association formation), a N1500–2000 on in the ACC (thought
to reﬂect the breaking of the mental set) and N2000-2500 generator in the posterior
cingulate cortex (PCC), which authors posit to be related to the emotional “Aha!”
eﬀect.
Finally, a relation between resting-state brain activity and problem strategy applied
(with or without insight) has been explored [85].
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These studies support the importance of making new associations, pattern completion
and re-representation (with cues of cognitive conﬂict between multiple interpretations)
in creative and insightful problem solving.
2.1.5 Visuospatial intelligence
Arguments have been made for visualization being essential for reasoning [76]. Others
consider spatial reasoning to be a form of interface for abstract reasoning [49]:
“We may interpret non-spatial concepts by mentally transforming them into
spatial concepts (i.e., understanding them in terms of spatial concepts), car-
rying out mental operations in this visualizable and graspable domain and
transforming the result into the original domain. In this way, spatial infer-
ence engines may have a much more general function than the term sug-
gests: rather than generalizing by forming a common abstraction for various
domains we generalize by forming suitable analogies to a well-understood
concrete domain.”
Mandler [102] extrapolates from empirical developmental data to form a theory according
to which spatial concepts are the functional base for developing abstract concepts. Some
of the spatial concepts which she proposes as primitive are: PATH, START PATH,
END PATH, PATH TO, LINK, CONTAINER, (IN)TO, (OUT) OF, THING,
±MOTION, etc.[103]
Further work shows the possibility that abstract spatial concepts like cardinal directions
are further grounded in body-referenced axes [151]. Priming with such concepts inﬂu-
ences further trajectories in concrete tasks. This is an example of top-down inﬂuence
from priming with abstract spatial concepts, back onto an aﬀordance of bodily motion,
and implies a strong connectivity between the two.
If abstract concepts are indeed grounded in spatial concepts, then such spatial concepts
will be relevant for the creation of new concepts and general creative problem solving.
Also, a shape bias [72, 88, 104] has been observed in children. Children who do not know
the name of an object tend to extend to the unknown object the name of a previously
known object of a similar shape. This has shown that (in the object domain) shape is
important in the categorization of objects (more so than color, size or material).
Image schema theory supports the view that perceived spatial relations are at the foun-
dation of abstract conceptual reasoning. Image schemas are supposed to also play a
structuring role in metaphors [87].
Finally, an interesting point about the link between perception, visuospatial intelligence
and re-representation can be made via the example of ambiguous ﬁgures. Ambiguous
ﬁgures, like Fig. 2.2, are ﬁgures in which two diﬀerent objects can be seen, albeit not at
the same time.
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Figure 2.2: Ambiguous ﬁgures: a) girl/saxophonist; b) duck/rabbit
This perception-based process brings to mind a certain similarity with the issue of re-
representation. Thus if in ambiguous ﬁgures, visuospatial features can be grouped in two
diﬀerent objects, in creative problem solving, objects of the problem might be grouped
or paid attention to in diﬀerent ways, invoking diﬀerent known heuristics, as to bring
about a productive problem representation.
We might be yet to hear the ﬁnal word on the inﬂuence of visuospatial processes on
creative problem solving. As things stand, we should consider this set of ﬁndings as
being representative of the fact that we should not think of knowledge only as verbal or
propositional when considering types of knowledge representation and processes which
could implement creative processes.
2.2 Knowledge organization for creative problem solving
An important question related to how creative problem solving happens in natural cog-
nitive systems and how it could be implemented in artiﬁcial cognitive systems pertains
to knowledge representation and processes. When implementing or trying to understand
creative problem solving, one has to deal with the question of what kind of knowledge
representation and processes support it.
The relationship between knowledge representation and processes, from a computational
point of view, is tight. Thus certain types of knowledge representation can support with
more ease the deployment of certain processes, similarly as certain data structures are
more productive in the implementations of certain algorithms.
Well structured problems and ill-structured problems have been deﬁned as easier or
harder to solve (requiring creativity) in natural and artiﬁcial cognitive systems. Consid-
ering the diﬀerence between them might be based on a diﬀerence of problem structure,
the following section will focus on structure topics: (i) structured representations pro-
posed in AI; (ii) types of processes proposed in creativity and (iii) restructuring as a
process of creative problem solving which points towards the need for implementing
creative systems in which knowledge organization is supportive of it.
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2.2.1 Representations and structure
One of the themes which emerges when looking at some of the constructs proposed to be
used for representing knowledge in cognitive science and AI is the theme of structured
representation. In the following, constructs of knowledge representation which have in
common an interest for structure will be described.
Frames are knowledge representation schemes initially proposed by Minsky [110] which
were meant to capture and express essential properties of concepts and often encountered
situations, like going out for dinner or being in the living room. Frames oﬀer a short
and poignant systems of expressing knowledge in an object-oriented manner [43] and are
useful for the semantic web [93]. The concept of frames later led to the development of
frame-based systems, which generally share the following properties [43]: a) frames are
organized in tangled hierarchies; b) they are composed out of slots (attributes) for which
ﬁllers (scalar values, references to other frames or procedures) need to be speciﬁed or
computed) and c) properties are inherited hierarchically from superframes to subframes
in accord to some inheritance strategy.
If schemata are psychological constructs [13, 130] which aim to account for atomic parts
of human generic knowledge, Minsky used frames to describe representation schemes for
both psychological description and artiﬁcial intelligence. The somewhat similar con-
struct of scripts [133] refers to schemata which represent stereotyped sequences of
action - i.e. the sequence of actions required for the scenario of a person ordering some-
thing in a restaurant. The word schema is also sometimes used to refer to sequences of
events, like in the case of narrative schemas [15].
The term of image schemas has widely been used with various meanings, and has been
approached in the context of metaphors in the work of Lakoﬀ and Johnson [86, 87]. The
use of image schemas further supports compositionality, and some conceptualization of
spatial schemas [53]. Some evidence points at the existence of image schemas in the
human brain [127].
Analogical representations [139] are representations in which some of the proper-
ties and relations between parts represent corresponding properties and relations in the
world (or in some hypothesised/imagined world). Sloman contrasts analogical represen-
tations to Fregean representations. Sloman mentions maps, images and scaled models as
analogical representations, with predicate calculus, programming languages and natural
languages (but not exclusively) Fregean. In our opinion, some analogical representations
preserve structure implicitly, requiring further interpretation in order to extract speciﬁc
information already existent in a particular representation.
The concept of mental models was ﬁrst proposed by Kenneth Craik [27]. Mental
models were meant to be molecular models of reality built by the human cognitive
system in order to reason, anticipate events and provide explanations. Models have
been further supposed to be constructed in the working memory [75, 105]. One of the
deﬁning characteristics of mental models, which makes them very similar to Sloman’s
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concept of analogical representation [139], is that the structure of the mental models is
in a relation of correspondence with the structure of the world that is being represented.
The argument for structured representation goes further, when connected with the
topic of creativity and creative problem solving, and this will be discussed in Section
2.2.3. However, a look at creative processes is ﬁrst warranted.
2.2.2 Creative Processes
Various processes have been proposed to account for mechanisms of creativity.
Bisociation is a concept developed by Arthur Koestler [83], which discusses it in “The
Act of Creation”. Bisociation can be seen as an ancestor concept of concept blending,
and is deﬁned as the moment when two or more matrices of thought (considered to be
the totality of possible moves) intersect.
Discussing the need for the discoverer to be prepared (which he calls “ripeness’), Koestler
makes a point similar to that of the Preparation phase. He also refers to the need for
something similar to an incubation phase by talking about the unconscious mind as the
generator of discoveries: “The creative process of discovery depends on the unconscious
resources and presupposes a regression to modes of ideation which are indiﬀerent to the
rules of verbal logic”. In this phrase, he also alludes to diﬀerent modes of ideation, in
which verbal language does not play as much a part. Koestler also diﬀerentiates between
creativity as being the “production of a new recipe”, compared to “the skilled routine
of providing variations for it”.
The study of human concept formation had yielded a variety of theories: prototype
theory [128], exemplar theory [106], theory theory [111]. A connected issue of importance
to creativity is that of the process of concept creation. Amongst others [2], the process
of conceptual blending has been proposed as a form of creating new concepts [41].
Concept blending is deﬁned by Fauconnier as a basic mental operation of constructing
a partial match between two inputs, projecting selectively from those inputs into a
“blended space” which has as a result the emergence of a new structure and of new
meaning.
Associativity is a relevant process for creativity. According to Csikszentmihalyi [29]
“Cognitive theorists believe that ideas, when deprived of conscious direction, follow
simple laws of association. They combine more or less randomly, although seemingly
irrelevant associations between ideas may occur as a result of a prior connection“. This
supports an associationist view of creativity. Various principles from hebbian learning
[66] to semantic networks [143] can be used for implementing forms of associativity.
Analogy [54, 71], an important mechanism in creativity and scientiﬁc discovery [35],
is the process of understanding a concept, process or situation via another. Thus a
concept, process or situation that is familiar (called the source analog) might be used to
understand another less familiar concept, process or situation (the target). It is currently
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assumed that various stages are part of the analogy-making process. A mapping or
aligning of the representational structures [39, 54, 55] allows projections of inferences. An
evaluation of analogy and the inferences produced by it follows. After this, one or both
initial representation might change, being adapted or re-represented. Analogy making
is a process which has been amply studied in the literature, with various computational
approaches [38, 39, 47, 63, 70].
It is worth noting that Gabora’s honing theory is also supportive of associative, structure-
relevant processes, as she thinks the process of analogy is “constrained by content-
addressable structure of associative memory to naturally retrieve items that are [...]
structurally similar” [50, 51].
Metaphor is the process of using one concept, process or situation to designate another.
For example, the phrase “The wheels of justice turn slowly” is based on a metaphor.
Metaphors make implicit comparison between two concepts, processes and situations
(in the example here, between the concepts “justice” and “machine”). Metaphors diﬀer
from similes by not using language (e.g. words such as “like”, “as”, etc.) to make such
a comparison overt. Lakoﬀ and Johnson [86] discuss the role of structural metaphors as
allowing people to use the structure of a concept in order to structure another. They
further posit the existence of structure in the metaphorical system as a whole, as “neural
connectivity of the brain makes it natural for complex metaphorical mappings to be built
out of preexisting mappings”[87]. Various formal approaches to modeling metaphors
exist [62, 73].
2.2.3 Restructuring or re-representation and the link between knowl-
edge representation and process
Support for a structured creativity approach comes from empirical psychology as well
[12, 159, 160]. Thus Ward [159, 160] shows that category structure has an important
role to play in creative generation. In one of his works, the participants in a test [159]
are given the task of creating imaginary animals that could live on a diﬀerent planet
in the galaxy. The participants created drawings and descriptions of such animals, of
members of their species and of members of other species. The responses generated for
this task were structured by properties of known earthly animals. Furthermore, when
asking the participants for animals with a particular attribute (e.g. feathers), categorical
knowledge was shown to be called upon and inﬂuence the imagined animal, which also
held other attributes correlated with that particular feature (e.g. beaks and wings).
Ward has shown that similar knowledge base categorical constraints apply to creative
writers, for examples science ﬁction authors, and proposed the concept of structured
imagination.
A further set of experiments was performed using categories of animals, tools and fruit
[160]. First, lists of exemplars were gathered for these categories from some participants,
as to determine accessibility of diﬀerent category exemplars. Then, other participants
were asked to draw and describe novel categories of those exemplar, which might live on
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an imaginary planet. Items rated as highly accessible in the lists provided by the ﬁrst
participants had a higher inﬂuence in imaginary production of new exemplars.
These experiments show the importance and inﬂuence of the structure existing in the
knowledge base of the cognitive agent when approaching a creative task. This is note-
worthy, considering that restructuring or re-representation are considered to play an
important role in insight and creative problem solving [31, 36, 78].
Thus a link between the process of knowledge representation (as structured) and the
creative process (as a process of restructuring) can be drawn. A type of knowledge
organization which allows restructuring and re-representation seems essential
for the implementation of creative processes. The implication of this on the well-
structured — ill-structured divide are discussed in Section 2.5.
2.3 Computational Creativity systems
Computational creativity has seen a bloom in recent years. Thus computational creativ-
ity systems have been implemented in domains as varied as mathematics [20, 22, 94],
music [121, 140], art [19, 21], poetry [23], architecture and design [135], discovery of
physical laws [89, 90, 92], magic trick making [167], video games [26], etc.
In the following section, we will give a short description of a few such systems: Aaron
[19], the Painting Fool [21], poetry systems [23], BACON [89, 90, 92] and a magic trick
making framework [167].
The AM system [94] by Lenat acts in the domains of elementary set and number the-
ory, and paved the way in concept formation and conjecture making. AM had a database
of 115 elementary concepts, like sets and bags, each deﬁned on a frame representation
with 25 facets, and 242 heuristics. AM reinvented set and number theory concepts and
some known conjectures, by choosing which heuristics were to be applied to a speciﬁc
task (like inventing a new concept) and applying those heuristics. As such heuristics
had multiple tasks and subtasks, part of the computational work of AM was to choose
which tasks to apply ﬁrst. This decision making process was guided by adding values
to concepts, their facets and actions which could be taken on the concepts, which were
then used to calculate a task value. A second part of the decision making process was
to assess interestingness using other heuristics, based on interesting properties, related
conjectures to a concept, whether examples of a concept have been found or not, etc.
The HR system [20], named after the mathematicians Hardy and Ramanujan, is meant
to produce theories in pure mathematics domains, taking as input simple concepts and
axioms. HR produces new mathematical concepts and forms new theories by using a pre-
deﬁned set of production rules. Such production rules act as structure and constraints
propagators within the new formed concepts. Third party automated reasoning software
is used by HR in order to attempt to prove the new conjectures. The search for new
concepts and mathematical conjectures is driven by various measures of interestingness
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[22]. Such measures of interestingness involve properties of complexity and surprise of
both concepts and conjectures.
Aaron
Aaron [19] is a drawing and painting computational creativity system on which Cohen
started working in the mid seventies from the cognitive question “What is the minimum
condition under which a set of marks functions as an image”. Aaron started as a simple
program which could distinguish between ﬁgure and ground, closed and open forms,
and perform simple structure manipulations, with a feedback mode, which allowed it
to consider its overall goal in relation to its current accomplished parts of the drawing.
After observing the behaviour of children in scribbling, in which “a scribble migrates
outwards and becomes an enclosing form for the rest of the scribble”, Cohen added to
Aaron a simple strategy to trace a path around core ﬁgures, which greatly enhanced the
complexity of the forms it generated, and their similarity to forms drawn from visual
experience.
Aaron continued to be developed over time, with the addition of physical ambience
around its ﬁgures, knowledge of anatomical parts (as complex connected parts) and
postural rules, while still operating with knowledge of two and a half dimensional ﬁgures.
Then, in order for it to turn from a drawing expert system (the drawings of which Cohen
painted himself) to a painter system, a three dimensional knowledge base was added.
Many of its knowledge sets of points are derived from medical illustrations of the skeleton.
In order to achieve diﬀerent points of view, Aaron places its ﬁgures, after constructing
them and transforming them to the appropriate pose, in a three-dimensional world, and
then places its point of perspective (its eye) in the same world. Aaron speciﬁes its plans
at the highest level of abstraction, with the lower levels generating instances of such
plans. Its drawings and paintings have been exhibited publicly from as early as 1979.
The Painting fool [21] has been initially designed as an art project, as to work in real
time, adding strokes to a canvas one by one. Colton would like the Painting Fool to be
taken as an artist in its own right, rather than as a creativity simulation machine, and
has invested interest in what helps people perceive a work or process as more valuable
and creative than others. The works of the Painting Fool have received wide media
coverage, have been entered in exhibitions and competitions, and videos of the Painting
Fool at work can be found online2. Besides its ability to simulate various styles in
charcoal, acrylic, chalks and pencil, the Painting Fool has various artistic styles in its
knowledge base annotated based on emotion keywords. This enabled the system to
create a painting in a style corresponding to a given emotion. Such an emotion can also
be read as an input by a machine vision program from the face of a person. A further
mix with HR and an expansion based on an evolutionary approach enabled the Painting
Fool to produce scenes which have been optimized for ﬁtness functions created by HR,
the choices on what to optimize thus being made computationally as well.
Poetry systems [23] demonstrate an interesting use of structure (as templates), word
associations and similes. Thus content is generally mined from a corpus or from a
2www.thepaintingfool.com
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pre-established lexicon. Corpuses thus mined can be very large, like the 85 million
words parsed from the British National Corpus for the Electronic Text Composition
(ETC) poetry engine [14]. At a smaller scale than poetry systems, but still dealing with
linguistic creativity, systems exist producing compound similes [154] and producing and
validating neologisms [153]. The corpus used by the former is also used for poetry
generation in [23] - demonstrating re-use of resources in computational creativity.
BACON
BACON.3 [90] is a production system aimed at data-driven discovery of physical laws.
Named after the philosopher of science Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626), the system ap-
plies principles in the spirit of his beliefs. Bacon thought that when one has gathered
enough data, its regularities will leap out at the observer [90]. In a similar manner, BA-
CON.3 aims to see regularities in its data, and develop its observations based on these
regularities. According to his author, BACON.3 has rediscovered Kepler’s law of plan-
etary motion, the ideal gas law, Ohm and Coulomb’s laws, the pendulum and constant
acceleration laws of Galileo. It is important to observe that there is quantitative data
which can be given to the system as input data for these regularities to be observed,
until a law it is deduced.
Unlike its predecessor BACON.1 [89] and allegedly more succesful because of it, BA-
CON.3 doesn’t make a sharp distinction between data and hypotheses. BACON.3 allows
hypotheses which aim at explaining data to be used as data themselves, thus allowing
for diﬀerent levels of description. Thus regularities observed in description at one level
(which are equivalent to hypotheses) become descriptive clusters at a higher level. BA-
CON.3 containst 86 OPS2 [48] productions, with descriptive clusters being variable-value
pairs.
BACON.5 on the other hand [92] also implements a simple form of reasoning by anal-
ogy, in order to make the discovery of laws containing symmetric forms easier. With
BACON.5 the following laws were rediscovered: conservation of momentum, Snail’s law
of refraction, Joule’s formulation of conservation of energy and Black’s speciﬁc heat law.
Magic trick making
Williams and McOwen [167] use experimentally derived perceptual and cognitive data
together with mathematical principles in order to create and optimize magic tricks. Thus
they provide computational tools for magic trick making, or assistance with magic trick
making. Two case studies are approached in order to exemplify their methodology - a
magical jigsaw and a mind reading card eﬀect. Genetic algorithms are used to evolve
solutions which satisfy psychophysical constraints known from empirical literature, thus
optimizing the trick in order to make it more compelling for human perception. The
tricks so created are then evaluated in empirical settings and via public performances.
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2.4 Evaluation of human and computational creativity
One cannot talk about creativity without discussing the way creativity can be evaluated.
In the following, two views on evaluation of creativity will be explored. One deals
with evaluation of creativity in humans via empirical means, mainly through the use of
creativity tests (Section 2.4.1). The other describes recent work on constructing forms
of evaluation for computational creativity systems (Section 2.4.2).
2.4.1 Creativity testing in humans
Creativity is an inherently hard thing to measure in humans, as we have no complete
deﬁnitions of it. However, empirical tests for measuring creativity do exist. In the
following section, some of the most important such tests are presented, and what they
measure is discussed. These tests are:
1. The Alternative Uses Test (2.4.1.1)
2. The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) (2.4.1.2)
3. Riddles (2.4.1.3)
4. The Remote Associates Test (2.4.1.4)
5. Empirical Insight Tests (2.4.1.5)
2.4.1.1 The Alternative Uses Test
The Alternative Uses Test has been developed by J.P. Guilford [61], and it involves the
following procedure: participants are given an everyday object, and a certain amount of
time (generally a few minutes) to think of as many possible uses for that object as they
can come up with. Then the procedure is repeated with another object.
This test is assumed to measure divergent thinking (the ability to diverge from subjec-
tively familiar uses and think of other uses), and is normally graded across four diﬀerent
dimensions:
• Fluency - the number of uses the participant can come up with;
• Flexibility - the number of conceptual domains the answers relate to (for example
tools, accessories, musical instruments are diﬀerent domains);
• Originality - a measure of how uncommon the uses are, as compared to the uses
other participants came up with, or Novelty - measured through the assessment of
human judges;
• Elaboration - a measure of how detailed these answers are (though one can see
how there is a trade-oﬀ between Fluency - coming up with many diﬀerent uses -
and Elaboration - coming up with them fully formed).
This is a task no classical AI classical system has previously solved.
Chapter 2. State of the Art 21
How does this test inform us on what we need to do when constructing a creative AI
system? The test starts from the assumption that being able to use an object in more
than just its traditional setting is a creative matter. The term aﬀordance, coined by
Gibson [57] to represent action possibilities latent in the environment, has also been
deﬁned as a relationship between the properties of an object and the capabilities of the
agent that determine just how the object could possibly be used [117]. The creative skill
that is emphasized in the Alternative Uses Test is related to aﬀordance knowledge and
ability to infer new, original aﬀordance knowledge out of previous knowledge about the
objects, their features, and the world.
2.4.1.2 The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT)
This test is part of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) [146–150] and has
been developed by Ellis Paul Torrance (for a critical review see [80]). The TTCT has
two main components: TTCT-Verbal and TTCT-Figural.
Both TTCT-Verbal and TTCT-Figural have two parallel forms (A and B). The stimuli
for TTCT-Verbal are pictures to which people answer in writing in ﬁve diﬀerent types
of tasks: ask-and-guess, product improvement, unusual uses, unusual questions and just
suppose. TTCT-Figural consists of three diﬀerent types of tasks: picture construction,
picture completion and repeated ﬁgures (lines and circles). In the ﬁrst task, participants
are given a shape (looking like a pear or jellybean) as a stimulus and asked to construct
a picture which includes the shape. In the second task, a set of 10 incomplete ﬁgures
is given to the participants, which must make of it an object or a picture. In the third
task, the participants are given pages of lines or circles which they must us as part of
their picture.
One of the most interesting parts of this test is the incomplete ﬁgure test. This is not a
test of image completion in the Gestaltist sense, as the picture presented is never only
a few lines away from pattern completion, but rather requires quite a lot of elaboration
to be “completed”.
It is also not clear what the correlation between having a higher drawing skill and scoring
well at this test is, or whether part of the deployed creative intelligence does not also rely
on a mix of motor intelligence and drawing skill - like drawing something around the line,
then checking again what object could be constructed out of the current drawing, in a
much more interactive process than simply “seeing” with immediacy what bigger picture
the part could belong to. Obviously, the solution set is rather unconstrained in this test,
unlike in some creative or insight problems, where one has to navigate constraints to
ﬁnd a very unlikely but only possible solution, given the resources or objects at hand.
The TTCT is scored on ﬁve subscales:
• Fluency, representing the number of ideas produced;
• Originality, a statistical measure of infrequent or unique ideas;
• Elaboration, showing ability to develop or detail ideas;
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• Abstractness of titles, scale relying on the premise that creativity and abstractness
fo hand in hand and
• Resistance to premature closure, relying on the premise that creativity is linked
to personality traits of open-mindedness and cognitive traits of an ability to con-
sider large and various amounts and types of information before closing in on the
solution.
2.4.1.3 Riddles
Though no comprehensive set of riddles test exists, performance on riddles has been
used to study or enhance creative problem-solving skills [125, 164]. Answering riddles
correctly and even being informed of the answer to a riddle the solution of which eluded
the solver can trigger ﬂash of insight eﬀects.
Diﬀerent types of riddles exist, depending on the process and resources required to solve
them. One categorisation system splits them into two types - enigmas and conundra.
Enigmas are the riddles which are phrased in metaphorical or allegorical language, thus
requiring a form of what we could call metaphorical reverse-engineering from the part of
the solver. The conundra type of riddles involve word play - thus words that can have
double meaning.
Other types of riddle categorisation exist, however following the categorisation system
mentioned below, the riddles which we ﬁnd the most interesting and characteristic of
the riddle genre are the ones from the enigma category.
Some riddle examples are the following:
Ex. 1 - Poor people have it. Rich people need it. If you eat it you die. What is it?
(Answer: nothing)
Ex. 2 - A box without hinges, key or lid, yet golden treasure inside is hid. What is it?
(From Tolkien - The Hobbit; Answer: egg)
2.4.1.4 The Remote Associates Test
The Remote Associates Test [108] is a creativity test aimed to measure ability to use
associates to come up with an answer. The Remote Associates Test is administered as
follows: the participant receives three words, like manners, round and tennis, and is
required to come up with a forth word that connects with each of them. In this example,
a correct answer is Table, with the three connections being table manners, round
table and table tennis. The Remote Associates Test has been widely used in the
literature [3, 10, 33].
The test itself starts from the premise that association is used in creativity, and the
ability to make associates between remote concepts across wide domains shows a higher
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degree of creative ability. This test uses response times and percentage of queries solved
to measure performance of the solvers.
2.4.1.5 Empirical Insight tests
Various empirical insight tests exists. However, depending on the type of knowledge
they elicit, they can be split into various categories. Thus, a diﬀerentiation can be
made between mathematical insight problems, verbal insight problems, spatial insight
problems and practical object insight problems. In the following, we will give an example
of each in the ﬁrst three categories:
1. Mathematical insight problem
Which would be worth more, a pound of 10 dollar pure gold coins or half a pound of 20
dollar pure gold coins; or would they be worth the same? Explain your answer.
2. Spatial insight problem
Given ﬁg. 2.3, without lifting your pencil from the paper, show how you could join all
4 dots with 2 straight lines.
Figure 2.3: The four dots problem
3. Verbal insight problem
The legendary runner Flash Fleetfoot was so fast that his friends said he could turn oﬀ
the light switch and jump into bed before the room got dark. On one occasion Flash
proved he could do it. How?
The solutions for these are the following:
• 1. A pound of gold is worth more than half a pound.
• 2. Exit the imaginary space created by the for dots, like in ﬁg. 2.3
• 3. He went to bed during the day.
Figure 2.4: The four dots problem solved
Some such empirical insight problems can be called object problems or practical insight
problems, due to their use of objects and object aﬀordance in their formulation and
solving. Some such problems are the candle problem [36] and the two strings problem
[101]. These will be presented and discussed in Section 7.
When solving such problems with objects, human participants sometimes encounter
functional ﬁxedness [1, 4], that is a cognitive bias which limits the solver to only seeing
one particular traditional way of using an object. This generally prevents participants
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from using objects for atypical functions, and thus solving such insight problems. Func-
tional ﬁxedness has been shown to aﬀect solvers from technologically sparse cultures
as well [56]. Some authors compare ﬁxedness in approaching the problem with getting
stuck in a mental rut [141].
2.4.2 Creativity evaluation in computational creativity systems
Various attempts at and theories about assessing creativity in computational systems
exist. In the following, an overview of four such systems of evaluation is presented: (i)
Wiggins’s model of the universe of possibilities and transformational creativity (Section
2.4.2.1); (ii) Ritchie’s typicality criteria and the inspiring set (Section 2.4.2.2); (iii) pro-
cess, novelty and quality based evaluation in the work of Pease, Winterstein and Colton
(Section 2.4.2.3) and (iv) the FACE and IDEA descriptive models (Section 2.4.2.4).
2.4.2.1 Wiggins’s model of the universe of possibilities and transformational
creativity
Wiggins [166] proposes a model for the description, analysis and comparison of creative
systems, starting to formalize Boden’s descriptive hierarchy of creative processes. In
this process, he deﬁnes the notions of creative system, creative behaviour, novelty and
value. These terms are deﬁned in his work as follows:
- Creative system – A collection of processes, natural or automatic, which are
capable of achieving or simulating behaviour which in humans would be deemed
creative.
- Creative behaviour – One or more of the behaviours exhibited by a creative
system.
- Novelty – The property of an artefact (abstract or concrete) that is the output of
a creative system which arises from prior non-existence of like or identical artefacts
in the context in which the artefact is produced.
- Value - The property of an artefact (abstract or concrete) that is the output of a
creative system which renders it desirable in the context in which it is produced.
This deﬁnition of the creative system aims to circumvent the fact that humans are
considered capable of creativity, while machines performing similar feats might encounter
critics. This is due to the fact that it is easier to understand creative processes when
these have been computationally implemented, and some of the computational creativity
critics might view such processes as less creative if they are easier to understand than
in humans.
Wiggins’s deﬁnition of Novelty can be seen as one of process. Thus the creative system
which produces an artefact is supposed to produce it in a context in which no identical
or “like” artefacts are produced. The “like” part is hard to assess in this context - is it
supposed to mean identity or similarity? If it means similarity, of what kind and what
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degree? Similar but varied artefacts might in some cases be an exhibit creativity in
themselves - like theme and variations forms in music.
Wiggins’s notion of Value adds a socio-economical component to creative products. This
deﬁnition of Value can be compared to a deﬁnition of Usefulness in the context of creative
problem solving.
After deﬁning this terminology, Wiggins proceeds to deﬁne a universe of possibilities
as U which contains all possible non-identical concepts. This universe of concepts is
multidimensional, and contains both concrete and abstract concepts. Wiggins aims his
proposal of U to be compatible to a state-space interpretation. Thus Boden’s conceptual
spaces are deﬁned as C , non-strict subsets of U . No C can be equal to U as this would
make transformational creativity unnecessary. Wiggins then deﬁnes R as the set of rules
which constrains the space, and T as the set of rules which allows for the traversal of
this space (i.e. a search strategy). Thus R represents the type of artefact to be created,
while T is the way in which an artifact is produced by an agent.
Wiggins further deﬁnes E as a set of rules which allows evaluation. While not deﬁning
the work of E , Wiggins then characterizes exploratory and transformational systems
under this notation. Furthermore, he introduces the idea of unreachable concepts. Thus
given C , a concept c ∈ C might be unreachable - depending on the traversal strategy
T which is being used. In Wiggins’s account, traversal strategies are thus dependent on
the properties of a given creator. A discussion on changing the traversal strategy itself
(T to T ′) prompts the author to consider Boden’s boundary between exploratory and
transformational creativity as ill-deﬁned. The author then proposes as interesting for
future work the changes that happen in the rules of evaluation (E ), which might lead
to adopting diﬀerent constraints for artefacts (R), and then oﬀers a new deﬁnition of
transformational creativity as acting at the meta-level of representation.
Wiggins then uses this theoretical framework to propose how implementations and their
properties could be described (and in a sense evaluated).
2.4.2.2 Ritchie’s typicality criteria and the inspiring set
Ritchie proposed a way of assessing creativity which takes into account the inspiring
set [126]. An inspiring set is for Ritchie the union of explicit and implicit knowledge.
Ritchie proposes fourteen criteria of assessing creativity, mainly in terms of typicality,
quality and novelty. These are further implemented in the evaluation of a poem generator
(Wasp), a conceptual blender (Divago) and a sentence paraphraser (Dupond) by Pereira
et al. [123].
Ritchie’s criteria are the following:
1. Average typicality
2. The ratio of typical results to all results
3. Average quality
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4. The ratio of good results to all results
5. The ratio of good typical results to all results
6. The ratio of good atypical results to all results
7. The ratio of good atypical results to atypical results
8. The ratio of good atypical results to good typical results
9. The ratio of results in the inspiring set to the inspiring set
10. The ratio of all results to the results in the inspiring set
11. Average typicality of new results
12. Average quality of new results
13. The ratio of typical new results to new results
14. The ratio of good results to results
2.4.2.3 Process, novelty and quality based evaluation - Pease, Winterstein
and Colton
Pease, Winterstein and Colton [122] propose an evaluation of creativity which takes into
account the input, output and process by which the output is achieved by the creative
system. Using Ritchie’s deﬁnition of an inspiring set, Pease et al. propose methods
for creativity evaluation. These methods are related to novelty, quality and process.
Diﬀerent types of novelty are considered, and measures proposed to deal with them:
- Novelty relative to a body of knowledge (e.g. a concept space) - a transformation
measure is proposed
- Novelty relative to complexity - a complexity measure is proposed
- Novelty relative to an archetype - an archetypal measure is proposed
- Novelty as surprise - a surprise measure is proposed
- Perceived novelty - a perceived novelty measure is proposed
The following types of quality factors and measures are proposed:
- Quality relative to emotional response - an emotional response measure is pro-
posed, depending on intensity and type of such a response
- Quality relative to aim - a pragmatic measure is proposed
In terms of process, a measure of randomness is proposed. Evaluation in general is
considered to be bipartite by Pease, Winterstein and Colton [122]. They posit that part
of the evaluation should deal with the created artefact, while part should deal with the
process of creating the artefact. Thus, they propose an evaluation of item measure and
an evaluation of process measure.
2.4.2.4 The FACE and IDEA descriptive models
The FACE and IDEA descriptive models where introduced by Colton, Charnley and
Pease [24] as a computational creativity analogue for computational learning theory in
machine learning. The FACE model describes creative acts as tuples of generative acts,
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while the IDEA model describes the impact of creative acts. These models are aimed
at describing software, with no claims that they might have value in describing human
behaviour.
Under FACE, creative acts are described as a non-empty set tuple of generative acts,
which contain exactly zero or one instance of eight types of such acts. Considering that
(i) a concept is an executable program which can take input and produce output; (ii)
an expression of a concept is an instance of an input-output pair which results from
executing a concept’s program; (iii) an aesthetic measure is a function of a concept-
expression pair which outputs a real value between 0 and inﬁnity and (iv) framing
information is natural language text which adds value to a generative act, the eight
types of generative acts are:
1. Eg - an expression of a concept;
2. Ep - a method for generating expressions of a concept;
3. Cg - a concept;
4. Cp - a method for generating concepts;
5. Ag - an aesthetic measure;
6. Ap - a method for generating aesthetic measures;
7. F g - an item of framing information and
8. F p - a method for generating framing information.
The g and p superscripts deﬁne ground and process level acts, thus 〈F g, Ag, Cg, Eg〉
denotes a creative act described by a 4-tuple of generative acts.
Colton, Charnley and Pease propose to use the FACE model in a variety of ways. A
quantitative way to use it might be to compare the volume of creative acts between
creative systems. A cumulative way might evaluate creative acts which produce an
aesthetic and framing as more creative than the ones which only produce concepts and
expressions. A comparative way would include orderings in which taking some generative
act is seen as more creative than another, etc.
The IDEA model replaces the notion of value of solutions with that of impact of cre-
ations made by a computational creativity system. The IDEA model stands for an
(I)terative (D)evelopment-(E)xecution-(A)ppreciation cycle, which includes the steps of
engineering the system and its exposure to an ideal audience. Six stages of development
are suggested, depending on the diﬀerence between the knowledge information given to
the system and the artefacts it generates, and using two thresholds - a lower threshold
which denotes too much similarity between given examples and generated artefacts, and
an upper bound threshold which denotes too high dissimilarity which makes assessment
impossible because of too little context. These stages are: (i) Developmental stage; (ii)
Fine-tuned stage; (iii) Re-invention stage; (iv) Discovery stage; (v) Disruption stage and
(vi) Disorientation stage.
Using a human assessment based on well-being (indicating liking or disliking) and cog-
nitive eﬀort, the IDEA model describes measures of disgust, divisiveness, indiﬀerence,
popularity and provocation for the human assessment stage, followed by measures of the
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impact of the creative acts based on provocation. These measures aimed to assess types
of impact like: acquired taste, instant appeal, opinion splitting, opinion forming, shock,
subversion and triviality. Thus the model deﬁnes impact as any other measure achieved
than triviality.
These FACE and IDEA models were used by the authors to exemplify a comparison of
mathematical invention and visual art computational creativity systems (like AM [94],
HR [20], AARON [19], the Painting Fool [21], NEvAR [99]) and later used to build a
poetry-based generation system which can be evaluated using all the FACE metrics [23].
2.5 Discussion
In light of the previously presented literature, various points seem of major importance
when aiming to study, model or implement creative problem solving:
(a) Elaborating the deﬁnition of problem solving as to include creative problem solving
processes;
(b) Developing uniﬁed cognitive frameworks, in which various diﬀerent types of cre-
ative problem solving tasks can be analysed;
(c) The ability to implement types of knowledge representation which enable creative
processes similar to those of humans, like association and restructuring;
(d) From a methodological perspective, the ability to evaluate artiﬁcial creative prob-
lem solving systems using comparable tools to those used to evaluate creativity in
human cognition.
As seen in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, creativity and problem solving are often addressed
separately in the cognitive and artiﬁcial intelligence literature. The classical (AI) deﬁni-
tion of problem solving needs to be updated in order to be able to include the cognitive
processes of creativity, and explain the phenomena of insightful problem solving de-
scribed in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4. As most problems in the world are ill-structured, a
wider deﬁnition of problem solving should include the ill-structured to well-structured
step before proceeding to accounts of the classical problem-solving steps.
Because of the interplay between knowledge organization and process explained in Sec-
tion 2.2, both knowledge representation and process have to be tackled together in an
account of creative problem solving. As the ﬁeld of computationally creative systems
has started gaining considerable traction (Section 2.3), an uniﬁed cognitive theoretical
framework should allow the possibility of building systems in which various diﬀerent
types of creative problem-solving tasks, like the ones in Section 2.4.1, can be studied.
Moreover, such a uniﬁed view should include the ability to study creative problem solv-
ing in a variety of modalities, as to include manifestations of visuospatial intelligence
and creativity, because of the reasons described in Section 2.1.5.
A cognitive systems implementation of such knowledge organization and creative process
has to also take into consideration the various types of process which seem relevant
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to creative cognition - including association, use of structure and similarity, and re-
representation, as shown in Section 2.2.
Diﬀerent types of evaluation are currently deployed for computational creativity sys-
tems and human participants in creativity tests, as shown in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2
respectively. An approach aiming to be of use to both AI and cognitive empirical studies
would need to implement a type of evaluation closer to human creativity evaluation for
the cognitive systems it yields, but to which computational creativity types of evaluation
might still be relevant.
Chapter 3
A Theoretical Framework for
Cognitive Creative Problem
Solving
Because of the importance knowledge representation, structure and restructuring and
re-representation seem to have on creative problem solving, it is worth taking another
look at the classical deﬁnition of problem solving and aiming to improve it as to include
creative processes. Section 3.1 will focus on reﬁning the deﬁnition of classical problem
solving, as to allow for ill-structured problems and thus for creative problem solving.
A framework in which creative problem solving can be studied in an interdisciplinary
manner will have to take the following factors into account:
• be a uniﬁed framework [115], aiming to account for a diverse group of creative
problem-solving tasks;
• aim to account for creative problem solving in a multi-modal manner - thus having
explanatory processes for stimuli that are visuospatial as well as linguistic;
• be based on a limited small set of processes, for which some cognitive translatability
can be assumed; such processes should involve association, similarity, ability to
structure and restructure the problem space;
• give comparable results to human answers in empirical creativity tests as to allow
further development of hypotheses about creative process and
• provide results which can be assessed in terms of computational creativity frame-
works.
A set of possible desiderata for such a framework is put together in Section 3.2. This leads
to an analogy between a mechanism made of simple machines and the components of a
knowledge base during the creative problem-solving processes.A framework of knowledge
organization which allows restructuring and re-representation processes of both search
and construction is described theoretically in Section 3.3. The implementation of the
processes from 3.2 is then explained theoretically in the context of the framework in
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Section 3.4 (while more formal concerns regarding these processes will be reﬁned in the
Section 4). A short discussion over the use of space and structure in this framework
concludes this chapter in 3.5.
3.1 Reﬁning the deﬁnition of creative problem solving
The classical deﬁnition of problem solving presupposes an orderly initial state. Perhaps
this is a reﬂection of a well-structured problem, or perhaps this misses the initial step of
“structuring” the problem - which happens in the mind of the programmer or problem-
solver. Thus, this initial state already contains all the objects, be it abstract or concrete,
necessary to solve the problem.
A revised version of problem solving which includes creative processes, used in creative
problem solving and the tackling of ill-structured problems could include:
- An initial set of features;
- An initial set of representations in the knowledge base of the solver;
- Interpretation steps act upon the set of features, translating them into represen-
tations of what the objects are, what the salient elements are, what the problem
is. Such steps are a form of structuring the problem which aims to bridge the gap
between an ill-structured problem and a well-structured problem, most likely using
structured knowledge (and ways of structuring) present in the knowledge base of
the solver;
- This yields an initial state, with aﬀerent operators and paths (which depend on
the operators known or strongly associated by the problem-solver to those repre-
sentations);
- The next steps are applied as in classical problem solving. If the process is not
successful: a) restart at the interpretation step (re-represent features, objects,
what the problem is) or b) change currently held representations or c) bring new
features in.
3.2 Reﬁning desirata for a uniﬁed theoretical framework
for creative problem solving
This section will tackle a set of diverse problems and processes that a uniﬁed creative
problem-solving framework could aim to solve. The processes described in this section
include: visuospatial inference (3.2.1), creative use of aﬀordance (3.2.2), concept gener-
ation and structure transfer (3.2.3), insight and re-representation (3.2.4). Visuospatial
inference, while not a creative mechanism by itself, can support creativity; thus it will
be described in its compositional and creative forms here, and used as an example to
explain restructuring at the higher creative problem-solving levels.
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3.2.1 Visuospatial inference
Visuospatial inference has been previously analysed by Sloman [139] as a rational (but
not necessarily logical) process of inference often performed by human beings. One of
Sloman’s examples depicts a mechanism of pulleys and levers. A human looking at the
example in Fig. 3.1 (a) and knowing where the motion is initiated in the system can infer
the way the system will move and what type of motion the end tip of the right lever will
perform. As shown in Fig. 3.1 (b), in this case the right side of the right lever will move
downwards. Humans are thus equipped with a variety of inference-making sensory-based
processes. These processes are not propositional or “logical” in nature, but come from
the sensorial experience humans have with their environment, from previously observed
and encoded features of various natural or human made “objects”, and their motion.
Figure 3.1: The original pulley and levers example by Sloman
What would an artiﬁcial cognitive system take to solve Sloman’s example? A system able
to tackle such a domain will need to know types of motion for a variety of objects (in this
case levers and pulleys), then be able to assemble or transfer such motion compositionally
to the level of the mechanism. At the creative level, such a machine should be able to ﬁll
in various parts of the mechanism when they are missing, or create its own mechanisms
when a certain type of motion is required (this is essential for insight problems situated
in the physical domain, such as the Two Strings problem - Fig. 7.3, which require
knowledge about motion and maybe its mental simulation). Moreover, this type of
inference is of use for creativity cases where visuospatial inspiration is integrated into a
diﬀerent domain, or the problem is synthesized in an abstract form into a visuospatial
problem. Also, this type of problem will be used as an analogy in our proposed framework
for solving insight problems, in a manner which will be explained in section 3.2.4.
3.2.2 Creative use of aﬀordance
Problems of creative use of aﬀordance1 can be easily explained in the physical domain
as object problems in which an agent requires a speciﬁc tool or set of objects to solve
1For more on the concept of aﬀordances see Gibson [57].
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a speciﬁc problem, but one of these objects is not given in its environment - e.g. an
agent needs a cup to pour water in, but there is no cup available. In this case, humans
can ﬁnd other objects with similar properties which can solve the problem, because they
have a similar aﬀordance. In the missing cup example, a bowl, pot, or even boot can be
used by a human, depending on how desperate the circumstances are.
At an abstract level, creative use of aﬀordance reﬂects the ability of using diﬀerent
concepts when some are not available or have somehow failed short (e.g. in mathematics:
use of diﬀerent proofs, constructs or concepts; in literature: use of diﬀerent words, parts
of plot development, narrative style; in research: use of diﬀerent experimental tools and
tests).
Creative use of aﬀordance in the physical domain (objects) can also be seen as the same
ability which is tested empirically by the Alternative Uses Test (previously described in
2.4.1.1). In consequence, introducing creative use of aﬀordance in a creative problem-
solving framework is useful because: (i) artiﬁcial systems implementing creative use of
aﬀordance can be evaluated comparatively to humans, and (ii) hypotheses about how
creative use of aﬀordance works in humans can be implemented in models and falsiﬁed
via computational experimentation.
3.2.3 Concept generation and structure transfer
Various theories have been proposed for concept formation: prototype theory [128], ex-
emplar theory [106], theory theory [111]. The issue of concept formation is connected
to, but not entirely overlapping the process of creative concept generation. Concept
discovery [34], concept combination [2] and concept blending [41] are themes of impor-
tance in both cognitive science and computational creativity. The ability to generate
new concepts out of new observations or old knowledge is thus another creative ability
which a uniﬁed framework should aim to implement. This is not identical with concept
blending [41], which can be considered a special case of concept generation.
Various ways of generating concepts can be envisaged, however we will focus on only
a couple of interesting processes which, if implemented by a framework, would prove
headway in the direction of concept generation. The processes which we will focus on
are: a) the use of visual templates and b) concept generation via overlap and synthesis.
a) Consider the case of an instance of the object chain (depicted in Fig. 3.2), in which
a cognitive agent observing or representing this instance is able to understand its ele-
mentary components (the loops) and the relationship between them (a speciﬁc type of
connectedness). Let’s say two other objects are known, which have similar features with
the elementary components of the chain, a scissor (part of its handle is loop like) and
a piece of string (because its property of being easily twisted, a string can become a
loop). Then a creative cognitive system should be able to transfer the speciﬁc template
of connectedness and realize it with the two new objects.
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Figure 3.2: An instance of a chain representation used as a structuring template
b) Consider a case in which a bigger than relationship is observed over the same object
domain twice - Fig. 3.3 a) and b). A new concept, that of growth could be derived if the
representations of those instances are overlapped and reinterpreted as in 3.3 c) . The
template of this process (the relationships and essential features) can be separated from
the non-essential (the object themselves), and transferred to a new set of objects 3.4,
where it can be used to recognize the same relationship or order those objects (productive
use). Then, a synthesis of the growth concept can be re-represented graphically like in
3.4 c).
Figure 3.3: Inference of a new relationship growth in c) via overlap of bigger-than
instances a) and b)
As mentioned previously, these are but a part of the concept generation mechanisms a
creative cognitive system should be able to perform, and more of them will be discussed
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Figure 3.4: a) to b) Adaptation of the growth template to a new domain;
c) synthesis via compression to deﬁning features
in 3.4.3.
As for the process of structure transfer, some of it is already observable in the cases ex-
plored above. However, a uniﬁed framework for creative problem solving should provide
types of knowledge organization and processes which support ampler cases of structure
transfer. This is necessary to account for the already studied processes of analogy [54],
and also to enable the ability of transferring known problem templates to new problem
spaces and the use of elements of such problem templates to create new templates. These
abilities are necessary in order for creative problem solving to occur.
3.2.4 Insight and re-representation
Insight is based around the restructuring and re-representation of a speciﬁc problem.
Such restructuring makes the problem center on diﬀerent features, and helps solvers
look at it with a diﬀerent mental toolset. This makes structured representations and the
ability to restructure them essential to the pursuit of modeling creative problem solving
and insight in artiﬁcial cognitive systems.
In the following, a way of looking at insight and re-representation is proposed, based on
an analogy with the simple machines example shown in Section 3.2.1. This “clockwork”
principle represents a core aspect of the theoretical framework we propose.
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In the simple machines example, a system which can compositionally solve the motion
inference over a set of connected simple machines was imagined; this system could ﬁll
in a particular missing piece through knowledge of the components and their motion
(where also multiple solutions can be applied). The simple machine elements in this
example can be replaced with concepts. The motion ability of the simple machines can
be replaced with concept aﬀordances. Then various combinations of such machines can
be thought of as problem templates used to achieve a particular end action.
Sometimes parts of such a system of simple machines are present, and parts need to
be ﬁlled in. This can be seen as knowing some elements of a problem, and needing to
bring forth diﬀerent concepts and their functionality to obtain the desired aﬀordance,
or end result. Not all the known or given elements are useful, nor their actual right
combination is initially known2.
However, some elements need to be used in some problems, corresponding to the ﬁxed
points in a simple machine mechanism. Multiple diﬀerent strands of known concepts
can be organized around the ﬁxed points. The ﬁxed points can be looked at as being
a possible part of multiple mechanisms. The ability to restructure knowledge and one‘s
problem space is equivalent to the ability to navigate between these compositional pos-
sibilities. Insight is the moment in which all the elements fall into place, allowing the
motion to be passed across the entire mechanism freely.
Simple machines can bind together when the motion of a machine can be carried on by
the other (a locking point). Similarly, concepts can bind together when some of their
features are similar. Simple machines can be replaced by other machines or groups of
machines which aﬀord a similar type of motion. Similarly, concepts can be searched for
and replaced by other concepts with which they share features
This allows us to think of insight and creative problem solving in a piece-wise fashion.
As we will see further, various ﬁxed points in the machine can organize their motion in-
ference (or aﬀordance inference) strands in parallel, with the insight being obtained via
a convergence moment of the diﬀerent strands of motion (or aﬀordance inference). Vari-
ous types of re-representation are possible (making/constructing parts of the mechanism
out of diﬀerent representational cogs or simple machines).
The cog to clockwork inspiration has warranted this framework the name CreaCogs. The
name stands for Creative Re-Representation using Aﬀordances in Cognitive Systems3.
However it can also stand for Creative Cogs, Creative Cognition, Creative Cognitive
Systems, etc. Notice how this principle actually is a small depiction of the principle of
re-representation - a set of features can be represented and interpreted in multiple ways,
each triggering their own associated meaning.
2 Functional ﬁxedness in this analogy is the act of assembling such concepts in a way which is most
comfortable and comes automatically to the mechanism assembler or clockmaker.
3Abbreviation CReACogS could have been used but its spelling has been deemed too cumbersome.
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3.3 The Framework: CreaCogs
The theoretical framework proposed here is based on a way of encoding knowledge
which permits processes of fast and informed search and construction for the purposes
of creative problem solving. These processes take place conceptually at three levels,
which are visually depicted in Fig: 3.5. The purpose of these three levels and their
interplay is explained in a theoretical manner, starting from the bottom level, in the
following sections: L1 - Feature spaces; L2 - Concepts; L3 - Problem templates.
L1 Feature spaces
The ﬁrst level is the subsymbolic level of feature maps or feature spaces. Whenever
an object is observed, its various known sensory properties, together with its observed
actions (or actions the agent can perform towards it) are encoded in the various feature
spaces of the framework. Thus, visuospatial properties like shape or color will be encoded
in diﬀerent feature maps, motion in another feature map, etc. Each observed or retrieved
object (or concept in its more general form) will be an activation over these distributed
feature maps. This expresses a way of tackling the grounding problem in line with
cognitive grounding theories [6, 7].
Figure 3.5: A visual depiction of the theoretical framework
Such grounding doesn’t only aﬀect the way concepts are stored/retrieved, but turns to
have important uses for the creativity domain. This is due to the encoding of various
feature maps in an organized fashion, according to a distance metric relevant to the
space in question (e.g. color similarity, shape similarity).
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L2 Concepts
The various known concepts are thus grounded in a distributed fashion in organized
feature spaces, and represent the second level of this theoretical framework. This allows
concepts with similar properties to have common or close points encoded across various
feature maps, thus making concepts similar on diverse properties accessible to search.
The name of the concepts is encoded in a diﬀerent semantic tag map, thus functionally
constituting another feature. This is reasonable as ability to name objects can be lost
(anomic phasia - word selection anomia) independently of the ability to comprehend
objects and concepts. With the semantic tag being only a feature, not the entire concept,
encoding meaning more than encoding concept names and concept meaning can be
recalled independent of name recall.
Thus a concept’s meaning is the collection of features, facts, actions and relations over
which that concept has been encoded. A concept can be fully identiﬁed or recalled not
only by name, but also by other sensory properties (the way it looks, moves, etc.), if
these are uniquely pointing to that concept, or with a subset of such features, when the
name is unknown. Concepts do not need a name to exist in the mind that beholds them
(though obviously that can impede their communication), and it is posited that some
problem templates also behave like concepts over time (when they are used multiple
times, compressed or named).
L3 Problem Templates
The third level of the framework is constituted by problem templates. These are known
ways of solving problems which contain diverse objects. They are structured representa-
tions which are encoded over multiple concepts, their relations, and the aﬀordance the
problem template provides. A concept can be connected in various templates, where
diﬀerent parts of its features are emphasized, or become functional. As shown in Fig.
3.6, a hammer encoded in a problem template with a walnut will have its aﬀordance
to break things emphasized, while when in conjunction with a nail, it will display a
fastening aﬀordance at the level of the problem template.
Figure 3.6: Concept in multiple problem template contexts in CreaCogs
The knowledge organization employed in CreaCogs has multiple advantages for the kind
of processes required in creative problem solving, including:
a) grounding downwards ; concepts are grounded in feature maps, while problem tem-
plates are grounded in concepts. This allows easy search and substitution of missing
parts. If a needed object is missing, a similar object can be found by looking downwards
Chapter 3. Theoretical framework 39
in the knowledge base or comparing needed features with the objects present in the
environment. This allows the agent to use a shoe when a hammer is not present (the
shoe has a similar weight, a solid sole which aﬀords hitting with similarly to the head of
a hammer, and a part which can be grasped).
b) anchoring upwards in context; concepts gain diﬀerent meaning (and hold diﬀerent
relational roles) through the various templates they participate in.
c) re-use of structure (or structure transfer) because of structure and content being kept
separately, but in relationship. The structure of a template can be used to recruit new
concepts. The structure of a concept can be used to recruit new features.
d) use of sensory experiences as structuring elements. Thus the features of a visuospatial
symbol representation (e.g. the Ouroboros snake) can be ampliﬁed into a problem
template and replaced with other conceptual elements (e.g. the elements of the benzene
molecule).
Besides the structuring and restructuring functionality, CreaCogs allows for creation
of new relations, concepts and templates via diﬀerent forms of overlap. Some of these
are residual, and can be viewed as generalizations over multiple correlations. As an
example, some features can be associated across multiple concepts (as some concepts
can be associated across multiple problem templates). If a feature to feature overlap
happens across multiple concepts, it can be strengthened and leave residual eﬀects on
the knowledge base, which trigger interesting ways of perceiving meaning. For example,
the colour RED is sometimes perceived as being somehow related to speed and violence
or ﬁre and energy - which allows further speculation of feature use and meaning creation
in the arts.
The next section explains theoretically how the previously mentioned desirable processes
can be encoded and solved in such a theoretical framework. A formalization is provided
in Chapter 4.
3.4 Theoretical explanation of processes
In Section 3.2 some processes were set forward as desiderata from a uniﬁed creative
framework. The way these can be theoretically deployed in CreaCogs is explained in
this section as follows: visuospatial inference (3.4.1); creative use of aﬀordance (3.4.2);
concept generation and structure transfer (3.4.3); insight and re-representation (3.4.4).
3.4.1 Visuospatial inference in CreaCogs
a) Single case Visuospatial inference of one object involves activating the knowledge
of that object, and simulating the speciﬁc previously encoded motor aﬀordance. Thus,
with a lever, two motor inferences can be encoded - when the lever is pushed down or
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on the left side, or pulled up on the left side, the eﬀect of the resulting motion being to
place the right side of the lever up or down respectively.
If the visual features of a lever have been observed in the environment, and have previ-
ously been encoded in the agent’s knowledge base together with the concept of a lever,
and knowledge about the start of motion is given, the system can then deploy one of
the two motion simulation routines attached to that object or concept to simulate and
anticipate the result of that motion.
b) Compositional case In the case in which a mechanism is being observed, the system
can deploy the same type of knowledge compositionally. Thus the motion inference
made on the ﬁrst object will then be propagated into the motion beginning pattern of
the second object. This can be applied to compositional cases of multiple objects. The
agent can then simulate and follow the motion as it propagates through the system4
until the last inference has been made about the exit motion (motion at the end of the
last part of the mechanism). In Fig. 3.7, the disambiguation of a problem containing
two cogs via repeated reference to and substitution with knowledge from the cog concept
is presented visually. Here, an initial problem (PT level- up left) inquires about the end
motion in a mechanism made of two cogs, given the an initial upward motion. The ﬁrst
of the two cogs is matched to the conceptual representation of a cog and the motion
aﬀordance known to be produced by the initial upward motion from the left of the cog
(C level - down left). This is used to elaborate the representation of the mechanism (PT
level - up right, ﬁrst three slots). The inference made about the motion of the ﬁrst cog
is then used to ﬁnd the aﬀerent motion aﬀordance of the second cog at the conceptual
level (C level - down right). Once this has been located, the problem representation is
elaborated again and the end motion is inferred (PT level - up right slots 4-6).
Figure 3.7: Compositional visuospatial inference in CreaCogs
c) Creative case In the case in which a mechanism needs to be reconstructed, with vari-
ous stable points (ﬁxed machines) and a certain type of motion ﬂow expected, the piece-
wise knowledge about the elements and previous experience with mechanisms (which
can be encoded as problem templates) can be used to construct the mechanism. This
can be done in multiple ways, via inference, template or property guided search, trial
and error, ﬁlling in previously known templates, using replacement parts or equivalent
sub-mechanisms until these sub-parts ﬁt to allow for the expected end motion, etc.
4This is a non-parallel, no-interference case. That is to say, in this case motion is assumed to ﬂow on
one strand, not on multiple parallel strands (possibly by having the initial object connected to multiple
diﬀerent objects).
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This can be depicted both symbolically and subsymbolically, however as we do not have
precise symbolic terms about motion, a subsymbolic implementation will probably be
more expressive and direct (also a more accurate depiction of natural cognitive systems).
The example discussed here talks about visuospatial motion inference in a restricted
domain, where only knowledge about simple machines or mechanisms can be used. This
has been done here to simplify matters and showcase the inferential process theoretically.
However, in the next cases, it is to be generalized that a suitable aﬀordance will be
searched across all types of known similar (or similarly aﬀording5) motion patterns.
3.4.2 Creative use of aﬀordance in CreaCogs
Creative use of aﬀordance can be deployed in various ways in CreaCogs. These are
described here in the context of concepts, and then applied to problem template use in
3.4.4.
Because in CreaCogs each object is represented as a distributed encoding in organized
feature maps, various types of search can be performed to ﬁnd replacement objects in
case an object is not available. Some of these are the following:
a) The aﬀordance of each object can be used to link back to other objects that have
been encoded over the same aﬀordance.
b) If no other object is encoded with the same aﬀordance, objects with a similar aﬀor-
dance can be found (nearby similarity search on aﬀordance).
If no object with same or similar explicit aﬀordance is found, the search can be focused
on other properties of the object which enable that aﬀordance (properties connected
with the aﬀordance in the concept itself are just a start, some properties might be
highly connected with the aﬀordance over multiple other examples). Thus, a functional
property or set of functional properties (which enable the aﬀordance) can be found.
Once this has been found, one can then navigate the space of known objects (or objects
at hand, present in the environment):
c) which are anchored in conjunction of the functional property;
d) which are anchored close to that functional property.
3.4.3 Concept generation and Structure transfer in CreaCogs
Multiple ways of doing concept generation and structure transfer are available in the
CreaCogs framework. These involve an interplay which can be both amodal or multi-
modal, between the various parts of the system - concept to concept, feature to concept,
template to concept (and vice versa). Here we will describe just a few to showcase this
diversity, and proceed to lay down more formal concepts for these mechanisms in Ch.4.
5That have a similar end result.
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Diversiﬁcation A concept can become a template by reﬁning its parts - i.e. a stone
which is used for smashing things or driving wedges through things has an inherent
handle within its body. When this handle is diﬀerentiated as a speciﬁc part, built and
optimized for the grasping aﬀordance, we get a hammer.
This allows not only expansion of a feature to a concept, a concept to a more complex
concept or to a template, but also permits overlapping transfers (of features or structure)
upwards from a feature into a concept, and from a concept into a complex concept or
template.
Concept to concept overlap Sometimes concepts overlap on certain features. Such
overlaps allow or can trigger composition and feature exchange. The concept sea has a
feature which involves liquid, and so does the concept juice. A creative concept obtained
via their overlap would be a sea of juice - which is probably something children have
thought about with pleasure before. Overlapping sea with another concept with ﬂuid
properties, blood, we obtain sea of blood, but also sea water in its blood - depending on
which concept we use as a container template. More complex templates could be sea in
the blood, sea waving through its veins, etc.
Some of these overlaps might seem like poetic license, while others are well established in
our spoken culture, like pitch black, a concept which could have been generated because
of the feature black being so characteristic for pitch.
Such a type of concept generation via overlap can be observed over a variety of features,
including type of motion, and sometimes involving deep conceptual structures - e.g.
the concept meme, which is meant to describe something that spreads in the world by
moving like a virus but is actually an idea. The movement of ideas in this case must
have seemed similar to that of a virus to R. Dawkins [32] who coined the concept.
Some overlaps can come from previously unnamed correlations of features, previously
unnamed concepts. As a concept is a correlation of features, it makes sense that further
correlations will allow the generation of further concepts. Some of these overlaps are
seemingly semantically unrelated previous to the overlap, however the CreaCogs frame-
work allows for overlap via features to trigger these possible constructions, as well as
overlap via concepts.
Using structure from a diﬀerent concept Some concepts come with their own set
of relations and structure. One can use this set of relations to create a new concept as
well. Take the following examples:
Ex.1 - chain The loops of the chain where sparkling. A chain of shops opened across
town (deployment of the same structure over space). Something triggered this chain of
events (deployment of the same structure over time).
Ex.2 - stores The warehouse stored various objects. The day stored various surprises
for him.
Ex.3 - shines The sun shines over the people today. The luck shined over him wherever
he went (omnipresence implies structure has been taken from the sun concept).
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Ex.4 - ﬂight The eagle ﬂew over the valley. The wooden log ﬂew from her hand in
the direction of the animal. His hands ﬂew over the keyboard. He had a ﬂight of fancy
over the events of the last few days.
In this case, the objects put in the template are made to play a diﬀerent role, depending
on the structure of the previous concept or template which they ﬁll in.
It is reasonable to think that such transfer has initially been done via overlapping fea-
tures - i.e. like in Fig. 3.2, were the chaining template can obviously be applied to
objects with similar properties - e.g. a loop of string and the eye of a scissor, which due
to their elliptical structure and the bend-ability of the string can allow for the similar
physical relation of chaining. After many transfers of such a template or relationship,
the template itself becomes strong enough (and perhaps abstract enough) to allow as-
sociation to and ﬁll in by diﬀerent and sometimes more abstract objects and domains,
which do not need to manifest such resemblances, but rather inherit features from the
template when put in it.
Synthesis Concepts can sometimes be re-compressed via their representative features,
as problem templates can be re-compressed by being named as concepts. This was
exempliﬁed in Fig. 3.4 c).
This allows not only the shrinkage of a template to its essential features (like reducing
the Tower of Hanoi problem to a movement heuristic which is required to solve it), or
to a concept (e.g. velocity), or of a concept to its essential features, but also permits
overlapping transfers (of features or structure) downwards from a template into a con-
cept, and from a concept into a feature space. This allows complex concepts, like the
one of the benzene molecule to be compared to visuospatial features, like the Ouroboros
symbol.
Synthesis thus allows further anchoring (grounding) and further productive connections
with other elements of the knowledge base.
3.4.4 Re-representation through search and construction in CreaCogs
Re-representation can happen in two main ways in CreaCogs - creative substitution of
problem template (or subparts of it), and generation of a new problem template (or
subparts of it). These, in their higher forms of deployment, are proposed to roughly
correspond to re-representation in insight and discovery (when a new useful template is
found) and creative innovation (creativity dominated by construction processes). Such
high-level cognitive feats can be seen as applying the processes described above - of
search of aﬀordance, structure transfer and generation - at a larger and sometimes more
abstract scale. We will exemplify this by describing these processes at the problem
template level.
a) Creative search The same creative use of aﬀordance can be made for problem
templates as for concepts, when searching for a particular object or template/heuristic
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that can reach a particular result. If in the previous case a concept or an object with
similar aﬀordances was found, in the problem template case, templates with the required
aﬀordance or a similar aﬀordance can be found, using the aﬀordance itself to guide
the search. If no such templates are found, the functional concept, or even functional
property of a particular template can be discriminated. When these are found, the
search for a useful template can proceed guided by the functional concept (a concept or
object that usually manifests a particular aﬀordance) for its connected templates. Also,
constructive techniques can be applied to make a new template out of useful elements,
if one has not been found.
Thus a new problem template which aﬀords the solution can be found via re-repre-
sentation. Finding a problem template brings about a new way of seeing things, of
organizing the objects in the given problem, and bringing forth diﬀerent information
from the knowledge base of the cognitive system.
The insight eﬀect with the appeareance of an entire new representation in the conscious-
ness of the solver (a pop-up eﬀect) might also rely on speciﬁc convergence mechanisms
being at play. This will be further addressed in Chapters 5 and 7.
b) Construction New templates can be constructed in ways similar to concept gener-
ation. Various concepts or templates which overlap can be made into new templates,
which will now yield aﬀordances pertaining to both initial concepts or templates, or qual-
itatively new aﬀordances altogether. Some such templates could emerge via processes of
overlap and repeated correlation, while others might take more overt eﬀort to construc-
tively develop. Construction might come at the cost of losing parts of the interacting
concepts or templates, and parts of the aﬀordances. The initial participating templates
could be also kept separately, or discarded and replaced with their transformation.
Parts of a template can be substituted with other templates, thus the template being
enlarged and enriched. This latter process of construction as elaboration can be seen as
the opposite of synthesis of a larger representation structure to some essential features.
Finally, various relations between concepts get stronger over time and can organize
themselves, when brought together, into a new template. This process doesn’t apply
only to concepts existing only in the mind of the agent, but can be distributed across
the mind and the environment of the agent. Thus concepts in the environment can
keep on overlapping with concepts in the mind, or a template in the mind can receive
interference from an object or layout in the environment.
3.5 How space and structure inform representation-process
coupling
CreaCogs allows easy access to relevant concepts or problem templates with similar
features. The divergent search can be done starting in whatever feature point, at the
concept level or at the problem template level, and still yielding similar results. If the
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relationships are represented as a feature space (and problem templates still represent
sets of concepts, relationships and aﬀordances), then the search can be done using rela-
tionships as a focal point too. However, that would possibly give the system more power
than normal human cognitive systems (which in general ﬁnd it harder to start searches
with relationships, as these are encoded at a more abstract level). Thus a cognitive
system would allow relationship search and transfer, but not with as much ease as it
allows exchange of elements.
The way space, connectedness and representation structure are used in this framework
allows re-representation. Space and connectedness allow easy access to multiple other
relevant elements, via explicit similarity links on the various feature spaces, and implicit
similarity links when reaching for context (problem templates) in which concepts have
participated and taken up a certain role (this role can provide implicit similarity due to
similarity of context). The structured representation allows for re-representing the ob-
ject as formed by diﬀerent parts (implicit re-representation). Explicit re-representation
can be realized by trying to construct the possible templates which will fulﬁll the re-
quirements for a certain problem solution.
CreaCogs is thus a spatially informed and organized theoretical framework, the mecha-
nisms of which will be formalized in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Formalization of knowledge
organization and processes
As shown in Section 2.2.1, structured representation is an important component in AI
and in theories of Cognitive Science. A hypothesis of CreaCogs (Chapter 3) is that
the lack of useful structure in ill-structured problems [114] must be compensated by a
cognitive eﬀort of restructuring. Thus such cognitive processes of restructuring are the
precursors or in some cases the very processes of creativity in the context of problem
solving.
In this chapter, formal tools are deployed with the purpose of characterizing creative
cognitive processes in CreaCogs. Some such processes are aimed at helping or enabling
re-representation.
The chapter proceeds as follows: ﬁrst, the main components of the CreaCogs framework
are described: Feature Spaces (Section 4.1), Concepts (Section 4.2), Problem Templates
and structured representations generally (Section 4.3). General creative mechanisms of
CreaCogs are presented in Section 4.4. These include: hypothesizing by concept simi-
larity (4.4.1) and creative use of problem templates (4.4.2). Then, special attention is
given to creative search, substitution and re-representation mechanisms 4.5, and these
are contrasted to creative composition and reconstruction mechanisms 4.6. While search
processes are assumed to be more predominant in creative problem solving, and con-
structive processes in artistic creativity, both are present in various amounts in both
endeavours. Section 4.7 takes as subject multimodal and concept to template transfor-
mations. This is followed by a discussion and short conclusion in Section 4.8.
4.1 Feature Spaces
Feature spaces are spatially organized sets of features encoded symbolically or subsym-
bolically1. They constitute the bottom level of the CreaCogs framework (see Fig. 3.5).
1A subsymbolic type of encoding would be more realistic from a sensory perspective
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The set of feature spaces (FS) in a knowledge base (KB) can be deﬁned as follows:
FS = {FS1, FS2, ..., FSm}, FS ∈ KB
Each feature space contains a set of features FS1 = {f11 , f12 , f13 , ..., f1n}, so that the
distance between features f11 , f
1
2 is expressed as δ
1
1,2. Features are organized in feature
spaces by a distance metric, thus:
if δ11,2 = |f11 − f12 |, δ11,3 = |f11 − f13 |, ..., δ11,n = |f11 − f1n|,
then δ11,2 ≤ δ11,3 ≤ δ11,4... ≤ δ11,n
In general form:
δ1x,(x+1) ≤ δ1x,(x+2) ≤ δ1x,(x+3)... ≤ δ1x,(x+n)
Each feature space contains a similarity operator sim(f1a , f
1
b ). As distance between
features expresses similarity of features within that feature space, the similarity operator
takes δ into account so that:
sim(f1a , f
1
b ) ≥ sim(f1a , f1c ) ⇐⇒ δ1a,b ≤ δ1a,c
max (sim(fkx , f
k
y )) ⇐⇒ min(δkx,y)
If a new concept Cz is learned, its features are compared to known features, determining
the set of features which need adding to the KB before anchoring the concept in them
(X), and the set of already known features in KB (Y ).
Thus for all fkx ∈ Cz, FSm ∈ KB :
X = {fkx |fkx /∈ FSm}
Y = {fkx |fkx ∈ FSm}.
As seen in the insertion algorithm in Table 4.1, features from set X (unknown) are added
to the KB by being encoded in their corresponding FS at the correct δkx,n, and then
connected to the new concept Cz. Features from set Y (known) are just connected to
the Cz.
The feature space grounding makes possible measures of concept similarity at the sub-
symbolic level. This also provides the ability to creatively use a concept or object as
a replacement of another when the distance δ between the required object’s functional
feature and that of the creative substitute is small.
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Table 4.1: Insertion algorithm.
Algorithm Insertion algorithm
for all fkx : Cz.getFeatures()
distance = FSk.size(), insertionPoint=0
for all fkn : FS
k
KB.getFeatures()
if fkx = f
k
n
do Cz.link(FS
k, fkx )
insertionPoint = 0
return
else δkx,n = calcDistance(f
k
x , f
k
n)
if distance ≥ δkx,n
insertionPoint = n.location+ δkx,n
distance = δkx,n
end for
if insertionPoint 	= 0
do insert(fx, insertionPoint)
do Cz.link(FS
k.fkx )
end for
4.2 Concepts
If KB is the knowledge base of an agent α, let C ∈ KB be a set of known concepts, so
that:
c1, c2, c3, ..., cm ∈ C
These concepts are anchored in the knowledge α has acquired via its various sensors (see
Fig. 3.5), motor routines, semantic tags and relations. These are encoded in feature
spaces (FS), where diﬀerent such feature maps can be distinguished, and diﬀerent points
can be determined within them.
Thus, without deﬁning all possible FS exhaustively, let V be a set of known visuospatial
features2, A a set of known aﬀordances (motor actions that have been learned to be
performed, or observed in the environment), and S a set of semantic tags (names which
the agent attributes to objects or associates with other types of abstract patterns), such
that V,A, S ∈ FS, and the elements of each speciﬁc feature space:
{v1, v2, v3, ...., vo} ∈ V
{a1, a2, a3, ..., an} ∈ A
{s1, s2, s3, ...., sp} ∈ S
Thus, each concept is understood as grounded in a subset of the respective known feature
maps:
C = (V ′, A′, S′), V ′ ⊂ V,A′ ⊂ A,S′ ⊂ S
2We treat visuospatial sensory features together here for the sake of simplicity, but they can be
diﬀerentiated in various types of visuospatial feature maps.
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and the set of known concepts C can be deﬁned as a subset of the powerset of known
features:
C = P (V )× ⊂ P (A)× P (S),
Thus in this formalization concepts can be encoded like the following:
c1 = {green, round, to eat, apple}
c15 = {red, round, to kick, ball}
In this example, only apple and ball are semantic tags, the rest of the features are
translated in their approximate semantic description. This is evident as the round in c1
is not the same as the one in c15. In a self-organized shape feature space they would be
in each other’s neighborhood. In translation to a symbolic description, much precision
and expressivity is lost.
Not all concepts need to be activated or have a representative point on all feature maps
for a concept to be encoded, thus ∅ ∈ V , ∅ ∈ A, ∅ ∈ S, and concepts can be encoded
on a subset of feature spaces, even if no corresponding feature has been encoded on the
remaining few, e.g.:
∃cx ∈ C, cx = (V ′, A′, S′) = {vi, vj , ∅, si}
For the purpose of implementation, such concepts can be encoded as e.g. cx = {v3, v5, a0, s3},
where a0 is the null element. In a generalized form, for any speciﬁc FS
x ∈ FS, x0 will
represent the null element of that feature space.
When a new element is observed as belonging to a concept known by α, this element is
added to the concept in the knowledge base, e.g.:
Known: c3 = {yellow, round, to eat, grapefruit}
Observed: cx = {pink, round, grapefruit}
Then in KB: c3 = {(yellow ∨ pink), round, to eat, grapefruit}
These concept elements can be disjunctive in nature, the activation of one in a concept
inhibiting the activation of another (e.g. a grapefruit being either yellow or pink).
Complex concepts (the grounding of which requires other concepts) and abstract con-
cepts (concepts for which no good physical representation exists) are better modeled by
representation structures which are discussed in the next section (4.3).
Comprehension of a presented concept, object or scene is thus the activation of the
known elements from the scene in the KB. If elements in the scene match elements
in the KB, previous knowledge of that object can be brought forth, be it that the
knowledge has been obtained in declarative, observational or interactive manner. After
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the objects have been identiﬁed, new knowledge present in the environment can be added
to the KB. Thus knowledge is obtained, brought to bear on the problem at hand and
updated in an interactive manner.
4.3 Problem templates
Complex concepts and problem templates are kept in the knowledge base as activations
over previously known concepts. They can include relations, actions, and results of that
set of actions. Such results can include new relations between the concepts or objects, a
transformation of the initial features and objects. Previously solved problems, encoded
with their solution in the KB of the agent, allow further use of their structure.
Given a set of relations R between concepts, these can be expressed as follows3:
rn(cx, cy), rn ∈ R
E.g. onTopOf(table, glass), onTopOf ∈ R
Given a set of heuristics - or moves H, these can be expressed as follows:
h1(c3, c2) ∈ H
E.g. pour(water, glass), pour ∈ H
All problem templates PT are structured representations over: concepts (C), relations
between concepts (R), heuristics or set of moves (H - which can be understood as the
higher-order counterpart of motion aﬀordances in concept encoding) and solution state
representations (SOL):
PT ∈ P (C)× P (R)× P (H)× P (SOL)
PTx = (C
′, R′, H ′, SOL′),
C ′ ∈ C,R′ ∈ R,H ′ ∈ H,SOL′ ∈ SOL
Example: PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c3, c2), sol3}
PT1 = {table, glass, water, onTopOf(table, glass), pour(water, glass), sol3}
sol3 = {table, glass, water, onTopOf(table, glass), in(glass, water)}
When a certain type of solution is required for a particular problem, the set of solution
state representations SOL can be searched for previously known templates in which such
3Such relations can be expressed logically, but they do not have to be. They could also be expressed
through a picture that has embedded or represents the spatial relations themselves, or a mechanism that
learns from such pictures and makes internal structure preserving representations.
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a solution state has been achieved. Then an attempt to apply the templates connected
to such a solution to the current problem elements can be made.
Templates can also be triggered when certain objects or concepts which have normally
been involved in a template are present in the given problem. This allows for the natural
modeling of functional ﬁxedness, by attaching an activation strength to the link between
a template and its participating concepts.
Problem templates can be treated as concepts PTx = Cx after a template has been
strongly encoded, compressed and provided a semantic tag which allows for naming and
communication. Abstract concepts, which are not understood through direct action
or physical representation, but through the relations of other concepts, or through a
reference to them, are considered a form of intermediary representation between con-
cepts and problem templates. However, as their encoding is dependent upon previous
experience and encoding of a set of other concepts, many more assumptions are made
when communicating about them than about concepts which have been encoded with
direct sensory experience, as their encoding might not be similar in two agents. This
reﬂects communication diﬃculties which humans encounter when dealing with abstract
concepts, like “justice” or “freedom”, which can mean diﬀerent things for diﬀerent peo-
ple. Deviation from a “common” meaning, if such a meaning exists, can be viewed as
the sum of the deviations of all other concepts used for encoding. On an individual level,
each agent can provide their particular encoding case (with diﬀerent objects and events)
for abstract concepts, which manifests itself in individual diﬀerences of meaning.
Acquiring or communicating a similar PT to a diﬀerent agent might have more chances
of success when the contributing elements, relations and actions are explained from their
anchoring concept level (bottom-up). However, even if these elements are communicated,
the agent which does the listening might group them in diﬀerent situational PT, which
are closer to the agent’s already encoded PT set.
Agents manifest preferential heuristics and interpretations because of expertise and fa-
miliarity with such heuristics and templates, which in the CreaCogs framework is repre-
sented as stronger KB associations. At the representation level, heuristics can be built
compositionally, as a set of actions over given objects, that are put in certain relations:
h1 = h2(h3(c1, c2), h3(c2, c3))
For example, cooking a favorite recipe like h15 = Pasta bolognese is a collection of
cooking actions like mix, stir, chop, season, simmer over a set of concept ingredients:
C = {c1 minced meat, c2 onion, c3 tomatoes, c4 mushrooms, c5 pepper, c6 basil,
c7 oregano, c8 pasta}.
The set of actions required is:
{h1 stir, h2 chop, h3 season, h4 simmer, h5 fry},
where each of these is a primitive cooking template. Such primitive templates are struc-
tured problem templates themselves, for which no heuristic can be further decomposed in
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other actions: h1 stir = {foods{c1, c2, ....., cn}, pans{c31, c32}, stirrers{wooden spoon},
in(food, pan), in(wooden spoon, food), stirring motion, stirred}
For the template h15 = Pasta bolognese, the bolognese sauce can act as a composition
of previously known actions over given ingredients:
h14 = (stir(stir(fry(minced meat), chop(onion, tomatoes)), simmer(5min),
season(pepper, basil, oregano), chop(mushrooms)), simmer(10min)), bolognese sauce
h14 = (h1(h1(h5(c1), h2(c2, c3)), h4(5 min), h3(c5, c6, c7), h2(c4)), h4(10 min)), sol5
4.4 General creative mechanisms
This section presents general creative reasoning mechanisms which can be deployed
under the knowledge organization of CreaCogs. Section 4.4.1 presents how hypothesizing
can happen using concept similarity. Section 4.4.2 describes the creative use of problem
templates and structured representations.
4.4.1 Hypothesizing by concept similarity
Due to the distributed encoding of concepts over features, concept similarity can be
computed between concepts by comparing their elements. This can be done: a) at
the similarity between features level and b) at the sharing features level4. E.g., due
to their common feature elements on the aﬀordance (A) and visual (V ) feature spaces,
c1 = {a1, a2, v1, v2, s1} and c2 = {a2, a3, v1, v3, s2} can be considered similar.
Both these types of similarity ratings can be used for hypothesizing. In the following we
will show a few examples of the element-based similarity hypothesizing.
Consider an agent that knows:
c1 = {a1, a2, v1, v2, s1}
c2 = {a2, a3, v1, v3, s2}
Then c1 and c2 overlap in a2 and v1.
c1 ∩ c2 = {a2, v1}
If both c1 and c2 are associative synaptic bindings over their elements, the activation
fC(c) traveling across both associative synaptic paths of c1 and c2 will strengthen the
connection between their overlapping features:
fC(a2, v1) = fC(c1) + fC(c2)
4A third type of similarity is implicit: c) being involved in the same structures.
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Now consider a c3, the aﬀordances of which are unknown:
c3 = {v2, v3, s3, a?}
The system will check its similarity with known concepts, select c1 and c2 as most similar,
and notice some degree of feature overlap:
c3 ∩ c1 = {v2}
c3 ∩ c2 = {v3}
The system will then propose that some of the aﬀordances which hold for c1 and c2
might hold for c3. A direct correlate relation between such visuospatial features and an
aﬀordance does not exist:
The query: ?∃ax ∈ A, fC(ax, v2, v3) ≥ 0 returns false.
The system could propose as a general hypothesis that c3 inherits the aﬀordances of the
concepts it overlaps:
c3 = {? a1, ? a2, ? a3, v2, v3, s3}
However, because of the previously observed strong correlation fC(a2, v1) and v1 /∈ c3,
the hypothesis can be reﬁned one step further, with only a1 and a3 being proposed as
possible aﬀordances to check for in the real world for c3.
This means that previously noticed feature associations cumulatively matter to the sys-
tem. Such associations can become strong enough to be triggered whenever one or
enough of the constituting members are present, thus trying to retrace a previously
known pattern (in a somewhat Gestaltic fashion).
These mechanisms can trigger further inference points and implicit information in the
system, the birth of new substructures and the functional ﬁxedness phenomenon.
4.4.2 Creative use and hypothesizing with problem templates
Previous problem templates, like the one for Pasta bolognese, can be used and re-used.
Moreover, because of the posited type of knowledge encoding, the template can pop-up
whenever an open search happens in the system for a general cook heuristic, with some of
the conceptual elements (c1 mincemeat, c3 tomatoes) present in the fridge. The search
can also be run over timing, and cooking pasta in general.
When creative solutions are proposed by the system or forced by the absence of certain
ingredients, similar ingredients will be sought. Thusmince can be replace with aubergine,
onion with leek or chalotte, red pepper with yellow pepper, chorizo with other types of
salami.
When trying to change or enrich such a recipe it is reasonable to assume that “sim-
ilarity” for an expert cook presupposes a set of observed, acquired and tested taste
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rules - like taste relations of food items that go well together (courgettes,mushrooms),
(red pepper, tomatoes), or food items that give a speciﬁc taste (chorizo, Parmesan,
herbs, spices).
Other problem templates can be used creatively in a similar manner, by using the
concept similarity procedures to yield and replace recipe elements by other ingredients
which have the same or similar features.
Hypothesizing by problem similarity can happen too. Thus, diﬀerent templates with
similar elements can be used creatively. Subtemplates might be created via intersection,
convergence, diﬀerence of previously observed templates. This can result in eﬀects which
look like mixing previously held templates or structurally sound parts thereof to achieve
a composed eﬀect, or parts of eﬀects from diﬀerent templates.
Templates can be similar based on their components, relationships, heuristics or solution
states. Replacement and creativity is possible across all these axes. Thus the following
presents some possible cases.
a) Similarity of components case: one can replace components in a template with sim-
ilar components (concepts that are equivalent or similar across the feature space that
matters for the respective problem)
PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
c1(FS
k) = c5(FS
k) OR c1(FS
k) sim c5(FS
k)
try PT ′1 = {c5, c2, c3, r1(c5, c2), h1(c5, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
b) Similarity of relations case: one can replace relations in a template with similar
relations
PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
r1 = r2 OR r1 sim r2
try PT ′′1 = {c1, c2, c3, r2(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
This also links h1 to r2.
c) Similarity of heuristics case: one can replace heuristics in a template with similar
heuristics
PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
h1(a, b) = h5(a, b) OR h1(a, b) sim h5(a, b)
try PT ′1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2),h5(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
E.g. h1 putting thing on the cooker and h5 putting things in the microwave might be
similar, if the desired result is to cook something.
d) Similarity of solution case : one can replace a solution with a similar solution
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PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
sol3 = sol5 OR sol3 sim sol5
maybe PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol5}
a′) Hypothesizing similarity of components: when two templates have similar relations,
heuristics and solutions, similarity can be hypothesized between them or their compo-
nents
PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
PT2 = {c4, c5, c6, r1(c4, c5), h1(c4, c5), h2(c5, c6), sol3}
propose PT1 sim PT2, (c1, c2, c3) sim (c4, c5, c6)
b′) Hypothesizing similarity of relations: when two templates share similar concepts,
heuristics and solutions, similarity can be hypothesized between them or their relations
PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
PT2 = {c1, c2, c3, r2(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
propose PT1 sim PT2, r1 sim r2
c′) Hypothesizing similarity of heuristics: when two templates have similar concepts,
relations and solutions, similarity might be hypothesized between them or their heuristics
PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
PT2 = {c5, c2, c3, r1(c5, c2), h3(c5, c3), h2(c2, c4), sol3}
c5 sim c1
propose P1 sim P2, h1 sim h3
d′) Hypothesizing similarity of solutions: when two templates that have similar concepts,
heuristics and relations, similarity might be hypothesized between them or their solutions
PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
PT2 = {c1, c2, c5, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h3(c2, c5), sol5}
c3 sim c5
propose PT1 sim PT2, sol3 sim sol5
Some of the hypothesizing described here requires mechanisms of creative search and is
a precursor for mechanisms of creative reconstruction. These will be presented in the
next sections.
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4.5 Creative search and substitution mechanisms
Re-representation requires a search for a productive, result-yielding problem represen-
tation. Generally, search for a productive problem representation can be described as
taking the form of ﬁlling in a template: given initial problem objects c1, c2, c4 and the
need to fulﬁll sol5, what mechanisms can you apply to reach a representation which
aﬀords the solution?
{c1, c2, c4, sol5} ∈ PT?
Various constraints and relations can be part of the problem requirements, requiring
accurate representation and solving.
In creative problem solving, the subset of objects required to solve the problem might
not be predeﬁned, closed, or restricted to only the salient objects or concepts oﬀered by
the problem. This subset might involve objects known by the solver, or objects which the
solver could create. Take the set of given objects in the problem to be OP , the objects
in the solution space to be OS and the objects in the solver’s KB to be OKB. If in
classical problem solving, OS ∈ OP , in creative problem solving OS ∈ {OP ∪OKB∪ON},
where ON are new objects constructed by agent α taking as input OP and OKB. Thus
intelligent search mechanisms need to take place over OKB for computational explosion
not to occur when searching for OS , for ON to be produced and for a productive solving
template PT? to be found. In the following, a few such mechanisms are proposed.
The search can be characterized in a variety of modes. The following characterisation is
based on the relative direction the search takes from the concept level in the knowledge
base, and is meant to give a few examples of how such a search can proceed in CreaCogs.
After sections 4.5.1, 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 give examples of such search, the mechanism of
applying the found problem representations and objects to do the re-representation are
explained in section 4.5.4. A short Discussion of such search mechanisms in the context
of some human creativity tests is presented in section 4.5.5.
4.5.1 Upward search
In this mechanism, the search in the KB of the agent goes up from the level of the
initial concepts to their projections in the problem template space, to check problem
solving or general representational structures the concept or the structure has been
involved in. A check is made to whether the aﬀordances or solutions of the such found
problem-templates are similar to the solution searched for the problem at hand. If similar
aﬀordances or solutions are yielded, the problem template is kept as a representation
structure relevant for the problem at hand. The solving of the problem is then tried with
this representation. This is shown in Figure 4.1 and in the search algorithm example in
Table 4.2.
In Figure 4.1, the yellow arrows show the direction of search: c1 and c2 trigger the
templates they’ve been involved in in PTx. Some such templates will be triggered from
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sol4 c1 c2 solx 
PT? PTx 
Figure 4.1: Upward search in the framework.
multiple concepts. If the solution of any of these templates - solx - is similar or equivalent
with the solution searched for - sol4 - then the PTx in which this has been found becomes
a candidate to structure the problem, and thus take the place of PT?.
Table 4.2: Upward search algorithm.
Search Algorithm ex.1: Upward search
for all cx : Problem.getConcepts()
PTxList.add(cx.getPTs())
activationIncrease(cx.PTs)
end for
PTxList.sortHighActivF irst()
for all PTx : PTxList
if PTx.getActivation() > threshold AND (PTx.sim(PTsol) OR PTx.equals(PTsol))
then return PTx
end for
The similarity behind the call PTx.sim(PTsol) contains a variety of cases:
• PTx and PTsol overlap - i.e. they have common elements - where the elements can
include not just concepts but also relations and aﬀordances (all this depends on
how much of the end state is known or presumed, and some initial interpretations
of the end state might be wrong or reﬂect biases). If elements of PTx not contained
in the initial problem-space are the ones responsible for the useful aﬀordances, then
these can be important, and their reconstruction can be attempted in the given
environment.
• PTx is a subpart of PTsol - i.e. it demonstrates some useful aﬀordances, but not
all the ones required. Then PTx can be kept as a useful subpart of the future
PTsol, where other parts might need to be found. The required elements of the
useful problem templates will then need to be used to construct PTx (4.6).
• PTx contains PTsol.
A special case of this mechanism can be that of convergence. When various PTs are
activated and checked against the problem requirements starting from the various initial
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problem elements, diﬀerent templates corresponding to diﬀerent elements might be found
to have elements in common. The search thus converges upon useful elements for the
productive problem template, and sometimes upon an entire solution.
4.5.2 Downward search
In this search mechanism, the agent goes down from the conceptual level of the given
“objects” to the feature level, then tries to match their aﬀordances to those required
for the solution state. This can be used either as an eliminatory strategy - to make less
salient the concepts or properties which don’t work for a successful representation, or for
ﬂagging essential properties for safe-keeping. Both can be done in one if this ﬂagging is
a form of activation which strengthens the useful properties - thus useful already present
elements of a successful possible structure are strengthened. This mechanism is shown
in Figure 4.2 and Algorithm in Table 4.3.
 c1 sol4 
PT? 
el11 
 c2 
el12 el21 el22 elsol1 elsol2 
Figure 4.2: Downward search in the framework
In Figure 4.2, the yellow arrows show the direction of the search. c1 and c2 are searched
for elements that match (elements of) the solution. These elements can then be used
element-wise, all together (abstraction / generalization strategies) or in diﬀerent new
combinations (constructive) to search for a useful template. The concepts which they
are part of might be used, or new concepts might be searched for that have been anchored
in the salient properties.
4.5.3 Sideways search
In memory (KB) or environment, the agent searches for concepts or objects similar to
the ones it has that can solve the problem, as shown in the search algorithm example in
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3. Similarity can happen on the various feature spaces, however
some features will be functionally relevant for a particular aﬀordance, while some will
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Table 4.3: Downward search algorithm
Search Algorithm ex.2: Downward search
for all cx : Problem.getConcepts()
elementList += cx.getElements()
end for
for all element : elementList
for all sol.el()
if element.sim(sol.el) OR element.equals(sol.el);
then element.active(), element.mark()
else return elementList -= element
end for
end for
not be. If such similar concepts are found, they can become part of the solving template,
or yield a solving template through one of their connections. In Figure 4.3, the yellow
arrows point the direction of the search. Thus c2 triggers a similar concept, cx. The
templates attached to cx are searched for one which might yield the solution sol4 or a
state similar to it. If this is found, it might prompt using cx rather than c2 to attempt
a solution. As a variant of this, the agent can also search starting from the expected
solution, through all the known templates that yield it, to ﬁnd a template that contains
similar concepts as the ones in the problem.
c1 c2 sol4 
PT? 
cx solx 
PTx 
Figure 4.3: Sideways search in the framework
Table 4.4: Sideways search algorithm
Search Algorithm ex.3: Sideways search
for all cx : Problem.getConcepts()
for cy : cx.getSim()
if cy.getPTs().contains(PTsol) OR cy.getPTs().containsSim(PTsol)
then Problem.tempReplace(cx, cy)
end for
end for
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4.5.4 Restructuring, creation of new objects and re-representation
Finding knowledge objects like PTx in section 4.5.1, a set of concepts which might reﬁne
a viable PTx in 4.5.2 and a concept cx which overlaps the requirements of the problem in
4.5.3 helps restructure and re-represent the given problem, and sometimes recast some
of the given objects as diﬀerent objects (or concepts).
Given a concept made from a set of features, it can be restructured as a diﬀerent concept
if such a diﬀerent concept can be found anchored in the same or a similar set of features.
Thus given c1 as part of the problem set, one can re-represent its features as follows:
c1 = {a1, v1, v2, s2}
v1 sim v4, cn ∈ KB, cn = {an, v4, v2, sn}
Restructure c1 as cn = {an, v4, v2, sn}
Given a PT made from a set of concepts, it can be restructured as a diﬀerent PT if such
a template exists anchored in the same or similar subset of concepts.
PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
c2 sim c4
PTn ∈ KB,PTn = {c1, c4, c3, r2(c4, c3), h1(c4, c3), sol5}
If a new PT is anchored in a superset of a subset of the given concepts, the other concepts
or objects might still be created from the existing remaining objects.
4.5.5 Discussion
After each re-representation, one can check if the new problem representation has a
solution within its inference set. If a re-representation was done speciﬁcally to obtain a
certain aﬀordance, of part of the requirements of the problem (solx), one can attempt
to solve the rest of the requirements. Upward moves can be done automatically, trig-
gering problem templates, relations or other structured representations in which the
concepts have previously worked together. This can bring about functional ﬁxedness
as some salient templates are hard to avoid, and humans are not used to manipulating
larger structures (like problem templates) quite as well as other smaller structures (like
concepts), which it is sensible to assume are easier to contain within working memory.
Riddles, Remote Associates Tests [108] and insight problems for empirical settings all
seem to use predominantly search processes in this paradigm. Take the following riddle:
What can you catch but not throw?
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The catch and throw concepts used in conjunction will initially yield sport templates,
of type:
PTs1 = {ball, catch(ball), throw(ball)}
A search of semantic contextual template just over catch, without the motion aﬀordances,
can yield the semantic context template catch a cold. This veriﬁes the problem condition
cannot throw, however is throwing a cold is not a usual pattern in thinking about colds.
One might generally think of giving someone else a cold, and giving something to someone
else and throwing something to someone else have the same result, if the other person
receives or catches that something. However, it is unlikely this similarity will be noticed,
without having cast catch in the context of the cold initially.
With remote associates, the search proceeds in parallel. Take the test containing the
words: Falling Actor Dust. Let’s say c1 = falling, c2 = Actor, c3 = Dust. To ﬁnd their
remote associate, one needs to ﬁnd a word c4 so that templates PT1 = {c1, c4}, PT2 =
{c2, c4}, PT3 = {c3, c4} exist. When one has activated PT1 = Falling Star, PT2 =
Star Actor, PT3 = Star Dust, or at least two of them, and the third can be veriﬁed,
one has converged upon c4 = Star.
The classical candle insight problem [36] is stated as follows: You are given a candle, a
book of matches and a box of thumbtacks. Fix the lit candle unto the wall so that the wax
doesn’t drip below. Various saliencies draw initial attention. The template of a candle
burning has eﬀects like {light, wax, fire}. The template of ﬁxing something unto the
wall requires some material which can be glue or nail. Wax has glue properties, which
probably explains why some people try to use wax to glue the candle to the wall. The
participants need to focus on a representation of the kind {support, candle}, and ﬁnd
the support aﬀordances of the box concept, which are not particularly salient in the
box of thumbtacks representation, with the aﬀordance of the object box being already
taken – {box, contains(thumbtacks), full}.
4.6 Creative construction mechanisms
Some of the mechanisms described above can be productive in themselves. Thus if the
search is bringing two concepts together which have not been previously connected, new
relations might be observed (and it is not assumed that all such relations were previously
encoded). It is commonsense that some of these relations will be interesting enough to
be consolidated over time in the agent’s memory.
It is not hard to imagine that some transformational processes happen during this search
(new templates are created, new relations are seen between concepts). However we
will refer here to mechanisms which are highly generative and productive by their na-
ture (thus not accidental associations) - whether they developed out of initial search or
whether they stand as mechanisms in their own right is an empirical cognitive questions,
which this analysis cannot solve.
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In this framework we will diﬀerentiate between two processes of conceptual composition
(cc(i) and cc(ii)), where cc(i) is a productive form of inheriting features from two concepts
in an integrative fashion, while cc(ii) aims to satisfy a higher template, or can create
such a new template which is structurally diﬀerent (c.f. [41]).
Thus taking the extremes of cc(i) and cc(ii), if given two concepts:
c1 = {a1, a2, v1, v2, s1}
c2 = {a3, a4, v3, v4, s2}
c3 is a concept composed via cc(i), where:
c3 = {a1, a4, v1, v4, s1−2}
while c4 is a concept composed with cc(ii):
c4 = {a1, a2, a3, a4, v1, v2, v3, v4, s3}
Thus, in their extreme form, cc(i) and cc(ii) can be simpliﬁed in this framework to:
1. maintain structure (aligned in both concepts) and import-compose features
2. maintain features (from both concepts) and import-compose structure
If some similar features exist, they can provide a locking point for the composition
processes (and to even bring the two templates together in the ﬁrst place):
Given: c1 = {a1, a2, v1, v2, s1}
Given: c5 = {a2, a3, v2, v3, s2}
Composed: c6 = {a1, a2, a3, v1, v2, v3, s3}
This is diﬀerent from processes of generalization, or observations of a relation through
synthesis, which later requires naming:
c1 = {a1, a2, v1, v2, s1}
c5 = {a2, a3, v2, v3, s2}
c7 = {a2, v2, v3, s?}
Thus cc(i) and cc(ii) are generative processes of a diﬀerent nature than varying some
features over the similarity neighborhood of one and the same concept (like choosing veg-
etarian ingredients that taste similar for an initially non-vegetarian cooking template).
Combination of problem-solving templates or representation structures (RS) larger than
concepts is a step of higher complexity. Many new relations can be established between
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concepts, and (depending on the problem domain) many more constraints are at play
when searching for an RS or sub-RS that needs to ﬁt a particular solution, aﬀordance
or relationship criterion.
Depending on the new relations, emergent aﬀordances can be made available. Thus a
problem template PT15 = hx(h1([C]a, [C]b, [C]c), h2([C]d, [C]e)), where [C]a, [C]b, [C]c
are conceptual placeholders for a 3-slot template, will have to account for some of the
relationships between whatever sets of concepts are tried on to see if application of h1
is possible, or if new (damaging) side-eﬀects don’t appear as part of that combination.
However, similarity of elements in problem templates and the structure of such RS can
be used in a variety of ways:
(a) synthesis and generalization of new relations. If PT1 ∩PT2 	= ∅, for a synthesis PT3
keep the common elements of both templates and the relationships and heuristics which
apply to both of them. For example:
PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
PT2 = {c1, c2, c5, r2(c1, c5), h3(c1, c2), h4(c2, c5), sol3}
then synthesize PT3 = {c1, c2, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h3(c1, c2), solx},maybe solx ⊂ sol3
(b) hypothesizing based on already observed strong relations - if a template contains
pre-existing elements of already known templates, hypothesize that the results of those
templates could be achieved as a consequence
(c) chaining - If a template PT1 presents in its solution set part of the elements of PT2,
then perhaps the two templates can be chained in PT3 = PT1 ∪ PT2
PT1 = {c1, c2, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), sol3}
PT2 = {c2, c3, r2(c2, c3), h3(c2, c3), sol5}
then chain PT3 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), r2(c2, c3), h1(c1, c2), h3(c2, c3)}, and maybe solx∩
(sol3, sol5)
(d) extending by replacement or via recasting - if part of the elements of PT1 can be
used for another template PT2 without destroying them, extend PT1 to PT
′
1 ⊃ PT2
(e) superset with emerging structure - keep all elements of template PT1 and PT2 and
see if new relations appear when attempting to construct PT3 which includes them both.
(f) element mix, keeping existing common structure - mixing elements from both tem-
plates
PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), sol3}
PT2 = {c1, c2, c5, r2(c1, c5), h3(c1, c2), h4(c2, c5), sol3}
try PT3 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2),h3(c1, c2), h2(c2, c3), solx}
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If (a) to (d) can be done with search, (e) and (f) are more likely to belong to compo-
sition processes. Such productive representation construction processes as the ones in
(e) and (f) can be deﬁned as combining previously known RSs in an RS which inherits
properties and/or structure from both elements. In this process, other generative, asso-
ciationist and comparative processes come into play, creating new concepts, hypotheses
and relations in the work necessary to come up with a new RS the properties of which
can support solving of the problem.
This comparison shows that productive and generative processes are closer towards the
spectrum of creative discovery and innovation, while search for a known representation
that can ﬁt the problem followed by the restructuring of the problem elements under
that representation is more akin to empirically studied insightful problem solving.
4.7 Multimodal and concept to template transformations
In the previous examples, V was used to stand in for visuospatial feature maps. How-
ever multiple modalities can participate in the creation of such a map, having as a
consequence multiple diﬀerent such feature spaces (e.g. for shape, color, orientation,
etc.).
Looking at the above described mechanisms, one could assume the type of feature map
engaged in such operation is not of importance, and the mechanisms can apply in a
general form to any sensory feature map. However, when characterizing a system with
multiple sensory modalities, a creative interplay is also possible between the diﬀerent
modalities.
Thus, a concept of growth observed visually can be compared to or translated into a
concept of growth based on auditory intensity, or pitch height. A concept experienced
in a certain sensory modality, like balance - which is generally experienced through
proprioceptive and visual modalities, can be transformed in a concept of balance in
one’s actions, as personally evaluated in various categories. A problem template could
also bring multiple concepts from diﬀerent domains into account.
Besides multimodal transformations, complex sets of features can act as concepts or
as problem templates themselves. This is shown best by the anecdotical examples of
Kekule´ using Ouroboros snake (iconic image) as a template for inspiring organisation of
the benzene molecule, and Watson quoting dreams of spiral staircases (iconic image from
a concept) as possible organizational (problem) template for the double helix discovery.
4.8 Discussion - the relation between imperfect recogni-
tion, constructive memory and re-representation
It is worth noting that, in this framework, the process of object recognition itself does
not require perfect matching of observation to pre-existing knowledge in the KB, and
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this reﬂects cognitive realities of operating in real-world environments. It is thus unlikely
that an object in the environment will present itself to its observer bearing all identifying
traits which the observer has encoded in its KB about the object. Recognition then
operates by oﬀering the best possible match in the KB, and switching to interactive
learning soon after. This allows new traits of known objects to be learned from the
environment. However, this type of recognition also has as a consequence the bias
that new objects will be initially compared to similar objects the agent has previously
encountered. In this context, hypothesizing over the possible uses of new objects will be
made by projecting pre-existing knowledge of already known objects, before a completely
new concept will be built for that particular object. This is also how human cognition
operates according to literature, and how known psychological eﬀects like the shape bias
are possible [72, 88].
Much recognition is therefore constructive - the agent assumes about an object, con-
cept or type of event that certain properties which the agent has already encoded will
be present. Such a type of operating is known as constructive memory [131, 132], and
has both negative and positive side eﬀects. Notable negative side eﬀects of constructive
memory are its ability to bias witness testimony [30]. On the positive side, constructive
memory is an ability without which we could not navigate real world environments with
any speed, as we would be required to retest all our assumptions about the world at all
times. Constructive memory, with its less productive side eﬀects, is thus a great mecha-
nism of cognitive adaptation which generally enables fast though imperfect recognition,
on which fast decision making and survival are based.
Functional ﬁxedness, the human tendency to apply and generally only see a certain set of
known and familiar solutions to a certain problem, to the detriment of other, simpler or
more productive solutions, is a side eﬀect of having encoded problem templates closely
knit with their practically used solutions.
Functional ﬁxedness seems based on similar processes as constructive memory. The
process of re-representation is the ability to reconsider our direct assumptions, and
re-encode the elements of the problem in a manner which is more productive. On a
lower level, the equivalent of this is to not take our constructive memory premises for
granted and examine the objects in the environment, to see if our assumptions about
their properties hold (and thus our recognition of them as part of a speciﬁc category).
However, at the problem template level, this can be harder to do, as problem templates
are ampler structures, and one has to inhibit such knowledge in order to regroup elements
in potentially more productive templates, or create such templates as an adaptation of
previously known ones. In human insight, an assumption about how this process of
restructuring is enabled, is that the incubation phase dissipates the functional ﬁxedness,
by diminishing the activation of normal patterns, and allowing for wider searches and
new templates to be grouped together and applied, until one emerges which ﬁts the
problem, with all parts falling into place - the Illumination stage [157].
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Insight and creative problem solving can thus be viewed under this framework as pro-
cesses of memory management, with both associationist and gestaltic (template pattern-
ﬁlling) underpinnings, and recasting - restructuring processes using memory and envi-
ronmental resources.
The experiments in the next chapters cannot cover all the possible range of the mecha-
nisms detailed here. However, they cover a reasonable amount of varied mechanisms in
variate domains, implemented under the CreaCogs framework, showcasing its capabili-
ties and comparing them to human performance.
Chapter 5
A cognitive system that solves
the Remote Associates Test
computationally (comRAT)
Various psychological tests have been used to measure creativity [61, 80]. As described
in Section 2.4.1, some of these are empirical tests using insight problems [36, 101]. Such
tests however can take a long time to administer to humans, as insight problems are
quite hard and can take a long time to solve. Because of this, the various empirical tests
on insight cannot contain many items, reducing the amount and inherent strength of
data coming from them.
A smaller test which is thought to measure a similar ability as the insight test is the
Remote Associate Test (RAT), initially proposed by Mednick and Mednick [108]. The
ability to perform well at this test has been shown to correlate with the ability to
successfully solve insight problems [136]. The advantage of the RAT is that many items
of this test can be administered relatively quickly. Furthermore, Mednick [107] held a
domain-independent associative view of creativity, thus the RAT is designed to measure
creativity as a function of the participant’s ability to associate remote items.
In this chapter, associative and convergent CreaCogs processes are implemented in order
to test whether they can be used to computationally solve the RAT. First, the test itself
is described in more detail in Section 5.1. The main CreaCogs mechanism implemented
and its place in the framework are described in Section 5.2. The proposed computational
solver for the RAT task (comRAT) is described in Section 5.3. The RAT, together with
preferred answers and query item contribution to answers are formalized in Section 5.4.
A set of normative human data [11] is used for evaluation and testing in Section 5.5.
An empirical analysis of the principle of preferred convergence is performed in Section
5.6. The correlation between human diﬃculty in solving a RAT query and comRAT’s
probability of ﬁnding an answer based on frequency is analysed in Section 5.7. The
generative abilities of comRAT are described in Section 5.8. An extension of the RAT
task and of the comRAT system into the visual domain is described in section 5.9. A
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discussion about the comRAT and proposals for further work regarding it are presented
in Sec 5.10, followed by conclusions in Section 5.11.
5.1 The Remote Associates Test (RAT)
The Remote Associates Test [108] is a test meant to measure creativity; it has been
widely used in the literature [3, 10, 33]. The test is of the following form: given three
words, the participant has to ﬁnd a fourth word which can be associated with all the
given three words. For example, the following 3 items are given:
COTTAGE - SWISS - CAKE
In this case, an answer considered correct is CHEESE, because of the following associates:
cottage cheese, swiss cheese and cheese cake [108].
With each test consisting of only three words, and taking a minute or less to solve,
the RAT makes possible the administration of 90 or more items for a normal testing
session per participant, thus yielding rich data. If the correlation in performance between
insight tests and RAT previously demonstrated empirically [136] holds, then the RAT
could be used to gather much more data and tap much faster into mechanisms which
are similar to the ones responsible for insight. This makes the RAT worthy of modeling,
and the following work aims to set the precedent for an automated Remote Associates
Test solver.
The Remote Associates Test solver has been translated and adapted to a variety of other
languages than English [17, 64, 113]. However, not all test items on the initial Mednick
test [108] are equal: Worthen and Clark [168] remarked that this test contains a mix
of functional and structural associates. Functional associates elicit a relationship which
is functional between them (e.g. between bird and egg) and may or may not translate
into a language relationship (i.e. the items often being closely associated in language
use). Structural associates are items which are generally associated together in language,
generally in the same syntactic structure (i.e. sweet and tooth; black and magic), but
amongst which a functional relationship doesn’t necessarily hold. Worthen and Clark
proposed a remote associate test based on functional associates (FRAT).
CreaCogs in its current form posits processes which could support both functional and
structural associates. Structural associates are the same with compound associates (i.e.
those obtained from a syntactical compound - like a phrase or a compound noun). Due to
access to normative data on compound associates [11] which makes evaluation possible,
in the following, an automated solver for structural or compound associates is proposed.
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5.2 RAT solving in CreaCogs
The process of solving the Remote Associates Test has some phenomenological overlap
with solving insight problems. Participants attest to having a solution come to mind
instantly, the equivalent of the illumination phase in insight problem solving. Because
of this we assume most of the search to happen “under the radar”, or “under the hood”,
i.e. unconsciously.
The hypothesis presented here about how the RAT is solved by humans is the following.
The associations from the given terms to the previously encountered compound terms are
activated in the memory of the agent. Then, common items are found via convergence,
which manifests itself as an overlap of activation. This convergence makes a term pop-
up from the long-term memory of the cognitive system. Various constraints could be
applied to this activation, or its strength, depending on the familiarity of that compound
term to the user, whether the terms are related semantically, etc.
This process implementation of this hypothesis is represented in the CreaCogs framework
by a reﬁnement of the mechanism of upward search 4.2. Concepts activate all the
problem templates (in this case compound terms) in which they have been involved,
which in turn activate other concepts present in these compound terms (other than the
given ones). The overlap of activation sent to a concept from multiple compound terms
is the convergence and helps ﬁnd the answer term.
c1 c2 c3 cx 
 PT 
(c1,ca) (c2,cb) (c3,cc) 
Figure 5.1: comRAT search mechanism as pertaining to previous formalization. C
stands for concept, PT for problem templates, and the tip of the arrows shows the
direction of the activation.
In the following, the implementation of this mechanism in an automated comRAT solver
will be described, together with the knowledge treatment and algorithm implemented.
5.3 A Computational RAT Solver (comRAT)
The following section is organized as follows: the data used by the system and its
preparation for this speciﬁc task is described in Section 5.3.1; the acquisition of the
knowledge and its organization, fundamental for the CreaCogs framework, is discussed
in Section 5.3.2; the process of solving the comRAT queries and the algorithm applied
is presented in Section 5.3.3.
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5.3.1 The RAT Knowledge Base
In order to build the RAT Knowledge Base (RAT-KB), language data of compound
terms was needed. For this, 2-grams of the publicly available, genre-balanced Corpus of
Contemporary American English (COCA)1 have been used. These 2-grams are indexed
on part of speech according to the UCREL CLAWS7 Tagset2 and contain data on
frequency of use.
The steps for acquiring and preparing the data were the following. First, the 1 million
most frequent 2-grams of this corpus were acquired. Based on the part of speech the
data is classiﬁed as, a pruning process was applied, in order to remove items not relevant
for the RAT task. The items categorized with the tags displayed in Table 5.1 were kept
as possibly relevant for the RAT task. As a result of this tag-based pruning process,
approx. 200 000 2-gram items were obtained.
Table 5.1: Tagset used for extraction of items from 2-grams of the Corpus of Con-
temporary American English.
Tag Description Example
FU unclassiﬁed word
FW foreign word chateau
JJ general adjective blue
ND1 singular noun of direction north
NN common noun, neutral for number sheep, cod
NN1 singular common noun book, child
NN2 plural common noun books, children
RA adverb, after nominal head else, galore
REX adverb introducing appositional constructions namely
RR general adverb down
RT quasi-nominal adverb of time now, tomorrow
VB0 be, base form ﬁnite, imperative, subjunctive
VVG -ing participle of lexical verb giving, working
VVN past participle of lexical verb given, worked
No a priori evidence whether this set will contain the necessary or useful data to solve
the RAT was obtained previous to experimentation.
5.3.2 Knowledge Acquisition and Organization by Association
comRAT-C is endowed with three types of knowledge structures (Classes): Concepts,
Expressions and Links. In this implementation, Concepts are one word lexical items,
Expressions are the equivalent of a representation structure containing two Concepts
(words), and Links are bidirectional connectors between Concepts and the Expressions
they are part of.
1Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA): http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/.
2For a complete list of the UCREL CLAWS7 Tagset see: http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/claws7tags.
html
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comRAT-C is presented sequentially with each of the 2-grams from the set pruned from
the corpus. When a 2-gram is presented to the system, an item of the Expression class
is constructed for it. The system then checks if it already has the Concepts contained
in this Expression in its KB. Any concept that is unknown is constructed as an object
and added to the system’s KB. Links are attached between each of the two Concepts
and the Expression they are part of. The bidirectionality of the Links ensures that,
when given an Expression (e.g. “Self Defense”), this is linked to both Concepts it uses
(e.g. “Self”, “Defense”), and that each of these Concepts has a Link to the Expression,
to the other concept it has formed an Expressions with through the Expression, and
to other Expressions it has been part of and Concepts it has been associated with.
After a while, each Concept is thus connected by Links to all the other Concepts it has
formed an Expression with, each Concept thus forming a hub of incoming and outgoing
connections.
Some of the RAT queries might refer to compound nouns which appear not split in the
corpus: e.g. “Healthcare” is a compound noun, however for solving the compound RAT,
“Healthcare” must be taken as an Expression, with the Concept “Health” being linked
to the Concept “Care”. Compound words are not marked by the tagset in Table 5.1.
To solve this issue, after all the Expressions have been acquired, the system proceeds to
compare each Concept with other known Concepts, in order to obtain knowledge about
compound words. If the system recognizes a Concept as part-of another Concept, it will
then try to match the second part of the now assumed compound (lexical unit) to the
other Concepts it knows. If the match is successful, this compound word is also added
as an Expression, and Links are set between its composing lexical units.
This concludes the knowledge acquisition and organization process. Now the system is
ready to accept queries.
5.3.3 Solving the compound RAT (cRAT) queries
In the following we will refer to the compound RAT queries and test as cRAT and the
computational RAT solver for compound queries as comRAT-C. Whenever a 3-item RAT
query is received, the cRAT solver (comRAT-C) searches its KB for matching Concepts,
which are then activated (3 or less). All the Expressions in which these Concepts have
been known to participate are activated via the Links. Then all the Concepts which are
Linked to these Expressions elicited by the original 3 query words are activated. This
happens independently of whether the given cRAT query items are in the ﬁrst or second
position of an Expression. Thus the second item in all 2-item Expressions which contain
the initial query items become active, as it is shown in Table 5.2.
The system then checks for answers by searching its most activated concepts. Thus for
the query illustrated in Table 5.2, the activation coming from the items COTTAGE,
SWISS and CAKE converges upon the Concept CHEESE. However, more than one
convergence item is possible. Such queries thus elicit only the conceptual and problem
template layer in CreaCogs, as shown in Figure 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Example of activation of linked items for the query
COTTAGE, SWISS, CAKE.
(Cottage + *) OR (*+Cottage) (Swiss + *) OR (*+Swiss) (Cake + *) OR (*+Cake)
cottage cheese Swiss Alps cake batter
cottage garden Swiss army cake decorating
cottage industries Swiss ball cake ﬂour
cottage ... Swiss chard cake layer
... cottage Swiss cheese carrot cake
... cottage Swiss chocolate cheese cake
Figure 5.2: comRAT-C process in terms of CreaCogs
At the concept level, various items are thus activated because of their association with
query items in various compound templates. Overlap of activation of such associates
yields convergence to various common terms. A visual depiction of this mechanism at
the concept level is shown in 5.1. As can be seen here, the term chocolate is activated by
two of the initial query items, and the term cheese by all three. Multiple results coming
from a 3-item convergence are possible with this process.
Normative data like the one oﬀered by Bowden and Jung-Beeman [11] only oﬀer one
correct answer. For comparability, in the case in which convergence happens to yield
multiple results, the system is set to initially oﬀer the ﬁrst Concept found with highest
activation (which is simply set initially as activation coming from all 3 items). As
multiple items might be activated from all three concepts, a diﬀerent though still correct
answer to that obtained by the normative data could be oﬀered.
Furthermore, some of the compound terms which are known by the human participants
which solved the queries in the normative data [11] might not be known by the automated
solver. Thus other 3-item convergence answers could be oﬀered due to diﬀerences in the
KB. If no 3-item convergence is found, the system will propose the ﬁrst encountered
2-item on which convergence has happened.
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Figure 5.3: Visual depiction of the activation during a comRAT query
The algorithm implementing this process is shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: comRAT-C Solver Algorithm
Algorithm Finding convergent terms in comRAT-C
int maxValue = 0
cList = c1.getLinkedC() + c2.getLinkedC() + c3.getLinkedC()
for all cx : cList
KB.cx.updateActivation()
if KB.cx.getActivation() > maxV alue
answer = cx
maxValue = KB.cx.getActivation()
end if
end for
return answer, maxValue
This algorithm is quite fast - O(n), where n stands for the sum of the (variable) number
of links of each of the 3 given terms. However, this requires a pre-ordering of all the
concepts and their links based on the expressions in the knowledge base. As multiple
answers are sometimes possible, a hypothesis based on frequency data is formalized in
the next section on why humans prefer a certain answer, and the contribution of the
diﬀerent query items to answers. This modiﬁes the updateActivation() function using
frequency data from the 2-grams in the COCA corpus.
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5.4 Formalizing preferred answers and item contribution
This section formalizes the RAT, and shows the approach we propose in order to answer
two questions: a) why is an answer preferred over another? and b) how do the various
items contribute?
We deﬁne all known words in our knowledge base (KB) as setW and all known two-word
expressions (or 2-grams) as set E, so that:
w1, w2, w3, ..., wm ∈ W,W ∈ KB
e1, e2, e3, ..., en ∈ E,E ∈ KB, ek = (wx, wy)
As our known words are acquired from 2-grams, for each wx, ∃ ek ∈ E, so that either
ex = (wx, wy) or ex = (wy, wx) (both can also exist). Thus for each known word wx
there exists at least one expression which wx is known to be part of, be it that it is the
ﬁrst or second term in that expression. Compound words or expressions made from the
same words in a diﬀerent order are not equivalent, as it is made clear by the example of
the compound words boathouse and houseboat, thus:
(wx, wy) 	= (wy, wx)
For now, whenever we refer to term wx as being part of ex, it can appear in either
positions - (wx, wy) or (wy, wx)
3.
Any RAT query is of the form:
qabc = (wa, wb, wc),
and its result will be set Sabc (which includes the empty set):
wx ∈ ea ∩ eb ∩ ec, wx ∈ Sabc, Sabc ∈ W
For our further analysis, we assume the probability of the three initial query terms to
be equal:
P (wa) = P (wb) = P (wc) =
1
3
For each of the given terms - wa, wb and wc - the set of expressions they participate in
with other terms is ea, eb and ea, e.g.
4:
ea = {(wa, w1), (w2, wa), (w3, wa), ...., (wa, wm)}
eb = {(wb, w1), (w12, wb), (w30, wb), ...., (wb, wn)}
ec = {(wc, w9), (w12, wc), (w22, wc), ...., (wc, wk)}
3Ordering inﬂuences will be addressed in section 5.10.
4The indices are not incremented by one unit because that would imply every one of the given 3
words to be connected with all the others. Instead wb might only be connected to w1, w12, w30, etc.
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Each of the expressions the given terms participate in will have associated with them
a frequency in our corpus. The total frequency of expressions (fr) in which the given
terms participate is calculated as:
m∑
i=1
fr(ea) =
m∑
i=1
(wa, wi) (5.1a)
n∑
i=1
fr(eb) =
n∑
i=1
(wb, wi) (5.1b)
k∑
i=1
fr(ec) =
k∑
i=1
(wc, wi) (5.1c)
For all possible answer terms wx ∈ Sabc, the likelihood that they will be the preferred
answer if frequency of use is the factor deciding the preferred answer, is calculated as
follows.
Simple probability that each answer should appear is computed using the number of
favourable cases that answer appears in combination with each of the items (fr(wa, wx),
fr(wb, wx) and fr(wc, wx)) and the number of total cases of each of the given query
terms (
m∑
i=1
fr(ea),
n∑
i=1
fr(eb),
∑
i=1
kfr(ek)).
Thus the simple probability formula: P(x) = Favourable cases
Total cases
becomes:
P (wx | wa) = fr(wa, wx)m∑
i=1
fr(ea)
(5.2a)
P (wx | wb) = fr(wb, wx)n∑
i=1
fr(eb)
(5.2b)
P (wx | wc) = fr(wc, wx)k∑
i=1
fr(ek)
(5.2c)
The total probability that wx should be the preferred response based on frequency of
expressions is:
P (wx) =
P (wx | wa) + P (wx | wb) + P (wx | wc)
3
(5.3)
This is then done for all possible answers. Thus, given possible answers wx, wy, wz, with
wx, wy, wz ∈ Sabc, the preferred answer based on frequency will be wp, where:
wp = max(P (wx), P (wy), P (wz)) (5.4)
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Bayes’s theorem is then applied a posteriori to see how much each of the given terms
contributed to ﬁnding preferred answer wp:
P (wa | wp) = P (wa)× P (wp | wa)
P (wp)
(5.5a)
P (wb | wp) = P (wb)× P (wp | wb)
P (wp)
(5.5b)
P (wc | wp) = P (wc)× P (wp | wc)
P (wp)
(5.5c)
For each solution (preferred or not) in Sabc, a triple cabc,x can be calculated for the
contributions of each initial term wa, wb, wc to solution wx. Thus for the preferred
solution wp:
cabc,p = (P (wa | wp), P (wb | wp), P (wc | wp)) (5.6)
and the maximum contributing item is max(P (wa | wp), P (wb | wp), P (wc | wp).
5.5 comRAT-C Experimentation and Results
To evaluate the performance of the comRAT-C, the normative data from Bowden and
M. Jung-Beeman [11] has been used. The results (see Table 5.4) show that out of the
144 items used in Bowden and M. Jung-Beeman’s test, 64 are answered correctly5 by
the proposed system. Out of these, for 47 of all given queries all three items were
known. These refer to the three expressions needed to answer the query - E1 = c1cx,
E2 = c2, cx, E3 = c3, cx - where c1, c2 and c3 are the given query words, and cx is the
correct answer from the normative data. The accuracy of the system is thus 97.92%
when all three expressions are known, without using any frequency data or complex
activation mechanisms, based on associative convergence principles alone.
Table 5.4: Analysis of comRAT-C’s performance in relation to known items.
Number of Expressions known => 0 E 1 E 2 E 3 E Total
Correct Answers 0 0 17 47 64
Plausible Answers 2 11 12 1 26
Not solved 4 23 27 0 54
Total 6 34 56 48
Accuracy 30.36% 97.92%
We called some of the answers obtained “plausible answers”, as they are not the given
correct answers in the normative data, however they could be considered as interesting
or good enough answers from the human perspective. Table 5.5 shows such plausible
answers. Some such plausible answers arise from data regularity, converging upon items
which are common to the three query items and possibly to many others, for example
adjectives like great, big, small. Other plausible answers are more interesting, surprising
5Correctness in this case is considered as the exact answer provided by the system on its ﬁrst try.
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and can be considered more “creative” from the human perspective; they oﬀer as a
response a noun or another word which is indeed a speciﬁc remote associate of this
particular 3 words tuple, rather than a word which might be a common associate to
multiple tuples (e.g. words like easy, small, black, etc).
A more rigorous description of the two cases might be that interesting items are items
with which the 3 elements in the query form new concepts, while the “regular” items
are attributes which are perhaps characteristic of many items (or form with the second
element an attribute-concept pair). In this case taking into account the frequencies
of such items or their part-of-speech tag might endow the system with the ability to
diﬀerentiate between surprising and regular plausible answers.
Table 5.5: Some of the plausible answers obtained by the computational RAT.
No. w1 w2 w3 Answer1 [11] Answer2
1 High District House SCHOOL STATE
2 Health Taker Less CARE RISK
3 Cat Number Phone CALL HOUSE
4 Chamber Mask Natural GAS DEATH
5 Self Attorney Spending DEFENSE BILL
6 Fight Control Machine GUN POLITICAL
7 Oﬀ Military First BASE PAY
8 French Car Shoe HORN COMPANY
9 Cry Front Ship BATTLE WAR
10 Change Circuit Cake SHORT DESIGN
11 Child Scan Wash BRAIN BODY
12 Mill Tooth Dust SAW GOLD
13 Home Sea Bed SICK WATER
In order to accurately assess the performance of the system, the knowledge in the KB-
comRAT needs to be compared to the knowledge required to solve the items in the
normative data [11] test. Figure 5.4 oﬀers such a visual analysis, showing the overlap
between comRAT’s performance (solved, plausible, not solved queries) and the number
of known query items. For some queries in Bowden’s data, the system simply did not
have enough knowledge to respond.
As Table 5.4 shows, in the cases where comRAT-C had all 3 items in its database, its
correctness of response when compared with normative answers was at 97.92%, while
when comRAT-C only knew two of the given expressions, it was ﬁnding the correct
answers in 30.36% of the cases. This is a bonus since humans are normally assumed to
know all the three items when answering a RAT query correctly, or to at least be able
to verify whether the 3rd expression is a valid, meaningful one.
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Figure 5.4: comRAT Results and their relation to the knowledge base: a) Left up -
Correct, Plausible and not answered items; b) Left down - Number of known items per
query; c) Right - Distribution of knowledge items over items answered
5.6 Preferred convergence - empirical analysis
This section presents results on whether the items preferred by humans as an answer
match the probability of answer (calculated as shown in Section 5.4) based on frequency
data from the corpus.
Four queries from the normative dataset where answered correctly and had multiple
interesting answers. Items where other correct answers where very common (like little,
great, only, big etc.) where put aside. These queries and their correct answers from the
normative data where the following:
1. High District House. Answer: School
2. Chamber Mask Natural. Answer: Gas
3. Self Attorney Spending. Answer: Defense
4. Back Step Screen. Answer: Door
Table 5.6 shows the frequency-based probability for each answer of the four queries,
calculated as shown in equations 5.2 and 5.3. Results have been rounded. The answers
are arranged in decreasing order of their frequency based probability (with the maximum
probability item to the left side). In all four cases, the ﬁrst answer (A1) which oﬀers the
highest probability is also the one which is considered correct in the normative data.
This shows that items with highest frequency might be the ones preferred by humans,
and such a hypothesis is testable (see section 5.10).
The contribution of the three items to the preferred responses calculated as shown in
Section 5.4 is shown in Table: 5.7. The highest contributing item is shown in bold.
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Table 5.6: Frequency-based probability for the multiple answers of four queries
Query A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11
High District House School Court Historic U.S. Oﬃcials Oﬃce Water State Suburban Light Church
Answer Probability 0.1850 0.0306 0.0069 0.0061 0.0046 0.0034 0.0033 0.0027 0.0012 0.0012 8.8E-4
Chamber Mask Natural Gas Death
Answer Probability 0.1162 0.0240
Self Attorney Spending Defense Bill Personal Private
Answer Probability 0.0767 0.0146 0.0059 0.0056
Back Step Screen Door Porch
Answer Probability 0.0485 0.0063
Table 5.7: Contribution of the three items to various answers
Query Answer Item 1 Item 2 Item 3
High District House School 0.60 0.40 0.00
High District House Court 0.07 0.83 0.10
Chamber Mask Natural Gas 0.24 0.43 0.33
Chamber Mask Natural Death 0.45 0.50 0.05
Self Attorney Spending Defense 0.25 0.47 0.27
Self Attorney Spending Bill 0.32 0.03 0.65
Back Step Screen Door 0.34 0.02 0.64
Back Step Screen Porch 0.66 0.19 0.14
Contribution of items, calculated as shown in equations 5.5 and 5.6, can help further
manipulation of preferred answer. When the ﬁrst item strongly contributes to a par-
ticular response, and the two responses are close in probability, changing the order of
the three items to show the strongly contributing items to one response or another ﬁrst
might help change the answer which is given by human participants.
5.7 Correlation with diﬃculty in human data
A correlation between the frequency based probability of results for the queries in table
5.6 and the diﬃculty of the RAT query in Bowden’s normative data was observed (see
Table 5.8). The number of participants that could solve a particular test item decreased
with probability based on frequency to trigger that item. The time taken to solve a
query by human participants increased the lower the probability for comRAT-C to ﬁnd
the answer item based on frequency data.
Table 5.8: Frequency-based probability for the multiple answers of four queries.
Query Probability % of participants solving (15s) Mean Solution Time (s)
High District House 0.1850 55 5.59
Chamber Mask Natural 0.1162 53 5.86
Self Attorney Spending 0.0767 4 8.42
Back Step Screen 0.0485 0 -
After this observation was made, more data was analysed in order to check for this
correlation on all the queries which fulﬁlled the following three conditions: a) comRAT-
C could answer them correctly; b) comRAT-C had knowledge of all three expressions
formed by the RAT query items and the correct answer and c) normative data was
available in the Bowden paper. 48 such items were found.
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The probability that an answer will be found by comRAT-C given the frequency data
correlates positively with human data on how many people can solve the test and neg-
atively on how fast they can solve it. Table 5.9 shows a summary of correlations and p
values for all the 48 correct answers, for participants being given 7, 15 or 30 seconds to
solve the problem.
Table 5.9: Correlation between probability based on frequency and human data, and
its signiﬁcance. MST stands for Mean Solution Time, and % PS stands for Percentage
of participants solving.
Measure % PS 7s % PS 15s % PS 30s MST 7s MST 15s MST 30s
Correlation P (wx) r = 0.45 r = 0.41 r = 0.49 r = −0.39 r = −0.3 r = −0.52
Signiﬁcance p < 0.002 p < 0.004 p < 0.002 p < 0.007 p < 0.04 p < 0.001
Upon further analysis, this correlation was due to the ﬁrst two terms - P (wx | wa) and
P (wx | wb), with the third term P (wx | wc) not being correlated to human performance.
Table 5.10 shows all three such correlations, together with the correlation between the
added probabilities of ﬁnding the ﬁrst two query items.
Table 5.10: Correlation based on P (wx | wa), P (wx | wb) and P (wx | wc). MST
stands for Mean Solution Time, and % PS stands for Percentage of participants solving.
Measure % PS 7s % PS 15s % PS 30s MST 7s MST 15s MST 30s
Correlation P (wx | wa) r = 0.38 r = 0.33 r = 0.4 r = −0.29 r = −0.25 r = −0.33
Correlation P (wx | wb) r = 0.40 r = 0.44 r = 0.53 r = −0.43 r = −0.26 r = −0.33
Correlation P (wx | wc) r = −0.11 r = −0.18 r = −0.07 r = 0.11 r = 0.04 r = 0.05
Correlation P (wx | wa) + P (wx | wb) r = 0.47 r = 0.45 r = 0.51 r = −0.41 r = −0.30 r = −0.41
5.8 Generative abilities of comRAT
A system like comRAT, which can ﬁnd convergences between given items of a query,
their known expressions and possible RAT answers, can also reverse-engineer this process
to propose queries which should be solvable by humans.
This can be done by checking for all convergences between all 3 items possibilities, thus
taking wa, wb and wc as variables, and replacing them with all the words in the corpus,
and saving as potential RAT queries the items which have at least one convergent term
wr, to be the RAT query response item. This process is computationally exhaustive. Its
costs depends on the initial size of the knowledge base (n), with a full run amounting to
speciﬁcally n∗ (n−1)∗ (n−2), thus approximately n3. Then all these generated queries
might need to be checked to remove very common attributes (like little, great, only, big
etc.), or the entire process could be restrained to nouns.
However, with comRAT;s type of knowledge organization, this RAT query generating
process can also be done by checking the items linked to each item after the knowledge
organization has been performed. Thus, one could check the Concepts by considering
them potential response items wr. Whenever a wr has more than three links, these can
be considered as items wa, wb, wc, wd..., wn. Queries can then be made out of various
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combinations of these items, obtained via the links to wr, with the cost of one pass
through the entire KB (n).
Some queries thus obtained are shown below:
1. Answer: StarRAT Query Items: movie, rock, pop, neutron, formation, basket-
ball, power, football, witness, ﬁlm, system, clusters, cluster, player, track, tennis,
shooting, guest, anise, child;
2. Answer: GlassRAT Query Items: doors, door, windows, window, ceiling, wall,
beads, case, plate, window, wine, bowl, water, bottles, jar, walls, shot, jars, panels,
cases, martini;
3. Answer: Silver RAT Query Items: medal, lining, sterling, bullet, hair, screen,
medalist, tray, spoon;
4. Answer: TableRAT Query Items: breakfast, pool, card, water, night, dressing,
operating, side, bargaining, end, dining-room, corner, buﬀet, tennis, defense, top,
lamp, salt, manners, oak;
5. Answer: Box RAT Query Items: oﬃce, ballot, dialog, boom, lunch, press,
jewelry, music, glove, shoe, metal, jury, deposit, cigar, litter, set, tackle, oﬃce,
spring, plastic, toe.
More examples can be seen in Table A.3 of Appendix A.
This technique can further use the frequency data to generate, for each answer item,
queries with diﬀerent probability (as weighed by the ﬁrst two terms). This can be used
to generate RAT queries fast to check whether the correlation with between diﬃculty of
query for humans and the probability of the ﬁrst two items holds over a larger body of
data. Generating RAT queries with comRAT and then gathering human data on them
can be used to further check this correlation.
Furthermore, in such an experiment one could measure whether indeed the frequency of
the ﬁrst two expression plays a decisive role independent of the frequency of the answer
item wr. This is because one can yield multiple queries with the same response item,
keeping wr as a stable variable, and only manipulating query items via their frequency.
The ﬁrst presented technique will need to be applied in order to generate tests with
multiple correct answers, of diﬀerent probabilities. This then can be used to check to
what extent the preferred answer can reliably be predicted using frequency data.
The semantic domain of the query items might play a role in the diﬃculty of the query,
and in making the query more interesting, or the answer to be considered as more cre-
ative. Thus, in the second example of the list of queries generated above from answers
(answer: Glass), items like “door” and “window” or “martini” and “wine” taken to-
gether are part of the same semantic domain, triggering the same interpretation of the
response word “glass”. They might thus not qualify for a convergence across semantic
domains. A more interesting query in the context of the same example would be “door”,
“wine”, “case”. Such experimentation would need knowledge of semantic domains to be
formalized and automatized.
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The general premise of the RAT test deals with the principle of “remote” association.
“Remoteness” could be understood in a variety of ways, including as diﬀerence of se-
mantic domain. However, remoteness could also be expressed in our current data as a
low amount of frequency of expression. Thus RAT items with lower probability to be
answered might not just be harder for human participants, but also considered more
creative by them. A set of such queries could be generated to check this hypothesis as
judged by human observers on some designed scale, and compare these items to objec-
tively high frequency and medium frequency items. This would shed light on whether
such quantitative means of assessing frequency correlate with qualitative judgements of
creativity, due to the originality component of creativity evaluations.
In summary, such generative techniques enabled by the comRAT allow further manip-
ulation of new Remote Associates tests, thus constituting a great tool to enable the
cognitive scientist, psychologist or linguist to further experiment with the task and dis-
seminate the processes which take part in its solving. Some possibilities for such further
work are, but are not restricted to:
• Verifying on a larger scale whether diﬃculty of answer is correlated to the prob-
ability of the ﬁrst two query terms. Also checking if this is independent of the
answer term, by keeping the answer the same.
• Gathering further data on the probability based preferred item hypothesis.
• Checking to see whether lower frequency items make for what is considered more
creative RAT queries and answers.
• Determining the impact semantic domain has on solving such queries.
5.9 Expanding the Remote Associates Test to the visual
domain
An important research question is whether such processes as the ones used by comRAT
could be explored in a domain which is not linguistic. This would bring about a variety
of advantages, including the following:
(i) The ability to dispel some fears in the literature that performance in the RAT
might reﬂect language ﬂuency performance more than creativity, by providing a
way to reliably diﬀerentiate between the two components of such performance;
(ii) The ability to study a cognitive process in diﬀerent domains, thus ensuring both
domain independence and an ability to study domain inﬂuences;
(iii) The ability to give a creativity test in two diﬀerent domains (such a test currently
does not exist; though test batteries like the TTCT have sections which address
visual creativity and others which address language, a test that can transfer across
domains is not yet present in the literature);
(iv) Ability to deal in a more uniﬁed manner with creative processes, thus make
stronger cross-domain and more reﬁned intra-domain claims about process.
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However, a visual version of the Remote Associates Test did not exist in the literature,
thus we had to create our own. After this, comRAT was expanded to respond to such
a test. The next sections describe this as follows: the steps taken to use our previous
formalization to create a visual variant of the Remote Associates Test (vRAT) are ex-
plained in section 5.9.1. The set up of a study with human participants to deploy the
visual variant of the RAT is described in section 5.9.2. The adaptation of the knowledge
base of comRAT in order to make it a visual RAT solver (comRAT-V) is described in
section 5.9.3. Results with human participants in vRAT and with comRAT-V for the
same queries are detailed in sections 5.9.4 and 5.9.5.
5.9.1 Expanding RAT to vRAT
In order to expand the RAT to a visual domain, the previous formalization was used.
Thus given a 3 item query in which wa,wb and wc are the query terms, and wx is the
answer term, three items (wa, wx), (wb, wx) and (wc, wx) or their reverse - (wx, wa),
(wx, wb) and (wx, wc) - must exist and be known to the solver
6 in order for the query to
be valid and answerable.
Starting from this, we replaced query terms wa,wb and wc with visual representations
of objects and scenes, so that wx is a visual representation of an object which can be
given as answer. The idea was to count on experience with said objects and visuospatial
schemas of the participants to trigger associates and converge upon the answer object.
In this context, order of visual entities may be irrelevant in the same terms in which it
mattered in language7.
A visual query constructed on these principles is shown in Figure 5.5. Thus items
handle, glove and pen are given, and the answer expected, associated with each of
these objects, is hand.
Figure 5.5: Example of a visual RAT question. This ﬁrst training query shows the
participants visual entities handle, glove and pen. The answer is hand
We considered each initial object of the query to have a variety of visual associates
in the mind of the participants, as language terms would have word associates in the
original language-based RAT. In the example in Figure 5.5, visual associates of entities
(handle, hand), (glove, hand) and (hand, pen) are necessary in order to solve the
6Two out of three items known might be enough for a human solver if they can still discover wx and
then assess whether the third term and wx form a meaningful construct.
7However spatial position of items may not be irrelevant. This will have to be settled in future work.
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query. In the next section, the application of these principles in a study with human
participants is described.
5.9.2 Study with human participants
In order to run the newly designed vRAT variant with human participants, 22 such
queries were composed (two were used as training queries and 20 as main test queries).
A process of cognitive knowledge acquisition meant to inform the knowledge base of the
computational solver (comRAT-V) was set up, by asking participants in this study to also
provide visual associates to the objects in the test. If they solved a query including those
objects, participants could be biased towards providing certain associates (or providing
them ﬁrst when they would not have otherwise). For this reason, measures needed to be
taken so that the participants give associates to queries they haven’t solved. To ensure
this, the study was split in two parts, and the participants were assigned in four random
groups. In the following, the two parts and the four group design are explained.
Part 1 - Training and Test
The 22 queries each showed 3 visual stimuli each, be it objects or scenes. Both objects
and scenes where provided in the training queries (the two training queries are shown
in Figure 5.5 and 5.6). Thus 5 objects and 1 scene where presented in training, and 54
objects and 6 scenes in the test itself.
Figure 5.6: Second training vRAT query showed to the participants items bathtub,
glass and beach. The answer is water.
Participants were instructed that they will be presented with three objects or scenes
and required to provide a fourth element related to each of them. In the context of the
two training examples, they were then instructed to assess how they ﬁrst perceived the
answer; they could choose between (i) Visual imagery (if they assessed they imagined
the answer), (ii) Word (if they perceived the answer verbally) or (iii) Other (case in
which they had to specify).
They were then instructed to provide an assessment of each query’s diﬃculty, on a
Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very Easy) to 7 (Very Hard). After these instructions
where provided in the context of the training examples, the participants where directed
to 15 of the 20 visual RAT queries. The objects in the remaining 5 queries (diﬀerent
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for each group as will be explained below) were meant to be used in the knowledge
acquisition phase.
Part 2 - Knowledge Acquisition
In the second part of the study, the participants were asked to contribute visual associates
to a set of 15 objects (5 unseen queries * 3 objects). The task was explained in the
following manner:
“Visual associates are things you see when you imagine a particular object.
These might be other objects, which are situated next to the object that you
are imagining in some circumstance, or speciﬁc parts of the object you are
imagining.”
Examples of various visual associates were then provided for some objects:
“For example, visual associates for “glove” might be: hand, thorns, snow,
scalpel, hot pan, bike, dirt. Visual associates for “pen” might be: paper,
notebook, letter, test, form, cheque, desk, ink, drawing, writing, pen holder,
ear, pen case, pencil, etc.”
The instruction for the participants when given an object was to “Imagine each item,
and then write the visual associates that come to mind”.
In order for all objects to be given visual associates to, while also having a good number
of participants answering each of the queries, the test was set up to be administered in
four groups, via four diﬀerent Google form surveys. The participants selected the group
themselves by using a coin randomizer8, in which the participants would ﬂip two Euro
coins and thus settle on a heads or tails position combination. The image thus obtained
via the randomizer was used to guide the participants to one of the four forms of the
surveys.
In terms of the group design, the 20 test questions where split in four 5-question groups,
as presented in Table 5.11. Each of the four groups was shown the two training queries,
was asked to solve 3 sets of questions (15 queries) and to provide visual associates for
the objects in the remaining 5 queries. These objects were presented in an alternate
order, thus not to trigger the convergent associate which would be the answer.
Thus, visual associates were provided by human participants to all objects and scenes in
the vRAT. These visual associates were further used by the knowledge base of comRAT-
V.
8https://www.random.org/coins/?num=2&cur=60-eur.germany-1euro
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Table 5.11: The four groups and their assigned tasks. “Q” denotes a question, and n
the number of participants in each group.
Study items Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Answers
n = 8 n = 15 n = 8 n = 12 per item
vRAT Training Examples Yes Yes Yes Yes Shown to all
vRAT Q1-5 Yes Yes Yes No Gr. 1, 2, 3 (n = 31)
vRAT Q6-10 Yes Yes No Yes Gr. 1, 2, 4 (n = 35)
vRAT Q11-15 Yes No Yes Yes Gr. 1, 3, 4 (n = 28)
vRAT Q16-20 No Yes Yes Yes Gr. 2, 3, 4 (n = 35)
Visual associates Q16-20 Q11-15 Q6-10 Q1-5 all objects
for objects in questions across groups
5.9.3 From comRAT to comRAT-V
In the previously described implementation of the comRAT-C solver of compound RAT
queries (5.3), n-grams (speciﬁcally 2-grams) from a language corpus were used to gen-
erate the template (Expression) knowledge and form the associative links between con-
cepts. Furthermore, frequency data from the same corpus was used in a probability
based algorithm (5.4) in order to select the preferred answer in cases of multiple possi-
ble responses, and this correlated with diﬃculty from human normative data (5.5).
In the visual expansion version - comRAT-V - the visual associates provided by human
participants were used in the same way as n-grams in comRAT-C. Thus visual associates
for the 60 objects were used to provide an equivalent to the “Expression Templates” in
comRAT-C, informing the KB of comRAT-V, which again organized its knowledge in
Concepts, Links and Visual Templates9 (which replaced Expression Templates).
The frequency with which the participants provided a certain visual associate was used
as a base for the same probability algorithm in order to break possible ties, and check
for correlation with diﬃculty. This amount of data is of course too small to draw strong
conclusions, and diﬀerent ways to extract larger amounts of such data will be discussed
in Section 5.10. However, the current expansion provided satisfactory results in terms
of adapting the RAT to a visual version. The results with human participants and with
comRAT-V will be presented in the following sections.
5.9.4 Results with human participants
A total of 43 participants completed the study, 30 male and 13 female. The age of the
participants ranged between (btw.) 20 and 60 years old (y.o.), as follows:
• 6 btw. 20-30 y.o.
• 19 btw. 30-40 y.o.
• 14 btw. 40-50 y.o.
• 4 btw. 50-60 y.o.
The English proﬁciency level of participants was (as declared by participants):
9Visual Templates can also be seen as a form of visual context.
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• Intermediate - 9
• Advanced - 21
• Proﬁcient - 10
• Native - 3
Human participants solved on average 63% of the vRAT, as shown in Figure 5.7. The
performance on queries varied between 6.45% (Q5) and 97.1% (Q20). Queries can be
classiﬁed in diﬀerent levels of diﬃculty based on the performance, with Q5, Q13 and
Q16 being the most diﬃcult, and Q8, Q18, Q20 the easiest.
Figure 5.7: Percentage of correct answers per query, as solved by the human partici-
pants.
In terms of self-appraised perception of answer, as it ﬁrst appeared, participants consid-
ered they perceived the answer mostly visually (56.6%) or as a word (38.9%), with some
participants choosing the Other category. Out of the Other category, some participants
speciﬁed they perceived the answer via a diﬀerent sense modality (0.16%), for example
perceiving the feeling of heat when the answer was ﬁre.
The responses on how the answer was perceived per query item are shown in Figure 5.8.
Thus the last 7 queries where perceived as much more visual on average than queries
Q5, Q10 and Q13.
Figure 5.8: Type of solution appearance as self-declared by participants per query.
Participants were asked to rate the diﬃculty of the problems on a 1-7 Likert scale. The
results of this rating are shown in Figure 5.9, together with the standard deviation (SD)
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of the ratings. Participants rated problems at an average of 3.41 diﬃculty on the Likert
scale. They rated problems Q5, Q12 and Q7 as being the hardest, and problems Q18,
Q14 and Q19 as the easiest, in the respective order.
Figure 5.9: Diﬃculty ratings for the 20 problems, as expressed by the human partic-
ipants.
Perception of diﬃculty might be individual or biased by intrinsic experience, and thus
not reﬂect the actual average diﬃculty of the problems. To check whether the average
of subjective diﬃculty ratings was related to actual average diﬃculty of problems as
expressed by percentage of participants solving the problem, a correlation between these
two types of values was run across the 20 problems. A negative high correlation of -0.78
with signiﬁcance of p < 0.001 was found between percentage of solvers and diﬃculty
ratings. Thus the more participants solve the problem, the lower the expressed rating.
Thus it seems participants can on average estimate diﬃculty of a visual query quite
reliably on a Likert scale, perhaps as a function of their own performance.
5.9.5 Results with comRAT-V
As explained before, the visual associates provided by the human participants to objects
in queries which they haven’t seen were used for the knowledge base of comRAT-V,
with the knowledge organization and process of query solving being similar to that of
comRAT-C. In this context, with no use of frequency, comRAT-V was already solving
63.64% of the query items. After calculating frequency, the accuracy of comRAT-V
responses as related to knowledge items existing in its KB is shown in Table 5.12. Thus
comRAT-V answered correctly 16 out of 22 queries. Most of the correct answers (13)
were found via 3 items convergences, no answer was found in the case of only one useful
visual associate being known, and 3 correct and 3 plausible answers were yielded in the
case of 2 useful visual associates being known.
A few queries encountered 2 or more possible answers. For example, for Q8, two answers
were possible in the 3-item convergence - cheese and meat. In the case of Q21 - (comb,
razor, shampoo) - a larger set of 4 possible answers is found via convergence from the
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Table 5.12: Analysis of the accuracy of responses considering knowledge coming from
visual associates in comRAT-V.
1 item known 2 items known 3 items known Total
Correct 0 3 13 16
Plausible 0 3 0 3
Not solved 2 1 0 3
Total 2 7 13 22
Accuracy - 42.86% (85.71%) 100% 72.73%
3 query items (water, bathroom, hair, mirror). The correct answers are chosen in
both cases using the frequency-based likelihood.
To correctly answered items, comRAT-V also oﬀered other plausible solutions, which
for simplicity we did not include in Table 5.12. This table includes only the highest
probability-based items, and plausible answers when no correct answer was found. A
total number of 10 other plausible answers appears in comRAT-V’s solution spaces.
The amount of knowledge in comRAT-V’s KB is a powerful inﬂuencer on performance.
As shown in Table 5.12 and presented in a visual manner in Figure 5.10, current per-
formance when all 3 items were known was 100%. Note that this is not necessarily
the case, as other plausible items might have a higher frequency. Also, it is reasonable
to believe that this level of performance is likely to decrease when aiming to answer
computationally a larger set of queries, with a larger knowledge base.
Figure 5.10: Visual representation of the inﬂuence of knowledge on answer accuracy.
A correlation between the likelihood that comRAT-V would ﬁnd an answer and the
diﬃculty ratings of vRAT queries as provided by humans was observed. A moderate-high
negative correlation p = −0.64 with moderate-high signiﬁcance p = 0.01 was observed
between the two values. Thus, the more likely comRAT-V is to solve a query, the
lower the diﬃculty expressed by human participants when rating the same query. The
percentage of solvers showed a positive yet non-signiﬁcant correlation (r = 0.41) with
comRAT-V’s likelihood of ﬁnding a solution, and more data is needed to check whether
this could become a signiﬁcant relation. However, altogether these results show that
comRAT-V’s likelihood algorithm and the CreaCogs convergence by association process
captures something about the diﬃculty of the process of solving these queries, in the
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same manner in which the results of the same algorithm, applied in comRAT-C, showed
an interesting relationship to human data.
5.10 Discussion and Further Work
In this section, the discussion is focused on explaining the following aspects: (i) the
place of comRAT in CreaCogs, cognitive processes implemented and artifacts of imple-
mentation; (ii) comRAT-C performance and limitations; (iii) preferred item selection
hypothesis and correlation with human data on diﬃculty; (iv) application of process
with visual stimuli and (v) comRAT perspectives including using diﬀerent data and
generative abilities
(i) place of comRAT in CreaCogs, cognitive processes implemented and ar-
tifacts of implementation
This implementation is a step further towards the automation of CreaCogs speciﬁcally
the use of associative links for problem solving via convergence, and the upward search
mechanism proposed in Section 4. The system proposed here models a convergent way
of ﬁnding an answer, with a pop-up eﬀect of such an answer. Thus, the query elicits the
knowledge of the agent, an implicit search over that knowledge base happens, and the
answers come up as a result of convergent activation from diﬀerent initial conceptual
points.
This process is not a classic problem-solving search process. Rather it is a form of search
in which the next possible states are proposed via association. These states are the items
associated with the objects oﬀered in the query - which is taken to represent the initial
problem state. The problem space becomes the cognitive space of all the associations
the agent can ﬁnd to the initial problem state in its knowledge base. In this case, three
diﬀerent lexical items ﬁnd the fourth element (answer) because they converge on it by
associative power. The initial items can act as initial constraints of the search, because
of the way the knowledge base of the system is organized.
In RAT the pop-up or the “aha!” eﬀect is the “sudden” appearance of the solution item
(or a possible solution item) in the attention of the agent. The comRAT-C assumes that
this pop-up happens via a convergence of the associative mechanism. CreaCogs posits
that this is what happens at much higher levels of complexity, and with much deeper
constraints, in insight problem solving.
The set-up of the knowledge base in the proposed system and the stimuli used are
symbolic. This is not a commitment that cognitive processing in such cases would
take part on a symbolic level alone, but an artifact of this particular implementation.
The proof of concept presented here uses lexical symbolic information because of ease
of access to both training data (lexical corpuses) and human performance data in the
literature (the RAT normative data). The principles used in comRAT-C are assumed
to be applicable to other types of data, as discussed in point (iv).
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(ii) comRAT-C performance and limitations
After the initial implementation of comRAT-C, its performance in answering compound
RAT queries when given enough knowledge was high (97.92%), even if frequency was not
used to select best answer. This suggests the type of knowledge, knowledge representa-
tion and convergence processes used are enough to automate such a task. Furthermore,
comRAT-C proved robustness when dealing with incomplete knowledge, by ﬁnding the
answer in some cases in which only two expression terms were known.
The limitations of comRAT-C are related to the amount of knowledge in its knowledge
base. Also, in the case of knowing two items, humans can check whether the third
item “ﬁts” the answer converged upon with two items. The automatic solver has no
mechanism to decide whether such an answer is absurd or can work in the context of
the third item.
The comRAT system has an ability to generate diﬀerent plausible answers or multiple
correct answers. This ability creates the opportunity for further study into what answers
are preferred by humans (iii) and what answers are considered as more creative or what
queries are considered as more interesting. Regarding the plausible answers, some of
them are interesting from a cognitive perspective. Part of them are semantically-related
to the “correct” answer oﬀered by Bowden and Jung-Beeman [11], like items 1, 2, 3,
11, 13 in Table 5.5, either by semantic similarity (11,13) or opposition (3) between
correct and plausible answer, between one expression and the plausible answer (2) or
just semantic neighborhood (1). This points at a possible inherent structure of the
associative data which requires further study.
The system was not built to speciﬁcally answer this normative data: as mentioned before,
its knowledge was compared to the knowledge required to solve this set of normative
queries only post-factum. The system was built in a general enough manner as to be
able to attempt to answer any other normative datasets of queries on similar tests which
are given to human participants. The only restrictions come from the nature of the
associations made by the system - thus structural associates queries will have a higher
likelihood to be answered - and from the limitations of the knowledge base. Any other
n-gram corpuses can be implemented as a source for comRAT-C’s knowledge base.
(iii) preferred items selection hypothesis and correlation with human data
on diﬃculty
As comRAT-C can come up with multiple results for a RAT query, a frequency based
mechanism of exploration for the most probable answers was proposed, as to check
whether this explains the answers preferred by human participants, or considered correct
in the Bowden normative data.
The highest probability results coincided with the answers preferred by people in all four
multiple answer cases with 3 known expression terms. More data is necessary to validate
or falsify this probability based preference hypothesis, however these initial results are
promising. Further data was obtained on the contribution of each item in the RAT
queries to each answer. Complete data on these contributions and probability for the
49 correct items is given in Table A.2 of Appendix A.
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The generative capabilities of the comRAT can be used to devise more RAT tests for
which there are enough multiple answers in comRAT-KB as to allow for the preferred
item hypothesis to be fully veriﬁed in a statistically signiﬁcant manner. More language
data can also be added on lower frequency items, or from other corpuses, to allow the
comRAT to give multiple answers to more queries, thus allowing for further validation.
A moderate correlation with strong signiﬁcance was observed between the frequency of
answers in the language KB and the percentage of participants solving the respective
queries. An inverse moderate correlation with strong signiﬁcance was observed between
probability of item selection and response times. As observed in Table 5.10, this corre-
lation was mainly due to the probability of the ﬁrst and second terms of the query.
This correlation is not strong enough to enable us to build a predictive mechanism of
human response times and general query diﬃculty based on frequency. However its
signiﬁcance points to it being a contributing factor in the future building of such a
predictive mechanism. Thus the current comRAT-C can be used as a tool in further
cognitive modeling of the compound RAT. Other RAT queries can also be generated
with comRAT and then given to human participants, in order to check if this correlation
holds in other experiments.
(iv) application of process with visual stimuli The transfer of the comRAT process
to visual stimuli, including the formalization and construction of a visual form of the
RAT test had the purpose to check: a) whether a creativity test can be applied on
multiple modalities and b) whether the CreaCogs convergence process can be applied
independent of modality.
Based on the current results, humans can solve such queries, and diﬀerent levels of
diﬃculty can be envisaged. The diﬃculty of queries can be reliably estimated by humans.
Future work related to the visual RAT will relate to creating a larger set of queries,
testing such queries on a larger number of participants, gathering response time data
and diﬃculty data. However, the initial small set of queries in vRAT shows promise in
terms of administering the RAT test in two diﬀerent modalities. This can further be used
in order to isolate performance inﬂuences on the RAT which are due to verbal ﬂuency or
visual abilities. This is the only creativity test to date to have been given in two diﬀerent
modalities, as the visual or language creativity tests that exist (in TTCT) are diﬀerent
in content and do not aim to account for the application of the same process. The ability
to investigate this process further across modalities will oﬀer cognitive psychologists the
possibility to understand this process further.
The comRAT-V system’s performance was promising, despite the limited amount of
visual associates data. In the future, more such data needs to be gathered, either from
human participants or by setting up a mechanism to extract such visuospatial relations
from existing data - for example from images depicting scenes. However, the initial
correlation of comRAT-V’s results with human diﬃculty shows that comRAT itself might
be successfully applied in both domains, with the process it embodies representing some
signiﬁcant similarities to that employed by humans when solving such queries.
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(v) comRAT perspectives including using diﬀerent data and generative abil-
ities
The comRAT perspectives discussed in this section refer to four major topics: a) com-
parison and transfer to other categories of RAT problems; b) analysis of items judged
to be creative or interesting by human participants; c) analysis of semantic inﬂuences
and d) generative abilities of comRAT, modeling and enabling further hypotheses about
and human solving.
a) comparison and transfer to other categories of RAT problems
The comRAT can easily be used with other corpuses. However, other types of RAT tests
could also be solved by comRAT in the future. The functional Remote Associate Test
(FRAT) could be solved when given enough function associates data - perhaps from
using functional data extracted from ontologies (category relations, part-of relations,
etc).
If context plays a role in the organization of knowledge or the strength of connective
paths between diﬀerent knowledge items10, then this test should be adaptable to diﬀerent
sensory domains. For example, in the visual RAT test, the stimuli are aimed at testing
context based associations of visual items. The visual RAT can further be enhanced
by controlling for and removing verbally connected items. Such investigations could
throw further light on the inﬂuences of context on memory organization, and on possible
diﬀerent memory stores (diﬀerent context organization based on sensory modality) for
diﬀerent sensory items, that can be tapped into with modality-speciﬁc stimuli. This
type of test could beneﬁt empirical studies of human performance in a direct fashion as
well, as no such studies exist to our knowledge on visual associative memory (or other
types of sensory associative memory), which might play a role in various domains of
creative problem solving and scientiﬁc discovery.
Thus tests carefully controlled to study structural versus semantic items, and lan-
guage/visual interplay could be modeled using the comRAT and enrich our knowledge
about principles of convergence and associations in the context of the Remote Associate
Test.
b) analysis of items judged to be creative or interesting by human participants
It is well known that one of the evaluating factors when humans judge creativity is
originality. The ability of comRAT to ﬁnd other plausible answers enables future work
on what constitutes a creative or interesting answer from the human perspective. Further
studies in this direction can be based on both low versus high frequency comparisons,
and use of related or far apart semantic domains. The ability to ﬁnd other plausible
items also makes comRAT a likely assistive companion for humans when solving RAT
queries or for triggering convergence processes in general.
c) analysis of semantic inﬂuences
The frequency of expressions might not be the only item having an impact on the
memory of RAT solvers. A second possibly contributing factor is the membership of
10Context is not assumed to be the only element that plays a role.
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two or all three of the query items to the same semantic category, or conversely, the lack
of semantic category overlap. Part of the collected data could be parsed to give some
answers to this question in the future.
d) generative abilities of comRAT and modeling of further hypotheses
The generative abilities of comRAT are yet to be fully explored and have great poten-
tial in creating Remote Associate Tests controlled on various variables, like: number
of multiple answers; diﬀerent queries with the same answer; same frequency of query
words+answer, changing frequency of only one item, etc.
Further analyses on what makes RAT problems diﬃcult using these tools could help inte-
grate quantitative (frequency factors) and qualitative principles (semantic and ordering
factors). This could enable comRAT to automatically categorize diﬀerent levels of prob-
lems. Such a categorization, and control over query variables, could enable modeling
and prediction of cognitive diﬃculty.
5.11 Conclusions
The comRAT-C implements a previously formalized upward search process in CreaCogs.
This process is used to solve the compound Remote Associate Test (RAT) automatically
using a knowledge base of language data.
The experimental results showed that out of the 144 items used in Bowden and M. Jung-
Beeman’s test [11], using the COCA corpus, 64 items are answered correctly - that is
provided by the system as an answer on its ﬁrst try. Moreover, over 20 of other response
items are plausible answers - that is responses that a human may deem viable. The
accuracy of response of the system is at 97.92% in the cases where the system had all 3
items in its knowledge base, and 30.36% in the case in which the system only knew two
of the given expressions. Humans are normally assumed to answer correctly the queries
for which they know all three items, so this proved that associative principles can add
robustness to the system and help ﬁnd solutions even in the cases in which knowledge
is lacking.
A preferred answer hypothesis has been put forward, based on frequency of expressions
in the knowledge base. Promising ﬁrst results where obtained towards this hypothesis,
however a full validation is still required.
A moderate, statistically signiﬁcant correlation has been observed between probability
to ﬁnd the answer and cognitive diﬃculty in solving queries, as expressed by response
times and percentage of participants solving the queries.
A visual version of the RAT test was created and given to human participants. Visual
associates where gathered from human participants as to be used by a computational
solver - comRAT-V. Human participants solved 63% of such queries and declared they
perceived the answer visually in 56.6% of the cases. Participants showed an ability
to reliably estimate diﬃculty of queries on a Likert scale. The comRAT-V adaptation
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using visual associates in its KB solved 72.73% of queries, and showed a moderate-high
correlation to diﬃculty of query as expressed by human appraisal. More data is needed
to make any strong claims on comRAT-V’s ability to correlate to human performance.
The successful solving of the RAT test shows the principles posited by CreaCogs are
valid and worthy of further investigation. The comRAT system has great potential
for becoming a tool for cognitive modelers to further investigate the human cognitive
processes used to solve the Remote Associates Test. Furthermore, comRAT-C can be
used with other corpuses, and its principles can be transferred to other types of data
(functional RAT, visual RAT, etc.).
The main contributions of this chapter have been:
(i) to show how upward search from CreaCogs can be applied to automatically solve
a creative human test - the Remote Associates Test;
(ii) to provide a cognitive modeling tool for further study of the RAT task, with
comparable results;
(iii) a moderate correlation with human diﬃculty has shown processes implemented
here are not just computationally feasible ways to automatically solve such cre-
ativity tests, but will play a role in the modeling of the cognitive process involved
in such tasks;
(iv) the foundations for a study of human answer preference in RAT in the case of
multiple possible answers have been set;
(v) initial steps in the direction of making the RAT a multimodal task, which can
be computationally explored in its various forms with the same comRAT process
have been accomplished.
Chapter 6
A cognitive system for Object
Replacement and Object
Composition (OROC)
In the CreaCogs theoretical framework for creative problem solving, certain types of
knowledge organization were posited to help the creative process, thus enabling artiﬁcial
cognitive systems to propose creative solutions to various problems. This type of knowl-
edge organization takes into account similarity of objects and concepts on diﬀerent types
of features, the structure of these concepts and the problem templates they engage in.
Such knowledge organization is meant to allow for processes similar to those encoun-
tered in human creative problem solving, like replacement via similarity, restructuring,
re-representation and convergence. While similar results to normative data for a human
creativity task have been shown for convergence processes in the previous chapter, simi-
larity and restructuring will be discussed here in an object domain. In this domain, the
aims of the system (CreaCogs-OROC) are to use knowledge organization and creative
processes in a way which enables it to replace objects that it needs with other objects
present in the environment, and to compose objects.
However, such knowledge organization raises a few problems. Various objects in an
everyday object domain are similar, over diﬀerent types of features:
- a spoon is similar to a bucket along a concavity feature.
- a surfboard is similar to a tabletop along a thickness feature.
Still, some tabletop is similar to a door along a shape feature. However, these objects
are dissimilar in terms of inclination and context.
Human creative thought and problem solving seems to employ such relations. However,
semantic and ontological approaches do not cover (and do not automatically classify)
this kind of similarities and relations (on multiple feature spaces), or how various types
of subgroups of features make things similar (on multiple granularities).
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At a higher level of reasoning, similar objects can have diﬀerent roles depending on the
context within which they are encountered:
- a tabletop on legs of lower height, with a couch nearby, is generally not used for working,
but has coﬀee table aﬀordances;
- a tabletop on legs of a higher height, with an oﬃce chair nearby and a computer on
top is probably used for working;
- a tabletop that is somewhat higher and has a coﬀee machine on it is probably found
in a kitchen and used as a preparation table for cooking.
These conjunctions of contexts are again not easily represented, or parsed from a set
of object features, though such relations are essential to understanding the aﬀordances,
roles, uses and sometimes the very nature of everyday objects.
Finally, some objects have complex structure, which cannot be expressed via a single
shape. However, knowledge of such structure could greatly beneﬁt a system which aims
to be able to compose objects on its own.
A custom-made approach for such knowledge organization, its implementation and anal-
ysis are thus necessary. In the following, ﬁrst steps towards this are done as we introduce
OROC - an object replacement and object composition system. Matters of cognitive
knowledge retrieval and encoding in OROC are presented in section 6.1. These include:
multi-feature object recognition (6.1.1), an approach to analysing multi-feature simi-
larity (6.1.2) and a short discussion on the various feature spaces obtained (6.1.3) and
how they could be further organized. First experiments with OROC are presented as a
proof of concept for the use of feature matching, similarity and structure in the domain
of everyday objects. The uses such an implementation can have for creative cognitive
systems are summarily demonstrated in object replacement (section 6.2.1) and object
composition (section 6.2.2). The evaluation of part of OROC’s capabilities is done in
section 6.3. Here, OROC’s answers to a human creativity test - the Alternative Uses Test
- are evaluated with the same tools with which human answers are usually evaluated.
The diﬃculties and advantages of the proposed approach, together with the implications
on the modeling of creative problem solving and empirical validation with human data
are discussed in section 6.4. As future work, we consider this approach to also be viable
for representing context.
6.1 Cognitive knowledge retrieval and encoding
Knowledge retrieval and encoding has special properties in human cognitive systems.
These include the ability to recognize an object when other features than its name are
presented, or have a guess at what the object might be when only part of its features
can be observed or are known. The way these cognitive abilities are implemented in
OROC is presented in section 6.1.1. Encoding similarity on various features brings
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about complexity; ways of describing such multi-similarity spaces are characterized in
section 6.1.2. The various feature spaces obtained after such knowledge organization are
discussed in section 6.1.3.
6.1.1 Multi-feature object recognition
Humans can recognize objects by a variety of features. Thus the same concept ball can
be triggered in a human mind via a variety of sensory modalities. However, sometimes
more than one feature is necessary to extract the exact object, and guesses can be made
at what the object is when various features are presented to the conceptual memory of
the subject.
In the following, the subject will be an artiﬁcial cognitive system, called OROC, and
will bring to bear knowledge from its database KB. Let’s assume that OROC lives in
environment E. Various situations are possible in this environment (Envx ∈ E). Agent
OROC has to do its best to understand any of Envx presented using its knowledge base
KB and making inferences.
Perception in OROC works in the following way: OROC receives a feature or set of
features from the environment. These can be a name (if OROC receives verbal input),
shape and color (if it receives visual input), material (from touch and vision), aﬀordance
(if OROC sees someone doing something with an object, or does something with an
object itself).
This means that by just hearing a name, seeing an object shape or a type of motion in
E, OROC should retrieve the type of object implied from its KB, or a subset of objects
which are candidate hypotheses retrieved from KB for what objects might be present
in Envx. The hypothesis (or hypotheses) built by OROC from eliciting knowledge from
KB to understand Envx is stored in the working memory of the system - WM (see
Fig. 1). This process is shown in Fig. 6.1. The working memory seems to be displayed
in Fig. 6.1 a separate, smaller knowledge base. However, this is only for visual clarity
purposes. Working memory is to be understood as the bounded activation of a set of
features or objects in KB. Only such a limited subset can be payed attention to at one
time (working memory generally has constraints in natural cognitive systems).
Thus, a few examples of possible given stimuli in a variate Envx, and the knowledge
retrieved in the WM of the agent from its KB are presented in Table 6.1.
The hypotheses made by OROC on what the object might be elicit its entire knowledge
base. For example, when something of paper is touched (and no other information is
present), OROC hypothesizes that it might be touching: (a) a book, made of paper,
with thick rectangular shape, with covers, the aﬀordance of which is “to be read”; (b)
a newspaper, made of paper, with thin rectangular shape, (larger but thinner than the
book), the aﬀordance of which is “to be read”; (c) a paper towel, made of paper, which
can have diﬀerent rectangular or square shapes, and diﬀerent degrees of softness, the
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Figure 6.1: a) The E - KB - WM cycle and b) - d) examples of it in action.
Stimuli from E Concepts ellicited in WM
Paper Book, Newspaper, Paper Towel, Wallpaper
Long Narrow Rectangular Shelf, Surfboard, Table top
Wood Shelf, Table, Desk
“to wipe with” Sponge, Towel
Sharp Blade, Pen
“to write with” Pen, Pencil, Chalk, Marker
Table 6.1: Results for multi-feature object recognition
aﬀordance of which is “absorbent”, “to wipe with”; (d) wallpaper, large very thin and
generally rectangular, used for decoration.
The elicited knowledge and a need for diﬀerentiation (as to understand exactly what
object is being sensed) can help guide future behavior, by guiding the senses of the
agent to retrieve a new property. The most eﬃcient property (or subset of properties)
to be retrieved as to minimize the number of hypotheses the agent comes up with
(ideally reducing it to 1), can be determined in advance; we would call this the maximum
discriminant. This maximum discriminant could generally be calculated based on the
knowledge present in the KB of the agent, and the feature set which has already been
given. Thus the maximum discriminant would be individual for each system. It is
possible that regularities in the maximum discriminant exist for agents which inhabit
similar spaces. Once the maximum discriminant has been calculated, the behavior of
the agent can be guided to retrieve that feature data point, allowing for a mapping of
the object in the environment to a smaller set of objects in the KB, and in some cases
to one object, and its recognition.
6.1.2 Multi-feature similarity
Triggering associated possible objects from the KB on one or more noticed features
in Envx helps OROC hypothesize about what the perceived object is, by exploring its
feature spaces (FS) - concept (C) links. However, the same link between concept and
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its anchoring in feature spaces can be used to determine similar objects. This brings
about the following consequences:
a) similar subsets of concepts can be determined on each feature map, for each feature
point (see Table 6.2) Thus concepts similar on that FS are all n concepts encoded in
that point or nearby. In the future we would also like these relationships to be partially
ordered, like: - Chair < Table < Wardrobe on Feature: Height ;
Objects classiﬁed as close or similar feature space
Book, Newspaper, Magazine, Notebook Material
Cup, Glass, Bottle Aﬀordance
Cup, Bucket, Flowerpot Shape
Wardrobe, Door Height
Table 6.2: Object similarity on diﬀerent feature spaces
b) a concept can be similar to other concepts on each of the feature spaces it is encoded
on. Thus book is classiﬁed as similar on amaterial feature space with newspaper,magazine,
notebook, on the aﬀordance feature space in point ”to be read” with newspaper, electronic
book, website,memorial plaque, on the shape feature space with notebook, chopping board,
etc. Moreover, a concept can be similar to other concepts on two or more feature spaces,
with a match on all feature spaces meaning identity for the given agent.
Various feature spaces can be envisaged for objects: size (height, depth, width), orien-
tation, color, material (primitive or composed), shape (primitive or composed), name,
etc. The more such feature spaces, the more groupings of similarity can be yielded (as-
suming γ to be a variable which represents the number of such similarity connections in
a particular similarity type group, see Table: 6.3).
FS no. Sim 1 FS Sim 2 FS Sim 3 FS Sim 4 FS Sim 5 FS
2 FS 2*γ Equivalent - - -
3 FS 3*γ 3*γ Equivalent - -
4 FS 4*γ 6*γ 4*γ Equivalent -
5 FS 5*γ 10*γ 10*γ 5*γ Equivalent
Table 6.3: Similarity degrees and their combinations
Therefore the number of similarity groups, depending on the KB, can be calculated as
a function of x, where x is the number of feature maps and k is the number of feature
maps similarity is searched on (this constantly increasing until it reaches the concept
equivalence case of similarity on all feature maps):
f(x) =
x
k!
+
(x ∗ (x− 1))
(k + 1)!
+
(x ∗ (x− 1) ∗ (x− 2))
(k + 2)!
....+
(x ∗ (x− 1) ∗ (x− 2) ∗ ...1)
x!
(6.1)
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Also, remember that each such type or group of similarity connections will have a variable
number of mappings (parameter γ), depending on the KB and the concepts represented.
Thus, for 6 feature maps, the number of concepts would be a function g(x):
g(6) =
6
1!
γ +
(6 ∗ 5)
2!
γ +
(6 ∗ 5 ∗ 4)
3!
γ + ...+
(6 ∗ 5 ∗ 4 ∗ 3 ∗ 2 ∗ 1)
6!
γ (6.2)
For 6 feature spaces, this yields 120γ possible similar items with range of γ between 0
and the size of the particular feature space being considered.
Due to the CreaCogs knowledge organization, these subsets of similarity relations can
easily be retrieved as a function of spatial arrangement. Thus, any or all these sets of
similarity relations can be retrieved by going down the anchoring links or up the context
links in this framework.
This allows inference of aﬀordance for concept or object replacement (see Section: 6.2.1)
based on whatever the functional properties of the object are, and object composition
(see Section: 6.2.2) based on previous knowledge of structure.
6.1.3 The various features spaces obtained
When being presented with objects, OROC learns their properties and organizes them
in its feature layer. Thus after learning a set of objects, OROC’s feature space of known
materials will contain, for example: “Ceramic, Paper, Plastic, Porcelain, Wood, Glass
ﬁber, unknown, Wax, Metal, Cardboard, etc ...”. These features can be reorganized
based on similarity metrics - thus “ceramic” can be moved next to “porcelain”, “cloth”
next to “paper”, etc. If these features are spatially reorganized, the pointers of the
Concepts to the feature space (which ensures concept anchoring) will be moved too. A
possible improvement to the current prototype system would be to obtain such similarity
metrics data. This can be done using sensory science data or setting up a form of
knowledge acquisition. Contextually, various material features can be grouped together
in various ways (e.g. in groups like “can burn”,“texture”, “absorbent”, “resilience”,
“breakable”). This happens implicitly in OROC, due to the links the various objects
have to aﬀordances. Thus if an object with certain properties can do something, other
objects with similar properties are inferred to be able to do it too (i.e. if the fact that
a ceramic cup has been broken is registered, a general inference can be made about all
the other ceramic objects that they are breakable).
6.2 Implementation of OROC
The prototype OROC system takes as knowledge base an .xml ﬁle in which 200 object
concepts have been deﬁned on various feature spaces. Some of these are complex object
concepts which have other objects as parts. The various features in the knowledge base
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are organized on feature spaces. This allows us to use features as search keys in the
various feature spaces.
Insertion
For each new concept Cx in the input, the feature spaces are checked to see if its features
are already known, so that the concept can be linked to them. If they are not known,
features can be inserted in the maximum similarity point that can be determined.
Recognition
The recognition of a concept in OROC is done by ﬁnding the concept with most matching
features, as shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Concept recognition in OROC
Algorithm OROC.1 Concept recognition in OROC
int maxFinder = 0
for all fx : Cinput
for all fy : KB
if fx == fy
do fy.activate()
fy.parent().setActive(), fy.parent().activity ++
end for
end for
for all Cx : KB.getActiveC()
if Cx.activity > maxFinder
maxFinder = Cx.activity
answer = Cx
end for
return answer
Thus from object recognition to object replacement there is only a step, as follows:
instead of searching for matches, on all features, a search with a looser threshold is
applied, accepting (i) matches on some features and similarity on others, or (ii) accepting
matches or similarity on a subset of features that is relevant for the aﬀordance at hand1.
This is the topic of the next section.
6.2.1 Object Replacement Experimentation and Results
Various types of questions could be answered by a system able to perform object re-
placement. In the following, we will discuss 3 such question types, and present results
which OROC provides to some of them. It is worth noting that the answer to all these
questions can be given in OROC (and CreaCogs) by using a small set of algorithms and
principles of search.
1Currently similarity of concepts based on matching of features is implemented, as feature similarity
would require either cognitively acquiring such metrics, or a subsymbolic layer. This is above the scope
of this current prototype, which aims to test whether processes of the theoretical framework can be
implemented with results that are creative, and comparable to human results.
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Question type 1
A possible question type would be to give OROC a known aﬀordance, a set of objects
in the environment, and ask which of the given objects can be used as replacement for
speciﬁc aﬀordances.
An example of this would be the following: given the aﬀordance to tie with, which of
the following objects could you use for it - a sponge, a hammer, an electric chord?
This can be solved under the CreaCogs paradigm by going from the speciﬁc aﬀordance
to known objects to embody it - thus let’s say objects like strings, rope have been used
for tying and are known to the KB of the agent. Common properties of these objects
can then be searched for, to generalize what properties seem essential for that aﬀordance
based on experience of aﬀordance-property co-occurence. The properties of the given
objects are then searched for, and the most similar object (in terms of this particular
aﬀordance) is thus chosen (in this case, the electric chord, which is also thin, long,
bendable). The algorithm in Table 6.5 shows an example of how this is implemented in
OROC.
Table 6.5: Algorithm for ﬁnding the objects to which aﬀordance applies from a re-
stricted set
Algorithm OROC.2 Finding objects to which aﬀordance applies creatively
affx.active()
for all Cx : KB.getCwithAff(affx)
for all Fx : Cx.getFeatures()
do Fx.active(), Fx.activity ++
end for
end for
for all Fx : F.getActive()
if Fx.activity > threshold
for all Cy : Cinput
if Cy.has(Fx)
do Cy.answerV alue++
if Cy.answerV alue > threshold
do add Cy to AnswerSet
end for
end for
return AnswerSet
Question type 2
A second type of question would be to give OROC an object, and ﬁnd all the objects
in its knowledge base that are similar to it, on it’s diﬀerent features, or that are of a
certain given degree of similarity (degree 2 for 2 feature spaces, degree 3 for three, etc.).
Thus, given object a, ﬁnd all objects which could replace a for each feature space fx or
with a degree of similarity n.
In human terms, such a question would be phrased as the following: given a cup, ﬁnd
all objects that are similar to a cup in terms of it’s various properties.
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In the CreaCogs framework, OROC would go down from its knowledge of the concept ca
representing object a into the features on which such knowledge is represented. Then it
would search for mappings of all the other objects in that feature, or in its neighborhood.
The algorithm in Table 6.6 shows an example of ﬁnding objects that have a matching
feature. The same can be adapted when searching for objects with a similar feature,
using F ix, where i stands for a distance in the feature space.
Table 6.6: Algorithm for ﬁnding objects similar on various feature spaces
Algorithm OROC.3 Finding objects similar on various feature spaces
for all Fx : Cx.getFeatures()
Fx.active
do C.List = Fx.returnConceptLinks()
for all Cy : C.List
do add Cy to AnswerSet
end for
end for
return AnswerSet
In OROC, such a question produces results like the ones shown in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7: Finding objects similar on various feature spaces with OROC
Given object Similar objects
Cup sim to Bowl on material
sim to Flowerpot on material
sim to Can on shape
sim to Candle Holder on material
sim to Container on shape
Coat brush sim to Bucket on material
sim to Toothbrush on material
sim to Toothbrush on shape
sim to Shoe brush on material
sim to Shoe brush on shape
[...]
Table sim to Shelf on material
sim to Wedge on material
sim to Desk on material
sim to Desk on aﬀordance
sim to Doorstop on material
sim to Hammer Handle on material
[...]
Question type 3
A third type of question which could be answered with OROC under CreaCogs is what
kind of other aﬀordances might apply to a particular known object.
Thus given a KB and a particular object a, make loose inferences about what affx you
can creatively use a for by learning from the other objects and their similarities.
This inference of aﬀordance mode output is more likely to correspond in its current form
to the Alternative Uses Test [60, 61], a test of creativity which asks its participants to
yield as many alternative uses for an object as they can think of in a certain amount of
time (e.g. 2 minutes).
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The Object replacement algorithm in loose inference aﬀordance mode simply selects the
2nd degree similarity matches on shape and material. The algorithm in Table 6.8 shows
the application of this in OROC. This can also be done with the 1st degree on shape,
or any other combination of features considered to be relevant2.
Table 6.8: Algorithm for ﬁnding new aﬀordances for objects
Algorithm OROC.4 Finding new aﬀordances for objects
FList = Cinput.getShapeFeatures() + Cinput.getMaterialFeatures()
for all Fx : FList
Fx.active()
do C.List += Fx.returnConceptLinks()
end for
for all Cy : C.List
if Cy.material.isActive() AND Cy.shape.isActive()
Cinput.inferAffordances += Cy.getAffordances()
end for
Some results of OROC can be seen in Table 6.9, with Table B.1 in Annex C presenting
a longer list of such generated examples.
Table 6.9: Object replacement in a household domain
Object replacement proof-of-concept with OROC
Maybe Cup can be used to carry water
Maybe Cup can be used to put ﬂowers in
Maybe Cup can be used as food container
Maybe Cup can be used to hold earth and plants
Maybe Cup can be used to cook in
Figure 6.2 shows how this mechanism of loose aﬀordance inference ﬁts into the CreaCogs
framework. Thus an object, which is a concept in the CreaCogs framework, triggers its
known properties in the KB. These, in their turn (especially the shape and material ones)
trigger other concepts anchored in them (or similar properties in the neighborhood can
trigger other concepts). In the next step, OROC infers that the aﬀordances of these
objects might also apply creatively to the initial given object.
The results yielded by using this approach for a set of objects in OROC will be evaluated
in section 6.3, but ﬁrst object composition and proof of concept results are presented in
the next section.
6.2.2 Object Composition Experimentation and Results
The second part of OROC uses the structure of known objects and their similarity in
order to generate new objects 3.
2Relations between functional property and aﬀordances could be also determined via co-occurrence in
a larger data set. However, in the object domain, shape and material seem to be particularly important
features for aﬀordance, as will be shown in section 6.3.5.
3This could be also used to generate new structures, and hypothesize about their composed aﬀor-
dances.
Chapter 6. Object Replacement and Composition 106
Figure 6.2: OROC’s loose inference mechanism in CreaCogs.
In the following, we will discuss three types of questions that could be asked about
object composition, the processes they reﬂect in CreaCogs, and present results of the
prototype OROC for the wider question type 3.
Question type 1
This question is of the type “Given a set of objects, what other objects could you make
from them?”. In this type of question, the composing parts are known, there is an
unlimited projection to the composed forms known in the KB of the agent, and a set
of composed objects is expected.
This translates in CreaCogs to the following: given a set of concepts c1, c2, ..., cn, ap-
plying templates of known composed concepts ccx ∈ KB, infer what new composed
concepts can be created. In the restricted case of this domain, the concepts which we
refer to are objects, and the complex concept templates are objects composed of mul-
tiple parts.4In this case, the templates to be applied are not given, they must thus be
triggered from an identity or similarity relationship to other object parts.
For example, in human form, this question would look like the following. Given a bar,
a piece of string, a bottle and a paperclip, what objects could you make of them? The
search in CreaCogs would proceed as follows: associationist processes would start a
search from each of the given concepts, into the known object templates. Thus objects
that contain a bar and a piece of string could be convergently yielded by such a search -
for example a ﬁshing rod. With the ﬁshing rod template, one would then need to search
the given objects for a hook. This could involve a downward search of overlapping
properties - thus the paperclip could be determined as the closest thing coming to a
hook that exists in the room.
A more restrained form for such a question would be the following: “Given a set of
objects, which of these composed objects could you make from them?”. This would
involve merely comparing properties of parts of objects in the complex objects with the
properties of the given objects.
4Templates for objects composed of multiple parts are anchored in the set of parts that create them,
the relations between those parts and the aﬀordance of the composed object in the same way in which
problem templates are anchored in objects, relations between objects, actions and solutions, as explained
in Section 4.
Chapter 6. Object Replacement and Composition 107
The algorithm in Table 6.10 shows how this question takes process form to be answered
in OROC.
Table 6.10: Algorithm for composing a new object from given objects
Algorithm OROC.5 Composing a new object from given objects
for all Cx : Env
PTList1 = Cx.PTLinks()
for all PTx in PTList1
do PTx.setActive() AND PTx.activity ++
end for
add PTList += PTList1
end for
PTz = PTList.getMaxActive()
partsFilled=0
for all Cy : PTz.getConceptParts()
for all Cx : Env
if Cx sim Cy OR Cx = Cy
do PTz.replace(Cy, Cx)
partsFilled++
return
end for
end for
if partsFilled==PTz.countParts()
return PTz
Question type 2
This question is of the type: “Given an object, what objects that you know of could you
compose it from?”. In this case, the object to be made is known, the object parts are
unknown and must be retrieved from the knowledge base. In a restrained form, this
question asks: “Given a set of objects, can you make a speciﬁed object out of a subset of
them?”.
This type of question translates in CreaCogs to the following: given a ccx, the parts of
which are known, thus which can act as template PTx, what set of other known objects
c1, c2, ...cn can be mapped to it? Thus a search can start from the PTx to the set of its
parts, and then further proceed to ﬁnding replacement of those parts as known objects
with similar properties. This is shown in an algorithm in Table 6.11. Similar objects
can be found via property based replacement, as explained in the previous section.
Question type 3Given all known objects, what new objects can you compose? This is a
loose inference form of the questions above, which asks for all projections of objects from
the KB into the composed objects in the KB. This question encompasses questions
1 and 2, constituting a directed search based on every object or on every template
(whichever set is smaller should direct the search). If the templates are guiding the
search, this is for replacement parts based on similarity. If the initial known objects
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Table 6.11: Algorithm for composing a speciﬁc object from known objects
Algorithm OROC.6 Composing a speciﬁc object from known objects
PTz = PTinput
partsFilled=0
for all Cx : PTz.getConceptParts()
get Cy = KB.getSimC(Cx)
do PTz.replace(Cy, Cx)
partsFilled++
endfor
if partsFilled==PTz.countParts()
return PTz
are guiding the search, this is a search for templates these objects (or objects similar to
them) have been part of, then a search for other objects to ﬁll in that template.
Examples of object compositions obtained with such a search are shown in Table 6.12.
Table 6.12: Object composition in a household domain
Object composition proof-of-concept with OROC
Use sharp stone and branch to make a knife with handle.
Use salad tongs and hairband to make a slingshot.
Use tree stumps and shelf to make a table.
Use jar and candle to make candle with support.
In loose inference mode, the number of composed objects created is equal to the number
of known structures times the number of variable replacements combinations in that
structure. Thus the larger the knowledge base, the higher the number of composed
objects and the object replacements that can be performed with composing object parts,
the larger the list of results. However, our current knowledge base has a very limited
amount of composed objects, thus we used this question to show a proof of concept of
creative compositional results.
Theoretically, a set of questions of type 4 is also possible - this involves using both
disassembly and assembly techniques. Thus, given a set of objects which in turn can
be regarded as composed objects with various parts, what objects can be made using
knowledge of their parts. The same processes would be applied in OROC to solve such
questions.
The object composition capabilities of OROC could be used in their current form in
empirical comparison to an object composition test given to human participants. A
creativity test for evaluating this ability doesn’t exist in the literature, but could be
designed. An algorithm could be written taking advantage of the system’s knowledge of
object structure to give answers comparable to those in the Wallach-Kogan test [28, 156],
which asks its participants to come up with as many possible items which contain a
speciﬁc component.
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6.3 Evaluation of performance with the Alternative Uses
Test
In order to evaluate the performance of OROC and further illuminate cognitive creative
processes, a creativity task normally given to humans that could be solved by OROC
needed to be found. The tasks that came to mind were the Alternative Uses Test [61],
and the Wallach-Kogan [156] creativity task. What follows is an account of OROC’s
performance in solving the former. The rest of the section is organized as follows. Section
6.3.1 describes how the evaluation procedure was constructed and deployed. Section 6.3.2
discusses results of this experimentation and evaluation with human judges, together
with other observed correlations which followed from data analysis. The viability of the
metric used is analysed in Section 6.3.3. Evaluation using human data from a think
aloud protocol is discussed in Section 6.3.4. Finally, the importance of property use in
human answers to the Alternative Uses Test is discussed in Section 6.3.5.
6.3.1 Constructing an evaluation procedure
The Alternative Uses Test [61] is a creativity/divergent thinking test as described in
section 2.4.1.1. The participants to this test are given a certain amount of time and
an object, which they are supposed to come up with alternative uses for. Then, the
uses are scored on Fluency, Flexibility and Originality or Novelty (sometimes also on
Elaboration).
We assumed OROC was able to come up with answers to this by using its ability to
make loose creative inference of aﬀordance. Thus, given an object x, OROC will check
it’s known properties (f1, f2, ...fn). These properties are then inspected for other objects
anchored in them - e.g. objects y and z have property f1 and f2 respectively. If a set
of signiﬁcant features are the same or similar between the given object ox and objects
oy and oz, then aﬀordances of oy and oz will be inferred to possibly apply to ox. Thus
OROC could propose those aﬀordances as alternative uses for x.
Concerning the evaluation procedure applied to human answers, Fluency and Flexibil-
ity could be assessed manually: Fluency by counting the number of alternative uses
proposed, and ﬂexibility by counting the number of diﬀerent semantic categories these
alternative uses span over. However, Originality could not be assessed as this metric
requires comparison of a particular answer to the answers produced by a population of
other agents in order to qualify answers as original or highly original if they have been
produced by a small amount of the population (e.g. 5% and 1% respectively). Norma-
tive data from human participants for a speciﬁc set of objects was not available, thus
we opted for using the Novelty metric instead.
Novelty is assessed using human judges which give their answers on a Likert scale. For
comparability to assessments of human answers from Gilhooly et al.[58], a 1 to 7 scale
was chosen, with 1 representing a use considered “not at all novel” by the judge, and 7
representing a “highly novel” use.
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In order to further investigate OROC’s answers in terms of human assessment, two
other metrics were chosen - a Likability metric and a Usability metric. These were
implemented on the same scale. These metrics were also meant to ensure that judges
will not give a low Novelty assessment because of interfering judgements of Usefulness,
or because of a preference for a certain object. Details of the experimentation procedure
are presented below.
6.3.2 Experimentation and evaluation with human judges
Five objects from the household domain were given to OROC to make inferences of
alternate uses for. These objects were: Cup, Newspaper, Toothbrush, Carpet and
Dental floss. Objects were chosen as not to overlap in shape category, thus producing
alternate use answers that did not overlap. Thus, for example, the object Vase was not
chosen, because of its high-convexity shape which overlapped with that of the object
Cup.
An online survey was set up using Google forms to evaluate OROC’s answers5. The
survey contained two initial examples of alternative uses to be rated. Each alternative
use was presented as a sentence, followed by the three rating choices which the judge
had to make. This looked as follows:
Sentence: “A shoe may be used for putting a nail in the wall”
Novelty Rating: not at all novel 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 highly novel
Likability Rating: I do not like it 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 I like it a lot
Usability Rating: not useful at all 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 very useful
30 alternative uses produced by OROC on the 5 objects were thus rated by 34 partic-
ipants - 24 male and 10 female (ages 20-70). To ensure no bias on the judgements the
participants made by their opinions on machine creativity in general, participants were
not informed that the answers they were rating were produced by an artiﬁcial system.
Figure 6.3 shows the ratings human judges made on all three factors - Novelty, Likability
and Usefulness - across the 30 alternative use statements. Mean Novelty appraisal for all
uses was 3.79, with a mean (across statements) standard deviation (SD) of 1.69. Mean
Likability appraisal for all uses was 3.31, with a mean SD of 1.68. Mean Usefulness
appraisal for all uses was 3.77, with a mean SD of 1.7. The mean of these judgements
as expressed numerically per sentence item can be seen in Table B.2 in Appendix B.
Over all items and uses, the highest ratings on each of the three metrics were obtained
by the following statements:
• Highest Novelty: “Dental ﬂoss may be used to hang clothes to dry” (statement no.
22, mean rating = 6)
5http://goo.gl/forms/snaqh4b0LH
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(a) Novelty Ratings (b) Likability Ratings
(c) Usefulness Ratings
Figure 6.3: Ratings on a Likert scale (1-7) across 30 object use statements.
• Highest Likability: “A cup may be used to keep objects in” (statement no. 20,
mean rating = 4.79)
• Highest Usefulness: “A cup may be used to hold a candle” (statement no.29, mean
rating = 5.59)
The highest Novelty and Usefulness combined score and Novelty (N), Likability (L) and
Usefulness (U) combined score were achieved by the following use: “Dental ﬂoss may be
used for sewing” (statement no. 15,N+U2 = 4.85 ,
N+L+U
3 = 4.56).
Table 6.13 shows an overview of the evaluation per object, including Fluency, Flexibility,
Novelty, Likability and Usefulness. Average Fluency over all 5 objects is 6; average
Flexibility is 4.4.
The participants in the study of Gilhooly et al.[58] come up on average with 27.25
alternative use responses for the Think aloud group and 26.43 responses for the Silent
group, for 6 objects. This is currently comparable to OROC’s total Fluency rating of 30
for 5 objects. However, this might change with the addition of more objects to OROC’s
KB if no time-sensitive mechanisms are put in place. Unfortunately, Gilhooly et al.[58]
do not present object normative data or Flexibility accounts.
Ratings per object group are shown in Figure 6.4. Thus the alternative uses for Cup
received the lowest Novelty ratings, while the alternative uses for Dental ﬂoss received
the highest Novelty ratings. This might be because Dental ﬂoss is relatively a newer
invention, while people have had much more time to be creative about the uses of cups.
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Table 6.13: Evaluation of OROC on Fluency, Flexibility, Novelty, Likability and
Usefulness.
Novelty Likability Usefulness
Item Fluency Flexibility Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Cup 7 5 2.61 1.47 4.30 1.72 4.80 1.76
Newspaper 7 5 3.34 1.72 2.84 1.50 3.61 1.61
Toothbrush 5 3 4.29 2.08 2.85 1.80 2.98 1.83
Carpet 6 5 4.00 1.71 2.86 1.64 3.60 1.63
Dental ﬂoss 5 4 5.32 1.56 3.25 1.75 3.53 1.71
However, the alternative uses for Cup were rated highest on the Likability and Usability
scale.
Figure 6.4: Ratings per object group.
A positive correlation with strong signiﬁcance was observed between the ratings on Lik-
ability and Usefulness of all judges. This indicated that the more judges the considered
an alternative inference to be useful, the more they liked it. For all items, the mean cor-
relation between Likability and Usefulness was 0.63, p < 0.005. This correlation ranged
across statements between 0.35 and 0.93, as shown in Figure 6.5. Thus for statement
no. 24 — A cup may be used to cook in — the Likability-Usefulness correlation was at
its highest (0.93), while for statement no. 21 —A carpet may be used as a bed cover —
it was at its lowest.
6.3.3 Validity of human evaluation metrics
In order to check whether the human judgement oﬀered a useful, generalizable metric,
two measures pertaining to the validity of this evaluation were analysed: a) the inter-
agreement of judges measured as the mean correlation between judge ratings and b) the
correlation of individual ratings to mean ratings.
Inter-agreement of judges is shown in Figure 6.6. Take px to be the number of the
participant and c(pa, pb) the Pearson correlation between the ratings of two participants
for the 30 uses on one of the 3 metrics. The inter-agreement was measured as follows:
Chapter 6. Object Replacement and Composition 113
Figure 6.5: Correlation between Likability and Usefulness for each item. The 30
alternative use statements are shown clockwise around the dial. The center of the dial
represents no correlation (0.0), and the edge of the dial a perfect correlation (1.0).
1. The correlation of each subject’s ratings with the ratings of all other participants
was established. Thus for all px, x ∈ {1, 2, 3....34}, a correlation set cx of 33 items
was obtained. E.g., for p1, c1 = {c(p1, p2), c(p1, p3), c(p1, p4)...c(p1, px)};
2. The mean of these correlations was calculated per participant. Thus for all px, x ∈
1, 2, 3....34, k=34, mean of correlations of each participant with all the others was:
μcx =
k∑
n=2
c(p1, pn)
k − 1 ; (6.3)
3. The inter-agreement measure was set as the mean of all participants’ correlation
means. This was calculated as:
x∑
n=1
μcn
x
(6.4)
Thus, for Novelty Ratings (6.6a), participant no. 30 shows the highest mean correlation
with all the other participants (mean r = 0.56), while participant no. 9 shows the lowest
(mean r = 0.17). The inter-agreement on the three types of ratings was: a) Novelty – r
= 0.43 ; b) Likability – r = 0.24 and c) Usefulness – r = 0.3.
To check whether the mean of the ratings was representative for the group, the cor-
relation of each answer to the mean was calculated. The average correlation of all
participants’ ratings to the mean was:
a) for Novelty - r = 0.68 (n = 34, p < 0.001);
b) for Likability - r = 0.55 (n = 32, p < 0.01) and
c) for Usefulness - r = 0.58 (n = 34, p < 0.001).
The inter-agreement of judges and the correlation of individual ratings to mean rat-
ings have thus shown that using human judges for evaluation was a reasonably reliable
measure.
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(a) Novelty Ratings Mean Correlation (b) Likability Ratings Mean Correlation
(c) Usefulness Ratings Mean Correlation
Figure 6.6: Inter-agreement as mean Correlation of ratings. The x-axis represents the
participant’s number. The y-axis represents the mean correlation (r) of a participant
with all the others.
6.3.4 Evaluation using human data from Think Aloud protocols
The results of the think aloud coding scheme by Gilhooly et al. [58] can be compared to
the processes used by OROC. Think aloud protocols use standard protocol analysis [37,
152] and are transcribed into short phrases (called segments). The resulting segments
are then classiﬁed into categories. As the paper from Gilhooly et al. [58] provided an
interesting analysis of the Alternative Uses Test, we decided OROC can further beneﬁt
from an analysis of its processes as compared to Gilhooly’s analysis.
Gilhooly et al. built 18 categories in their ﬁrst experiment. These are treated as de-
scribing diﬀerent processes. A residual “Other” category accounting for less than 1% of
the segments is also built. The ﬁrst 15 categories with a frequency above 1% are then
detailed.
In the following, the categories of most interest to OROC are listed. Note that we
kept their original number as provided by Gilhooly et al. [58], who arranged them in
decreasing frequency:
• Disassembly Uses (no.6) - States a way of decomposing the target item and using
the resulting components. For example, Remove laces from shoe and use them to
tie your hair up. 80% of participants, 5.5% +/-1.3% of segments.
• Property (no.8) - States property of object. For example, Bricks are heavy. 55%
of participants, 3.4% +/- 0.7% of segments.
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• Property Use (no.11) - Explicitly indicates property which enables the stated use.
For example, A pencil is sharp so can be used to poke holes in paper. 48% of
participants, 2.9% +/- 0.7% of segments.
• Context (no.14) - Mentions context in which target object is often found. For
example, You often see tires in garages. 40% of participants, 2.9%, +/- 1.2% of
segments.
The rest of the segments and their corresponding categories are not as informative when
trying to understand the processes humans use to solve such tasks. For example, these
are: Unmediated use (mentioning a possible use without an explanation) – 33% of
segments, Item naming (repeating the name of the item - perhaps to enhance search
activation processes) – 11.66%, Episodic Memory use (remembering previous creative
use, so not novel to their experience) – 9.2%, Use query (Re-asking themselves what else
the item could be used for) – 5.9%, etc.
The categories of Property and Property Use are both reﬂected in OROC’s processes.
Properties and their use are the equivalent of features in OROC. Thus both of these
categories can be interpreted to use feature match of some form in order to generate
alternative uses of objects.
The Disassembly category refers to the ability of decomposing the object in speciﬁc
parts and using those parts while thinking about alternative uses, or thinking of objects
as having a potential role as an object part. This is reﬂected in OROC’s compositional
capacities. Note that the Disassembly strategy frequency has been shown to make an
important contribution to novelty.6
The Context category reﬂects a use of context for the initial object in the creative
alternative use process. Though not yet implemented in OROC, CreaCogs posits the
use of context, deﬁned implicitly by the templates in which objects are used. A spatial
neighborhood in the real world might also determine associative links and context.
6.3.5 Human Alternative Uses answers
The evaluation survey in which 34 participants made judgements on the Novelty of
OROC’s alternative uses of objects had a second part. This part was meant to provide
the judges with an opportunity to express their free answers, in the style of the Alterna-
tive Uses Test. This part can be used to further understand the processes humans use
to answer this test, and compare these to OROC’s processes.
This free part was two-fold:
1. After rating each statement, the judges were asked “What other objects would you
use for this purpose?” (with the purpose being implicit from the sentence);
6This is further motivation to put together a type of evaluation which includes OROC’s compositional
capacities. It might be that the objects created using these processes, or both processes in tandem, would
be rated as the highest in Novelty. Such a rating might reﬂect a higher appreciation for the cases in
which two processes are used to make such a inference: (i) composition/decomposition, used to transgress
object boundaries, and (ii) creative replacement.
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2. At the end of the evaluation of the 30 uses, a page asked for each of the 5 objects
“What other uses would you ﬁnd for this object?”.
As not to encumber participants which were in a hurry, or felt uncreative, discouraging
them to ﬁnish the evaluation, these parts of the form were made non-compulsory.
This part of the survey links each 30 uses to other objects, and each 5 objects to other
uses. Table B in Appendix B shows the other uses humans came up with for the 5 initial
objects of the test. These uses were grouped according to how unique or frequent they
were. A summary of the most frequent and some of the most unique alternative uses
proposed by the human participants is presented in Table 6.14.
For example, for the object Cup, 9 of the alternative uses given by the participants
involved putting stuﬀ in the cup (pencils, brushes, pens, sauce for mixing), and 7 uses
proposed involved amplifying sound (using the cup as a speaker, headphones, musical
instrument, or to hear through a wall). One use of Cup referred to using it as a shovel
(speciﬁcally to dig earth with) and another one to use it as a mace, in order to smash
garlic using the basis of the cup.
Table 6.14: Frequent and rare alternative uses proposed by participants for the given
ﬁve objects
Object Frequent use No. times Rare use No. times
proposed proposed
Cup to put things in 9 as a shovel 1
to amplify sound 7 as a mace to smash garlic 1
Newspaper to make shapes and origami 10 as oven gloves for protection 1
to wrap something 8 wrapping a mommy - fancy dress 1
Toothbrush to clean with 16 as a nail on a sundial 1
to brush with 4 weapon 1
Dental ﬂoss ﬁshing line 4 macrame 1
jewellery part 4 keyring 1
Carpet damping noise/vibrations 2 to protect against wind 1
keeping ﬁre lit 2 make new shoe soles 1
This data grouped by uses was analysed in order to ﬁnd out:
(a) what properties are relevant for humans when connecting an object to a possible
aﬀordance, and
(b) whether feature similarity, a principle which OROC’s processes use, is relevant
when coming up with creative answers.
The results of this analysis follow. Table 6.15 shows how often properties of shape and
material were important when humans came up with a new aﬀordance for the given 5
objects. For example, for the object Cup, participants came up with a total number of
26 diﬀerent other uses (some of these occurred repeatedly, as explained above). Out of
these uses, the shape, material or shape and material properties together of the given
object were relevant to the new uses in 21 cases. Thus the percentage of shape and
material relevance amongst unique uses was 80.77%. On average, shape and/or material
properties were relevant for 85.67% of the new uses human participants came up with.
Out of these, shape was sometimes relevant on its own, material relevant on its own or
both properties were relevant together for the ability to create a new use. As Table 6.16
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Table 6.15: Human participants’ reliance on shape and material properties when
coming up with new uses for the given ﬁve objects
Object Total unique Total unique no. of uses Percentage of uses
no. of other uses with shape and material with shape and material
relevance relevance
Cup 26 21 80.77 %
Newspaper 25 24 96 %
Toothbrush 18 17 94.45 %
Dental ﬂoss 28 20 71.43%
Carpet 28 24 85.71%
Total 125 106 84.8 %
Average per obj. 25 21.2 85.67%
shows, for the unique alternative uses for which shape and material mattered, shape
and material were relevant together 51.15% of the cases, Shape was relevant on its own
19.32% of the cases and material for 29.53% of the cases.
Table 6.16: Relevance of shape and material properties itemized for the other uses
provided by participants to ﬁve given objects
Object Total shape Shape Shape Material Material Shape & Shape &
&material % % Material Material %
Cup 21 9 42.86 % 4 19.05% 8 38.1 %
Newspaper 24 0 0 14 58.33% 10 41.67%
Toothbrush 17 2 11.76 % 5 29.41% 10 58.82 %
Dental ﬂoss 20 5 25 % 1 5% 14 70 %
Carpet 24 18 16.98 % 38 35.85% 50 47.17 %
Average 19.32 % 29.53 % 51.15%
6.4 Discussion
OROC shows a good comparability to humans in both results and process when answer-
ing the Alternative Uses test. However, OROC has not been purposefully designed to
answer the Alternative Uses test, and its abilities encompass a larger area than answer-
ing this one creativity test. OROC can further be investigated using the Wallach-Kogan
test, object composition tests (which need designing), or elaboration tests starting from
one object part or feature.
An interesting knowledge organization property of OROC is that each object in the KB
is anchored in a set of features. To recognize an object uniquely, a determinant set of
features is needed, otherwise a set of objects is given as the possible object. This can
depend on what features exactly are provided, thus on the upwards mapping of various
features in certain concepts. For example, to recognize object O14, when given the name,
the full existing knowledge can be retrieved unambiguously. When a general description
of the shape is given, this maps to 6 possible objects. When material is given, this maps
to 10 objects. When material and shape are given, this maps to 2 possible objects, etc.
This sets us up for an ability to model shortest discriminant description of an object,
given the other objects in the KB, and the way ambiguity grows or diminishes when
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adding more objects and features (cognitive economy would indicate that it is mostly dis-
criminants that are retained). As mentioned before, these descriptions, as implemented
in OROC, might be diﬀerent for diﬀerent systems with diﬀerent KB. This is probably
a cognitively valid emergent property. However, in the context of OROC, changes in
the shortest discriminant description could be calculated as a function of learning, thus
providing a good setting for experiments on various measures of information entering a
KB - coherence, informativity and generativity [120].
A valuable result is that the hypothesis of creative processes modeled by OROC is
falsiﬁable, as its computational underpinnings transform into the following empirically
testable assumptions.
We can increase people’s ability to be creative by:
1. increasing their ability to see the way objects are structured
2. enhancing their ability to notice similarities between objects or object parts
3. increasing their ability to notice similarities between structures
4. generally giving them a larger number of object templates and types to know/-
choose from (this would be like learning more items for the KB, therefore the
capacity for transformation applying these principles should grow)
5. encouraging them to destroy and construct object/ generally cross over what the
gestalt of an object is perceived to be.
6. encouraging ﬂuidity of transfer between diﬀerent parts/templates.
These assumptions could be proven or disproven using speciﬁcally designed alternatives
of the aforementioned tests. Such design could include a condition in which each of the
assumptions mentioned above are tested.
The Likability–Usefulness correlation provides an interesting point of further investiga-
tion. Previous computational creativity evaluation models generally deal with novelty.
An implicit assumption seems to sometimes be made that aesthetic appreciation (part
of which is measured here by Likability) would be correlated with Novelty. However,
according to the results described above, in an object domain, Likability and Usefulness
are correlated. This can have interesting implications for usability in design, and for
the more complex investigation of aesthetic appreciation of creativity as pertaining to
object domains.
The contributions of this chapter are the following:
(i) A prototype system capable of object replacement and object composition was
implemented, expressing and testing part of CreaCogs’ principles;
(ii) A prototype knowledge base in the household object domain which speciﬁes prop-
erties and object parts was designed for this system;
(iii) A more concrete description of types of similarity spaces in such a knowledge base
was explored;
(iv) The system was shown to oﬀer results comparable to the Alternative Uses Test. A
methodology for evaluating such systems in a manner comparable to the evaluation
of human answers was put in place;
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(v) More complex metrics for such evaluation have been explored, including ratings
on Likability and Usefulness in the human judge rating. Likability and Usefulness
ratings have been shown to correlate;
(vi) Humans where shown to use similar processes and properties as OROC.
Various points are open for future work, including the following:
- Modeling shortest discriminant description of object. Checking what empirical
inferences can be made from the model;
- Testing assumptions relating to creativity processes as pertaining to structure and
similarity of features empirically, through adding new conditions to creativity tests;
- An implementation of the various feature spaces in subsymbolic maps;
- Obtaining object similarities from humans or from sensory data science;
- Devising a human test for creative object composition;
- Implementing larger databases of objects, adding knowledge from ontologies to the
current scheme.
As OROC is currently a proof of concept system, further work to improve it will in-
volve the development of the similarity metric, which can be done using qualitative
shape descriptions [40] or approaches based on the conceptual space theory [52], like
the approach proposed by Chella et al. [16]. Learning can be used for the acquisition,
recognition and categorization of knowledge in OROC using various computational ap-
proaches [42, 69, 142].
Chapter 7
Practical Insight Problems
The account of creative problem solving wouldn’t be complete if the mechanisms of the
proposed CreaCogs framework weren’t tested on some insight problems. In this chapter
we opted for the further study of practical object insight problems, as the knowledge
involved in solving such problems, involving objects, aﬀordances and spatial relations,
will be easier to model in the future than knowledge in problems which involve abstract
concepts.
Empirical insight problems are generally considered very diﬀerent from each other, as a
diﬀerent insight is required to solve each insight problem. Insight problems can also lose
their insight problem status after being solved once, if the participant still remembers
the type of restructuring or re-representation which triggered the insight. Thus once a
participant has acquired the insight about how to solve a particular problem, the same
problem cannot be used a second time with the same participant.
Though such problems are one of a kind (in terms of solution) and with the caveat
that “insight” is not present on a second round of solving the same problem, this work
started on the assumptions that: (i) data can be gathered on human participants as
long as it is taken into account whether or not they have seen the problem before (ii)
diﬀerent problems will address similar processes, though the knowledge required to solve
them and the solution itself might be diﬀerent (iii) diﬀerent problems can be created as
long as one has a working assumption about what insight is. Our working assumption
is that insight requires re-representation, restructuring of the initial interpretation of
the problem space, and that creative problem solving processes like the ones posited by
the CreaCogs framework will be encountered in the human problem solving of insight
problems.
The rest of this section proceeds as follows. Empirical insight problems which will be
used for testing the framework are described in Section 7.1. Some of these problems are
classical and some are made by the author. The principles of creating such problems are
described in Section 7.1.2. A think aloud protocol with human participants was run with
these problems. The encoding strategy and codes deployed to analyze the data from
this think aloud protocol are described and explained in Section 7.2. Two case studies of
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human participants solving the problems in this think aloud protocol are described and
analysed in Section 7.3. The codes utilized to analyse the solving process are discussed
in the context of CreaCogs in Section 7.4. The order of the processes is analysed in
Section 7.5 to enable the future modeling of such problems in CreaCogs. Some of the
aforementioned problems are then analysed in the context of CreaCogs in Section 7.6.
A discussion and future work directions are provided in Section 7.7). Conclusions close
the chapter with Section 7.8).
7.1 Setting up the practical insight problems
Five classical empirical insight problems have been selected from the literature by the
author. Some of these came with classical illustrations, some required the author to
create the stimuli from the description of the problem in the literature (sometimes by
its creator). The creation of the scenes of such problems required also the addition
of various other objects, as described below. Three other problems were created by
the author in the spirit of classical insight problems and object composition. Some of
these were meant to provide multiple solutions and to be used in an empirical setting
to study the process of forming a solution, selecting salient objects and re-representing
the problem. Some were meant to require “insight” in the classical sense.
A list of these problems is presented below, with abbreviation C being used for a classical
problem, and abbreviation N for a new problem:
1. The Candle Problem (C) [36]
2. The Two Strings problem (C) [101]
3. The Hat rack problem (C) [101]
4. The loop problem (C) or The paperclip problem [36]
5. Attach the pendulum problem (C) or the weight problem [36]
6. Johnny dusting (N)
7. Lost teddy (N)
8. Jack and Jill - weight problem (N)
7.1.1 Practical object insight problems
The Candle Problem [36] is stated as follows: You are given a candle, a box of
thumbtacks and a book of matches (see Fig. 7.1). You are supposed to ﬁx the lit candle
unto the wall in a way that doesn’t allow the wax to drip below.
The solutions that human participants come up with for this problem are varied in the
literature. Some participants melt some of the candle to then use wax as a gluing agent.
Some use the thumbtacks to pin the candle to the wall. Obviously, this is not enough to
make the wax not fall below1, which is why some participants attempt to make a small
1Some formulations of the problem include a table next to the wall onto which the wax is not supposed
to drip.
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Figure 7.1: The Candle Problem
bridge or support under the table from thumbtacks2. However, the solution considered
as “correct” for this problem is to use the thumbtack (or nail) box as a support, to pin
it to the wall with thumbtacks (or nails), put the candle in it and light it. It has been
shown that human participants are better able to come to this solution if the thumbtack
box is already empty, and the thumbtacks are presented outside of it. It might very
well be that while the thumbtack box is being used as a container (and full), human
participants do not consider its other possible uses or aﬀordances. The solved Candle
Problem is shown in Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: The Candle Problem Solved
The Two Strings Problem [101] is stated as follows: A person is put in a room that
has two strings hanging from the ceiling. The task is to tie the two strings together,
but it is impossible to reach one string while holding the other. The depiction of this
problem is shown in Fig. 7.3.
The participants make various attempts at tying the two strings, including getting on
the chair thinking this might enable them to pull one of the strings further, and thus
reach the other. The correct solution to this problem is considered to be using one of
the strings and a heavy object from the pile of objects scattered on the ﬂoor (like the
pliers), to create a pendulum. The creation of the pendulum allows the solver to set one
2This is sometimes made of nails, as some formulations of the problem give a box of nails rather than
a box of thumbtacks. A nail might be a better tool for pinning a thick object (like the candle) to a wall,
thus leading the participants on a wrong representation path.
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Figure 7.3: The Two Strings Problem
of the strings in motion, so that the string comes towards the solver. This allows the
solver to grab onto the other string and catch the one set in motion.
Some participants struggling to solve the two strings problem are helped to come to this
solution by the investigator, which brushes past one of the strings, setting it in motion.
The aﬀordance for pendular motion of the string is thus triggered. However, though
more successful in solving the problem in this condition, participants report most of the
time not being aware that the investigator has helped them, or that they have seen the
string set in motion by her [101].
The insight in this problem is about switching the representation template from trying
to reach the other string to trying to make the string come to the participant. The
second creative step is the construction of a pendulum out of the given objects (see Fig.
7.4). This is were both object composition and object replacement procedures can help.
Figure 7.4: Composing a Pendulum, a subpart of the String Problem
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The Hat rack problem [101] is stated as follows:You need to make a hat rack (a rack to
put your hat) in the room shown below; on the ﬂoor they are two planks and a G-clamp.
What do you do? The hat rack problem is depicted in Figure 7.5 - with measurements
adapted from the original (in inches), to cm3 - as to be suitable for participants more
used to the metric system. This adaptation was made because the hat rack problem
seems to be amongst the hardest practical insight problems in the literature.
Figure 7.5: Depiction of the Hat Rack problem with metric measurements
The solution to this problem is to use the two planks vertically and clamp them with
the G-clamp while overlapping 20 cm of their length, as to match them to the height
of the room. Then the G-clamp, because of its shape, can also be used as a hook for a
hat. Thus the planks together form something like a tree hat rack with the knob of the
clamp being the only hook.
In our opinion, two main diﬃculties are presented by this problem. The ﬁrst one is the
lack of resources - in opposition with other problems where the main diﬃculty might be
selecting the best suited object or set of objects amongst many, and memory might be
overloaded as a function of this. However, in the hat rack problem very few objects are
present - two planks and the G clamp, together with two boards that are attached to
the ceiling (and which serve no purpose in reaching the correct solution, however they
might be considered red herring objects).
The second diﬃculty of this problem is the ambiguity of the goal - forming a hat rack
begs the question which kind of hat rack, and what the hat rack looks like. Depending
on which kind of knowledge would thus be brought to the fore by the solver, this can
3This was an adaptation, not a direct translation of original measurements, as not rounded measure-
ments might have encumbered the solver with more information in the metric measurements variant.
Chapter 7. Practical Insight Problems 125
be horizontal (shelf-like), or vertical (tree-like). The latter template obviously has more
chances in triggering the right solution.
Besides needing to bring the right kind of template to the fore, the hat rack problem
involves two insight parts: a composition element and a double use element. The com-
position element requires the insight that the two planks on the ﬂoor, though longer
together than the height of the room, can be thought of in terms of adjustable height
- thus depending on where one overlaps the planks and puts the G-clamp, the height
of the two planks can be made to match the height of the room (despite an initial mis-
match). This insight can probably be triggered by the measurement of 4 cm on the
opening of the G-clamp, being the sum of the widths of the two planks. However, the
G-clamp in itself is a tool the width of which can be altered (to a limited degree), thus
participants might miss this cue when seeing the tool under its adaptive nature rather
then as a ﬁxed point to start building the problem solution from. The second insightful
part of the solution consists in realizing that the G-clamp can be used not only for its
clamping aﬀordances, but also, because of its shape, as a hook.
The Cardboard and loop problem was taken from Duncker’s On problem-solving
[36], where it is called the paperclip problem4, and came without an illustration. The
cardboard problem is stated as follows: You are asked to help the experimenter attach
this piece of cardboard to the loop in the ceiling. How do you proceed? We represented
the problem for empirical investigation as in ﬁgure 7.6, adding as other objects a hammer
and nails on a table. The cardboard to be attached to the loop has four pieces of paper
attached to the four corners with four paperclips - as per Duncker’s formulation. The
solution to this problem is to get one of the paperclips out of it’s position in holding the
piece of paper, bend it and turn it into a two way hook, then use one side of the hook
to attach to the loop, and another to pierce through the cardboard (in a corner, to also
hold the piece of paper in place, if necessary).
The diﬃculty in this problem is presented in our opinion by: a) seeing the paperclips
in two functions - as holding one of the pieces of paper attached to the cardboard and
as a bendable object which can be detached and used for hooking and piercing, and b)
piercing through the cardboard, an action which might be perceived by the participants
as destroying the cardboard and thus yield resistance.
There is perhaps an added amount of diﬃculty in our presentation because of similarity
of aﬀordance between attaching to loop and attaching to wall, and ﬁxing aﬀordances
pertaining to nails. In fact an interesting second condition here would be to present this
problem with diﬀerent objects in the context, the aﬀordance of which would have less of
a chance in interfering with the one of the request. This would probably yield a much
lower chance for an imperfect mapping of the request to diﬀerent objects with similar
aﬀordances (the nails), and make the participants less likely to perceive those objects
as salient and ﬁxate on them as useful for the solution.
4We have not used the original name here because the name contains the object used for the solution.
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Figure 7.6: Author’s depiction of the cardboard problem
Attach the pendulum problem This problem was taken from Duncker’s On problem-
solving [36] - where it is called the weight problem5 - and came without an illustration
as well. The problem is stated as follows: You are to help the observer set up the room
for an experiment. You need to attach the pendulum to the ceiling. What do you do?
We represented the problem for empirical investigation as depicted ﬁgure 7.7, adding as
other objects the red sock, the glasses, the table and the ladder. The solution to this
problem is to use the pendulum head as a hammer to put the nails in the ceiling, before
attaching the pendulum.
Figure 7.7: Author’s depiction of the pendulum problem
5We have not used the original name here not to confuse this problem with the Jack and Jill problem
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The diﬃculty in this problem resides in seeing the pendulum in two functions - the
thing to be attached, and the hammer replacement. The nature of the problem, or
the stumbling point in attempting it might not be clear to the participants initially.
Participants might thus take a while to realize that the inherent problem - making a
hammer - is not formulated in the problem description, but comes as a consequence of
one of the steps.
Dusting the clock is a new problem created by the author, and meant to elicit multiple
solutions. The problem is stated as follows: Johnny is cleaning a room. How can he
reach to dust the clock? Figure 7.8 depicts this problem.
Figure 7.8: Dusting the clock problem
A large amount of constructions and solutions are possible in this problem, due to
the large amount of objects presented. The author was thus looking to observe the
process of construction of various solutions here, rather than one particular solution. An
interesting part of the problem was that some solutions could be perceived as dangerous.
One possible solution, for example, was using the surfboard on the table as a seesaw
and putting the globe on the other side, as this involved bringing knowledge about a
new object to structure some other objects in the given environment. The diﬃculty
in this problem thus consisted in the multiple objects present and multiple possible
solutions (which might make participants stuck and unable to see other possible ways
of structuring the problem), coupled with the ambiguity in terms of stability and safety
of the solutions.
Blown away teddy is a new problem created by the author. The problem is stated as
follows: The wind blew your son’s teddy bear from the clothesline into your neighbour’s
garden. The neighbour is in holidays and the fence is too high to climb. How can you
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retrieve the teddy? Figure 7.9 depicts the problem. The solution to this problem is to
construct a ﬁshing rod, using the mop, the clothesline and the bended clothes hangers.
Figure 7.9: Blown away teddy problem
The diﬃculty in this problem can reside in seeing objects out of their normal context
and aﬀordances: a) seeing the mop out of it’s cleaning context (which is why the mop
was put in this context using a bucket and water) and b) seeing the clothesline and
clothes hangers out of their context of being used for drying clothes. However, this
might not be as hard an insight as when an object shares two uses out of which both
seem required for the problem at hand. In terms of insight, this problem requires the
solver to realize a ﬁshing template would be useful to “catch” and drag the teddy over
the fence. In terms of object composition, this problem requires the solver to map
various objects as parts of a ﬁshing rod. The exact distance to the teddy is unclear to
the solver. Thus the observing experimenter can intervene at various object construction
or strategy deployment points and state the object might not be long enough to reach
the teddy, thus requiring the solver to come up with another solution, and sometimes a
new way to see the problem.
The Jack and Jill weight problem is another new problem created by the author.
The problem is stated as follows: Jack and Jill are arguing about whom weighs more.
What could they do to ﬁnd out for certain? Figure 7.10 shows the problem.
The solution to this problem is to create a seesaw out of a borrowed surfboard and the
bucket in order to weigh Jack and Jill comparatively.
We consider this problem as the closest to a classical insight problem. An object which
exists in the picture in a diﬀerent context, is already in use and is not salient, is (re)used
for a construction which the solver has to bring to the fore as appropriate from their
knowledge base. The second object used as a pivot (the bucket) is also full of sand (in
a similar way with the thumbtack box being full with thumbtacks - though in this case
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Figure 7.10: Jack and Jill weight problem
the representation is not accessed necessarily to use the contained object - i.e. the sand.
These constitute sources of diﬃculty, together with the fact that the problem only allows
one correct solution.
Furthermore, the inﬂatable swimming pool can be taken as a red herring and Archimedes’
principle for measuring mass rather then weight deployed. Similarly, appearance of the
two people can be taken as a red herring.
Several other problems were created, on the same principles, however for the sake of
brevity they won’t be depicted here. These eight problems (5 classical and 3 new) were
the ones employed in an empirical investigation of the creative problem-solving process,
as explained in Section 7.3. However, the strategy of creating new problems will ﬁrst be
discussed.
7.1.2 Strategy for creating new problems
The strategy used for creating new problems was to start from a form of a practical
problem involving objects, with an easy solution, and then switch to a creative form.
This was done by hiding the objects needed for the solution or obscuring the solution
itself, with various processes, like the following:
(i) making the objects less salient, through putting them into a diﬀerent aﬀordance
context;
(ii) making needed objects occur under a diﬀerent form - a diﬀerent object represen-
tation;
(iii) decomposing the solution into (object) parts and hiding the parts in other struc-
tures;
(iv) adding more salient possible solutions and red herring objects (the inﬂatable pool)
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(v) using an object for a rare or remote aﬀordance which had no salient association
with it, so that the useful problem template needed to be found ﬁrst, before dis-
covering the possible useful objects.
This strategy could also be automated by the CreaCogs template by, for example: (a)
replacing objects of a given problem with other objects which have the same particular
aﬀordance, but for which that aﬀordance is less salient and (b) decomposing the solution
into various objects and putting such objects in a non-salient context in the environment.
This strategy was used when depicting classical insight problems as well, in the process
of making a choice for other objects to add to the problem6. While designing problem
stimuli, an interesting diﬃculty encountered was that adding virtually any object to
a scene introduces multiple possibilities of interaction with other objects in the prob-
lem, multiple new possible problem paths, problem representations, and sometimes new
solution paths. As the intention was to explore the complexity of restructuring and re-
representation, salient objects that could lead the solver on diﬀerent paths and multiple
solution paths have been added in some problems.
7.2 Encoding strategy and Codes
A think aloud experiment was set up with the aforementioned problems. In accordance
to think aloud protocols, in order to analyze the answers and the problem solving process
of the participants, the recorded verbal data needed to be transcribed and the transcrip-
tion segments needed to be coded. A set of codes thus needed to be created. In order
to usefully analyse to what extent the processes posited by the theoretical CreaCogs
framework are present in the solving of such problems by human participants, a relation
between the transcript and the theoretical model of processes needed to be established.
To this purpose, upon inspection of the pilot answers and according to the CreaCogs
framework, a set of codes was constructed. The pilot protocol on which these codes where
established will from now on be referred to as P0. Some such codes pertain directly to
the CreaCogs framework and formalization, while others are part of the larger issue of
(creative) problem solving.
In the following section, these codes will be listed, together with a short description and
examples of how they can look in think aloud protocols. Some such codes didn’t have
a suitable example in P0, however we posited them anyways, as a relevant part of the
CreaCogs framework. Segments corresponding to these codes were later found in the
protocols of other participants. In this case, we shall give examples for them from those
participants. In the case of each example, the anonymous participant code is mentioned
(e.g. P0, mb8, fb6), together with the name of the problem.
6Some classical insight problems are depicted in the literature by describing the main objects that
are necessary to solve the problem, with no mention of what the ”ﬁller” objects where.
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Problem solving general process codes (PSP)
PSP - Reading the problem This encodes both initial reads and complete re-reads
of the problem. In the case in which only the key requirements are read again, this
corresponds to code PSP - Deﬁning key requirements of the problem.
PSP - Comprehending This can appear in transcripts through moments of re-reading
the problem, pauses at various points when reading, and verbal cues like “So let me
understand this ...”.
PSP - Deﬁning key requirements of the problem In these segments, the partici-
pants focus on extracting the main requirements of the problem, thus they scan through
the problem statement to synthesize such requirements. We hypothesize that this then
allows strategies of search based on the key requirements, and also enables future evalu-
ation using those said requirements. This code might correspond to reiterating key parts
of the problem statement, like “It needs to be attached to the ceiling” (P0, Attach the
pendulum problem), or to actual statements about what the key requirements are - for
example: “So, let’s redo the... the logical assumptions here, and these are that the fence
is too high ... Yeah, that is actually the only one that is to be taken into consideration”
(P0, Blown away teddy).
PSP - Mapping problem formulation to objects This code describes looking at
the objects in the problem while reading the problem, as to anchor the verbal formu-
lation of the problem into visuospatial input, or visuospatial representation. The two
presentations are somehow bound together - the Environment problem depiction to the
Problem formulation, and then participants proceed to reason about it. Looking at ob-
jects is not always obvious from speech. Sometimes, notes on this have been made by
the experimenter that was observing. At other times, speech segments point to it, for
example: “I have to get teddy, so that is the teddy over there”.
PSP - Taking stock of problem objects This code reﬂects statements in which the
participant seems to run an inventory of the objects in the room. Sometimes such an
inventory is run in conjunction with aﬀordances (or might trigger such aﬀordances). For
example: “So, what do we have? There, we have a chair and some... some bowl. And
we also have some... some old objects that could look like some pieces of paper, and some
things on the ground [...] Maybe some... some very, very small nails.” (P0, Two strings
problem). Sometimes this strategy appears later in the process of solving (after at least
a way of solving the problem has been already tried). This might help the solver switch
focus on other objects, and build solutions around them. Thus we assume this is used
to both select useful objects in a fast broad manner and to trigger associations of uses,
which might be unconscious or not vocalized.
PSP - Proceeding on path Once a path has been set (starting with some objects or
a problem template which will be used intuitively as a heuristic), the participant then
proceeds on this path. This is a complementary code to switching path or template.
PSP - Backtracking This code refers to going backwards on a solution path, and
picking things up from an earlier state. This can involve going back to a crossroad
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decision point. This is sometimes done explicitly, like in the following: “Okay, sorry,
wait, let me... let me come back on that” (P0, Dusting the clock). At other times, this is
done implicitly, by turning back fast from a hypothesis that was being considered; this
can sometimes be followed by PSP-Deﬁning key requirements again, for example:
“And we... we will tie that left end of the rope to the fence... No, we will not do that.
So, you... you cannot climb the fence” (P0, Blown away teddy).
PSP - Evaluation In these segments, participants evaluate a particular solution to the
problem. This can be more general than comparing solution states to constraints (though
not necessarily). For example: “so I would have to go with this solution, although [...]
maybe ﬁve percent certain that this solution would work” (P0, Attach the pendulum).
Also, this might involve expressing satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the solution, in
both objective or emotional, intuitive and aesthetic terms.
PSP - Running through consequences This describes segments in which the par-
ticipant thinks about the consequences of moving objects, or doing things in a certain
way. For example: “And we will have, after this action will be performed ... so we will
have that piece of paper nailed to the ceiling by three or four nails, and will have that
piece of rope left and on top of that piece of paper, and right under the ceiling ...” (P0,
Two Strings problem).
Aﬀordance related segments (Aﬀ)
Aﬀ - Determining object aﬀordance This can range from actually listing the aﬀor-
dance of various objects, to listing more creative aﬀordances, or aﬀordances for which
objects are not generally used (like in the Alternative Uses Test). In the latter case,
we generally also use code OU - Object used in novel way. Examples of deter-
mining object aﬀordance can look like the following: “The matches could be there just
to [...] light the candle ... and maybe to melt the candle”(P0, Candle problem). It is
useful to remark upon the fact that aﬀordances in this context can be related to another
object (they can show ways of acting upon the other objects), thus acting as links to
build higher compositions of solution chains, which can be matched to various existing
(known) templates.
Aﬀ - Inferring more aﬀordances This refers to inferring new aﬀordances that are
not explicit, as well as developing upon direct object aﬀordances to infer what other
aﬀordances might be present. Such inferences generally make use of common sense
knowledge, and can prepare the object for use within a speciﬁc template. For example:
“so those two wooden objects out there seem to be of the same width and length [...]
it looks like a square. So that means that actually the lower width ... width is also
30 centimeters as the vertical width there.” (P0, Hat rack problem). However, such
inferences are to be diﬀerentiated the mentioning of unusual or creative aﬀordances
with existing objects.
Aﬀ - Determining lack of aﬀordance This code stands for stating or determining
that a certain object can’t be used in a certain way. Such a determination can initially
begin as a statement of aﬀordance, which then turns negative - a form of aﬀordance
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rejection (in which the participant prompts himself to stop considering an aﬀordance as
being enabled by the object). For example: “The thumbtacks would .... couldn’t possibly
be used for nailing the candle to the wall” (P0, Candle problem).
Aﬀ - Determining template aﬀordance If a certain template is being used con-
sciously, or the participant has access to meta-reasoning tools about the template used,
this code marks segments in which aﬀordances about templates are being used - for
example: “I could construct a platform but that’s not going to be any good, what I need
is [...]”.
Problem template use category (PT)
PT - Requirement-based search of template This code implies searching for a
template with the constraints of the problem. For example: “So, how can you... how
can you ﬁx something up near something [...] Oh yes, you can provide some sort of
stable platform for... for it.” (P0, Candle problem). Sometimes this overlaps with
Determining PT to use, at other times determining PT to use is a less speciﬁc code,
as it is not clear how the template to be used was reached. This code is also part of the
Search codes.
PT - Determining PT to use This code describes segments in which the participant
is choosing what template could be suitable for the problem. These segments correspond
to moments of structuring the problem in a certain way, using that speciﬁc template,
which will probably guide the future steps until either a solution is found, or an impasse
is reached, and the participant decides to let go of the template, or a new template “pops
out”, intersecting current solving. Such a new template could appear from already made
associations which converge or form a new template/way of solving things. Examples of
segments in which the PT to use is determined are the following: So, of course, there is
no way for him to reach that clock, yes, which is on the left wall. Okay, so once again
we would have to provide some steady platform for... for Johnny to be able to dust that
watch. (P0, Dusting the clock) or “by looking at it... by looking at it... It seems to be a
very straightforward application for the Archimedes’ principle” (P0, Jack and Jill weight
problem).
PT - Adaptation of PT to problem A chosen problem template is adapted to ﬁt the
constraints of the problem (or to work with other templates). Sometimes this adaptation
can occur when determining a PT to be used. For example: “So, how can you... how
can you ﬁx something up near something, or in this case, to the wall?” (P0, Candle
problem). This is also a Creative Adaptation code.
PT - use to search for suitable objects An abstract template that would be suitable
has been found (or the participant estimates it is suitable). Now this template is used
to select objects that could participate in realizing it in the given problem environment.
For example: “So, the only thing that could be provided as a stable platform in which to
place the candle is of course that box, that it couldn’t be something else.” (P0, Candle
problem). This code is also part of the Search category.
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PT - Adaptation of problem template to objects An existing problem template
is adapted to properties of the objects. For example: “If you put it [...] on a horizontal
position, then you would need just two thumbtacks on each end of ... it to nail them to the
wall, and in this case to really ﬁx, to link the box to the wall by using thumbtacks, which
would provide a stable horizontal platform for the candle, in which you could place the
candle” (P0, Candle problem). In this example, after the platform template is applied
to the objects, a modiﬁcation is observed: the candle is not on top of the platform, but
in the box that has initially been used to ﬁll the platform template, which is actually
upon inspection also a container. This code also belongs to the Creative Adaptation
category.
PT - use of PT construct This code marks segments in which a problem template is
being used to organize objects in an obvious manner. This code is also used when the
same template is being used again immediately or a participant comes back to it after
trying out diﬀerent paths - however, the objects used to populate the template might
diﬀer. This is also a Composition code.
PT - use of PT construct with reaching solution path This code marks segments
in which a problem template has been used successfully to reach a solution.
PT - Rejecting template In the segments encoded under this category, the partici-
pant decides against using a template, or makes statements about how a certain template
would be inappropriate. Sometimes, such a template is rejected out of hand on initial
assumptions, without running through the consequences of using it, just because a cer-
tain template does not seem to ﬁt, because of some of its aﬀordances or requirements
coming in conﬂict with constraints of the problem, or not being enabled by the objects in
the problem. A PT could also be rejected because it simply seems that aﬀordance-wise
it comes short of getting the job done. Examples of this are “but unfortunately, here
we have to... to establish if some.. some sort of diﬀerentiation can be obtained from
weighing, and not from... not from just calculated... calculating volume” (P0, Jack and
Jill weight problem).
PT - Template Switch This reﬂects segments in which the participant switches from a
pre-existing or used problem template (or way of structuring things) to a new one. Such
template switches might ensue during or after the process of restructuring the problem
elements. For example: “So, instead of ... instead of ﬁxing the candle to the wall in
the most regular way, you could just provide a platform for it on which it could stand.”.
(P0, Candle problem)
Assessment category (A)
The Assessment category generally refers to partial assessments, rather than end of
solving Evaluation segments.
A - Checking joints in plan This code reﬂects segments in which the participant
considers how the various objects ﬁt together, in the overall attempt at solving the
problem. This might involve references to particular parts of objects ﬁtting with other
objects, in the general context of the plan.
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A - Checking object against constraints This code pertains to checking an object
against problem constraints or template constraints. Subsequently, the object could be
integrated or found to be lacking, which would make the participant discard it or adapt
the problem template to this issue by adding other objects to the problem space. For
example: “Okay, but right now Johnny is... Johnny is still very small to be able to get
on that... that platform” (P0, Dusting the clock)
A - Comparing solution state to constraints In these segments, the participant
compares directly some state that has been reached in solving with the constraints or
requirements given by the problem. For example: “which will make him a little bit higher
and maybe able to place himself and... and now climb on [...] that platform, from which
he ... he can easily dust that clock. ” (P0, Dusting the clock)
Focus changes
F - Focusing on object This reﬂects a segment in which the participant focuses on a
particular object (or objects) and builds solutions around it, or tries to use it in every
solution for a while. For example: “So, obviously, we ... we would have to use that rope
in some way to reach the... the teddy” (P0, Blown away teddy)
F - Switching to new object as focus This reﬂects segments in which the focus is
switched from an object or a set of objects (and implicitly their aﬀordances) to another
object or set of objects, thus allowing for a new type of solution to emerge, around
those objects. Sometimes this is a fresh start, equivalent with structuring the problem
starting from that object and its aﬀordances. At diﬀerent times, it happens when the
participant notices a new object, which then can be integrated. For example: “[...] and
the box would be ﬁxed to the wall by using thumbtacks. But why that box of matches
there? ”(P0, Candle problem)
The equivalent of this focus and switch of focus in problem templates are codes PSP -
Proceeding on path and PT - Template switch.
Creative problem solving process speciﬁc
Composing fuller results based on previous exploration If aﬀordances of various
objects were previously just triggered, or new creative uses of some objects assessed,
in this case a fuller, more detailed result is assembled based on these initial “hunches”,
the mechanism of which the participant didn’t yet run through (at least verbally). It is
sensible to assess that after making previous fast and wide searches of solution aﬀording
objects and templates, the participants take, at this stage, more time to deploy in detail
a solution which seemed plausible.
Insight marker expressions This code is assigned to segments or expressions which
can be reﬂective of insight. For example, this code refers to utterances like “Ah!”,
“I see!”, “I know!”, “Aha!”, “I got it”, “I have a new crazy idea which might just
work”, especially when such utterances come after a long break in verbalizing or in new
ideas, when they seem to come out of nowhere, or intersect a previous (coherent) line
of thought. These may or may not be reﬂective of actual insight, and further proof
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of a new restructuring is necessary to deem such expressions as actually reﬂecting an
insightful moment of problem solving.
Making assumptions With insight problems and problems which require creative
problem solving, a decent amount of ambiguity comes naturally. Participants seem to
contend with this by setting up assumptions of their own. Such segments may but
must not necessarily start with “I’m gonna assume that..” or “Can I assume that..?”.
For example: Okay, assuming that Johnny can... can easily move on... on top of the
table (P0, Dusting the clock) or “So, assuming that you... you in no way are able to
disembowel that... that table” (P0, Blown away teddy). These assumptions may or may
not be valid or helpful.
Stuck or functional ﬁxedness This code reﬂects segments in which the participant
can’t come up with anything new, and is either silent, voices that no new idea is being
found, or keeps on iterating previous ideas.
Forcing solution This code is allocated to segments in which the participant is trying
to force a certain solution to work, despite evidence to the contrary or already declared
estimations that it wouldn’t work. Some such solutions can be far fetched, and can be
seen as a way to trying to close the gap between problem space and solution state, with
very low thresholds on what can be done with the objects, and sometimes applying quite
complicated attempts at solving the problem. For example, P0 forces the solution to the
Attach cardboard to loop problem by attempting to nail the table to the wall, in such
a way that a table leg is placed under the loop, in order to be used as support for the
cardboard which also now touches the loop. Such forced solutions might appear after
being stuck in functional ﬁxedness for a long while, and possibly being frustrated with
the inability to solve the problem in any feasible way.
Object (O), Object templates (OT) and object use (OU)
O - Disassembles object An object is split in pieces or broken, possibly to extract
parts which can be used for their aﬀordances. For example: “take the shoelace or the
lace of one of the skates there” (Mb8, Dusting the clock) or “ pull the legs oﬀ the table”
(Mb8, Dusting the clock). The code is also part of the Disassembly category.
O - Property-based search of object This code stands for segments in which a
participant has already formulated what kind of property is essential for ﬁtting an object
into a problem template and is searching the objects in the room that could yield the
corresponding property (or aﬀordance). For example: “so wow now I can take the
clothesline because it’s a long wire” (Fb6, Blown away teddy). This code is also part of
the Search category.
O - Adaptation of objects to template An object is ﬁtted into a problem template by
changing properties or main uses of the object. This sometimes comes as a consequence
of how the object is seen (object template) or of needing certain properties of the object
as required by the template, though those properties are not necessarily salient. For
example, properties of the object “paperclip” need to be changed for the object to
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become a hook. Physically, the object needs to be unbent. Paper sheets can be folded
to use their length and bendability properties, under a Chaining template, etc. This
code is also part of the Creative Adaptation category.
O - Object used to search for template Starting from a given object, the participant
is trying to extrapolate what template it could be part of, or ﬁnd a template that is
suitable. The constraints of the problem can simultaneously be used in this search,
overtly or covertly. This is partly why sometimes aﬀordances are developed, and initially
explicitly stated. For example: “diﬀerent sorts of construct, but all of them would imply
that... that rope some...somehow, because we need to ... to make that pendulum moving,
and we can do that by only...by only linking... tying that one end of that rope to the
upper side of the pendulum”. (P0, Attach the pendulum) This code is also part of the
Search category.
OT - Object template use An object template is used to re-create the object out
of parts or other objects. Thus parts of other objects or full other objects are adapted
to an object template. For example: “Okay, to use the right rope for tying down the
neck of that bowl right there, then swing it and the weight of the bowl will just make the
rope act like a pendulum.” (P0, Blown away teddy) or “So, that means we will actually
use... we will actually use that table as some sort of prerequisite step for him to be able
to gradually move... move up the... the ladder up on.... on that platform” (P0, Dusting
the clock). In this example, the table is used as a step of the ladder. This is also a
Composition code.
OT - Object template adaptation An object template is adapted to the parts at
hand. For example: build a scale of sorts [...] But you do not have anything to support
it on except for the bucket. (Mb8, Jack and Jill weighting problem). This code is also
part of the Creative adaptation category.
OT - Object template rejection An object template the use of which has been
considered for a brief or long period of time is rejected. For example: “It’s not like you
can build a scale” (Mb8, Jack and Jill weighting problem).
OU - Object used in novel way This code marks when an object with a set of familiar
aﬀordances is used in a novel way, similar to the answers given in the Alternative Uses
Test. For example: “maybe we will use some of the matches to further prevent the candle
from dripping down” In this example the matches are used as a miniature dam, or a drip
stopper. (P0, Candle Problem).
Meta-cognitive
Meta - remark on problem nature This code reﬂects segments in which participants
make meta-cognitive comments or reason at a meta-cognitive level about the nature of
the problem they are confronting, or the nature of such problems in general. For example
“so those objects put there in the right side of the room, obviously we will have to... I
will have to give them some purpose in order to help me to make this person able to
reach both strings” (P0, Two strings problem).
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Meta-remark on own process This code reﬂects segments in which participants make
comments about their own perceived process of solving the problem. For example: “I
have a few solutions that come to mind quickly. I can’t really iterate them or I can’t
really verbalize them that quickly. I got a couple of diﬀerent ones coming. You could
[...]” (Mb8, Blown away teddy) or “Okay, right now I’m just looking at all these diﬀerent
things, trying to ﬁgure out how... which combination can be of any help.” (Fb6, Dusting
the clock).
Other codes
Other - aﬀective state The participant expresses an aﬀective state about the problem
at hand, be it directly (telling the experimenter about it - for example “I am getting
frustrated with this now” or “That’s interesting!”) or indirectly (tone of voice, giggles,
gestures, etc.) like joy, interest or frustration.
Other - talking to audience or observer These are statements in which the partic-
ipant addresses the observer directly or talks as if having an audience.
Other - talking about self action The participant describes an action she has done,
like moving to the next slide, or picking up the glass of water, etc.
Other - talking about previous experience The participant relates the current
problem template used or object use to a previous experience or a memory.
Other - distraction The participant distracts themselves from the problem. Possibly
an indication of encountered diﬃculty, or need for rest/refocus.
Other - talking to self This might show up in the form of boosting one’s own process
by directing it in a certain way or another, be linked to evaluating a certain way the
participant is proceeding or performing, as well as a variety of other cases. For example:
“Okay, not forget, don’t forget” (Fb6, Attach to loop) or “Okay, keep talking” (Fb6,
Attach to loop).
Creative adaptation processes (CA) PT - Adaptation of PT to problem, PT -
Adaptation of problem template to objects ,O - Adaptation of objects to
template and OT - Object template adaptation.
Composition and Disassembly PT - use of PT construct, O - Disassembles object
and OT - Object template use.
Search O - Property-based search of object, PT - use to search for suitable
objects, O - Object used to search for template and PT - Requirement-based
search of template.
Insight relevant This includes insight moments, as expressed in insight marker expres-
sions, sudden moments of attempting a new strategy and restructuring the problem.
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7.3 Two Cases Studies
The codes described in Section 7.2 were constructed to analyze the think aloud protocols
of participants solving the eight problems described in Section 7.1. These problems were
given to 32 participants, 16 male and 16 female. The participants were asked to provide
an assessment of their problem-solving and creativity skills before and after solving, on
a 1 to 7 Likert scale (7 being excellent), and an assessment of their performance. 10
minutes solving time were allocated for each problem, except for the Hat rack problem,
which was the hardest and for which 15 minutes were allocated. Solving time was
observed, and voice recordings were made of the problem solving think aloud sessions.
In the following, the codes from Section 7.2 will be used to provide a descriptive nar-
rative of the think aloud protocol of two participants in this think aloud study. These
participants were the best performing participants in their gender group - mb8 in the
male group, and fb6 in the female group.
7.3.1 The case of mb8
Participant mb8 is a male Entomologist graduate student, with native level English
skills. He rated his problem-solving and creativity skills at 5 on a 1 to 7 Likert scale
(where 7 is excellent), both before and after the session. The participant solved in the
expected correct way 7 out of the 8 problems, and provided multiple plausible solutions
to the 8th (Dusting the clock). He rated, on good grounds, his performance at a 7
(excellent) and considered he had plenty of time.
P1 - Attach to loop problem - solved in 4m 25s, diﬃculty as rated by participant
1-2.
The participant read the problem. Then he took stock of problem objects. He then
returned to determining key requirements of the problem, reﬁned this as attaching the
cardboard to the ceiling, and tried to determine what template to use by asking the
experimenter how the solution would look, which would allow him a PT search:
“How do you want to attach it to the ceiling? Do you want to attach it ﬂat
like the broadest surface to the ceiling like that or do you want to hang it?”
He then focused on the paperclips objects, and started building solutions around them
and the nails. In this process, the bendable property of the paperclips was used multiple
times, to bend paperclips around the nails. The nails were then used to attach the card-
board to the ceiling. The observer prompted the participant to the initial requirements
of attaching the cardboard to the loop. The participant adapted his initial solution to
using a nail to hold the paperclip in place, then using the paperclip to make the connec-
tion to the loop. While talking about these solutions, the participant mentioned object
properties (“paperclips are light”) and object parts (“the round end of the paperclip”).
The participant kept on applying the same template even when confronted with the
constraint that the cardboard might be too heavy to be supported by one paperclip
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hanging from the loop. He attempted to get around this by adapting the same template
to multiple paperclips, and making more complex constructions with nail supports. After
using multiple times the nails to pierce the cardboard, he realized that the nail could be
skipped (Discarded object), and the paperclip used more directly:
“You could always just skip the nail and stab the paperclip through the card-
board. [...] Oh yeah. If you - yeah, you could just punch the paperclips
through the cardboard and then hook that onto the loop”
He motivated this template switch, that aﬀorded him the correct solution, with notic-
ing the parts of the paperclip distinctly: “because the paperclips have two open ends”.
However, his evaluation of the solution, at the aesthetic level, was not positive: “I think
that would look pretty ugly”.
P2 - Candle problem - solved in 7 s, diﬃculty rated by the participant 1-2.
Participant mb8 solved this problem directly, in full form, adding to the solution the
further reﬁnement of dripping wax into the box so that he could use that to ﬁx the
candle.
P3 - Attach pendulum problem - solved in 2m, diﬃculty rated by the participant
as 2-3.
After reading the problem, mb8 took stock of the problem objects - pendulum, string,
nails. He then focused on properties of the pendulum, looking for parts of it to attach
it from and observed the hole in the pendulum. He proceeded to compose a fuller result
based on the string and the pendulum, by looping string through the hole. He then
moved his focus on securing the pendulum to the ceiling. For this, he asked about the
weight property of the pendulum, checking the object against constraints of what could
be hanging from a string nailed to the ceiling. After detailing on joints of the plan - how
to tie the string to both the weight and pendulum, he was asked by the experimenter
how exactly he would nail the string to the ceiling. At this, mb8 ﬁnally noticed the lack
of the hammer.
Mentioning he has previous experience with such situations, he proposed using either the
pendulum or one of the legs of the table to replace the hammer. Thus, in this context,
both objects received an alternative use. The participant however worried about damage
to the pendulum, and the ability of the table to be disassembled.
P4 - Two Strings problem - solved in 1m 15s, diﬃculty rated by participant as 2-3.
Mb8 read the problem and proceeded to take stock of the objects - pliers, pieces of
paper, nails, stool. He then focused on the nails and the chair, re-iterated the goal and
made the assumption that collateral damage was not an issue. He then proposed as a
ﬁrst solution to climb the chair, nail a string to the ceiling, then grab the other string
and bring it to the previous ﬁxed one. Running through consequences, he verbalized the
damage he was initially describing: But then you have a hole in your ceiling.
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Told by the experimenter that he might not be able to reach the ceiling, even while
standing on the chair, mb8 then asked about the strength property of the string and
about the parts of the jar (whether it has a lid or not). He proceeed to empty some of
the nails out of the jar to make it lighter (still worried about the strength of the string),
then tied the string to the jar, and used the pendulum principle to solve the problem:
“Okay, so you can empty some of them (n.a. nails) out so it doesn’t weigh
very much, and then you could screw... screw the string so that it’s - you
know - kind of on the jar. Then you stand on the stool, grab your one string,
hop on the stool. Then if you tied the jar of the nails to the other string, you
could let it swing... And then you could grab it when it comes back to you,
just kind of get your string out and tie them together. ”
P5 - Jack and Jill weight problem - solved in 6m 36s, diﬃculty rated by the
participant as 2-3.
After reading the problem, and then making social politeness comments about Jack
declaring one’s weight as higher than Jill’s, mb8 started taking stock of the problem
objects. He then checked for access to the seawater, and depth properties of the pool,
looking like he was already applying a certain unvocalized template and checking if
objects would be in place to apply it. He then indeed proceeded to apply an Archimedes’
principle template, on the path of which he stayed and added details for a while. This
involved getting rid of the sand in the bucket, using the bucket to bring water from
the sea and alternating between the two kids ﬁlling the pool and displacing water. The
measurement he proposed was that of the water remaining in the pool after each kid’s
immersion. He correctly evaluated this solution path to lead to a volume determination,
rather than weight. This made him discard the template for a while.
Mb8 then focused on the other people, asking whether they can help, then he discarded
such a possible path due to subjectivity of the measurement, which might be tampered
in his opinion by social politeness. After discarding a path which involved the other
people weighing both Jack and Jill, mb8 returned to his previous Archimedes’ principle
template, and tried to realize it using diﬀerent objects, speciﬁcally sand rather than
water:
“You can do the same thing in the pool with sand. You could set one of them
in the pool and ﬁll it up with sand and then have them get out and see how
much is left, but ...”
Mb8 then started making a template switch, based on considering the requirements of
the template. These requirements for certainty made him try to search for a form of a
scale, which he attempted to obtain in various ways, ﬁlling in the template of a scale with
initial unlikely objects. A speciﬁc template of a scale is also implied as mb8 mentions
ends of a scale. He oscillated between keeping and rejecting the scale template for a
while:
“Huh! The only way to say for certain would be to put each of them on the
opposite ends of the scale and there is no way to construct a scale here...
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or is there? ... You can’t build anything out of sand because it’s not like
it’s going to hold up... or maybe you could. I don’t know... [...] I was just
thinking about what kind of options you would have if you have a bucket of
sand and the shovel in play when you could build diﬀerent things but I mean
that wouldn’t really be useful. It’s not like you can build a scale. ”
Considering the template however proved useful, because mb8 then found more likely
objects to ﬁll it with: the bar of the umbrella and the bucket:
“so I initially thought about taking the poles from the umbrella and using that
as ... as something to help build a scale of sorts because you have two ends
of it that could hold... (and show you) which one is heavier. But you don’t
have anything to support it on except for the bucket [...] like if you put the
bucket upside down and you put the bar over it”
Mb8 then proceeded to compose the solution in more detail, run through it’s conse-
quences and evaluate it. Then he switched back to oﬀering arguments for his Archimedes’
principle solution, and evaluated that solution again. However, he noticed a new object
all of a sudden “Uh! Surfboard!” and then proceeded to integrate it in the “scale”
template (rather a seesaw as scale template):
“You can do the same thing. So you could scrap the pole idea and then ...
and then just use the surfboard on the bucket.”
P6 - Hat rack problem - solved in 2m 30s, diﬃculty rated by participant as 3-4.
After reading the problem, mb8 proceeded to make assumptions: “So it doesn’t matter
how it looks, as long as it holds the hat(s)”. Then proposed jokingly to “Put the hat on
your head. The very ﬁrst hat rack!” Mb8 then proceeded to inspect the measurements
in the scene, focusing on the width property. From that, he put the width of the two
planks together, and proceeded to infer aﬀordances, like “That’s probably big enough to
stand on”. Mb8 then proceeded on a path of constructing a vertical hat rack made by
the two planks held together by the G-clamp, ﬁtted in a corner of the room. He then
asked the experimenter about more requirements, on whether the rack should ﬁt one or
multiple hats. He evaluated this construction, than proceeded to develop it. Noticing
one of the parts of the G-clamp, he then determined it’s aﬀordance in terms of holding
the hat, thus achieving the ﬁrst part of insight required to solve the problem in the
classical way. He returned to aesthetic evaluation:
“I mean it’s not going to look pretty. You’re not going to want your guests
to see that. You want a hat rack that looks nice.”
Mb8 then switched template, to a new vertical construction that represented the second
path of the classical solution of the problem: posting the planks between the ﬂoor and
the ceiling, with a small overlap. He then composed the fuller solving path and described
it, proposing putting the hat on the board overlap part. Mb8 then switched his attention
back to the G-clamp, while integrating the object in this new vertical template, noticed
its uses as a hook and achieved the full solution.
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P7 - Blown away teddy - solved in 3m 58s, diﬃculty rated by the participant as 2-3.
Mb8 read the problem, then proceeded to take stock of objects, already regarding them
as tools: “What kind of tools do we have?”. He then inquired about object properties -
whether the clothesline is a long solid or non-solid object . He asked about the distance
between the fence and teddy bear, which cannot be provided. Mb8 then made meta
remarks on his own process:
“..so I have a few solutions that come to mind quickly. I can’t really iterate
them or I can’t really verbalize them that quickly. I got a couple of diﬀerent
ones coming.”
The participant then proceeded to describe one such solution path, under the assumption
that “collateral damage is not an issue”. This solution was based around the fence and
an ability to disassemble it, though mb8 evaluated it as “probably not the best way to
do it”. The participant then looked closer at the assembly properties of the fence, and
decided to use the mop handle in a novel way (as a lever) to “Pop oﬀ the boards”. He
then proceeded to compose further on this path. Then proposed alternative paths, like
“walking around the fence to see if there is a door”.
The participant then focused on another object, the umbrella, and used an object tem-
plate, a rake, to cast the umbrella. Immediately, he recast the same rake object template
to another object ﬁller - the mop.
“You could try using the umbrella like a rake in reaching over the fence to
grab the teddy bear. You could do that with the mop, too.”
Mb8 then switched template again, proposing to climb on the table and jump over the
fence. At the experimenter’s prompting that he may not break or dismantle the fence,
nor set foot in the neighbour’s garden, he restated the previous path. The casting of the
umbrella as a rake was so strong, that later he referred to the umbrella with the name
“rake”, despite being a native English speaker:
“The rake or the mop over the fence, trying to rake the teddy bear back would
be the best thing to try”
Determining a lack of the long enough aﬀordance for these previous constructions, mb8
then started focusing on other objects that could be used to lengthen that construction.
Thus, the coat hangers where considered, adapted to the “lengthening” template, and
unbent. The mop was also considered for its length properties. After searching for
suitable objects to lengthen the construction, mb8 composed a fuller path based on
previous exploration of aﬀordances. Thus he proposed making a straight line out of
the coat hangers, the length of which he estimated. Analysing the properties of the
coat hangers, the bending property became suddenly apparent, and mb8 adjusted his
construction to better suit the goals of the problem: “You can put a hook at the end
of it”. Considering this construction further under the length lack of aﬀordance, mb8
added to it the sunglasses, appearing to search for long objects (property search), or
objects that could be adapted as to become long (e.g. by straightening them). The
bucket handle was also considered.
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With markers of insight (Huh! (laugh to self)), mb8 used the already fashioned hook
at the end of his construction to switch to a new template. Thus the hook alone was
kept, disassembled, and attached to the clothesline. Soon enough, this grappling hook
template turned to a ﬁshing rod template:
“Huh! (laugh to self) It’s a little bit cliche´ ... but you could take the clothes-
line, and you could fashion a pronged hook out of the coat hanger. You
could attach that to the clothesline, and then you could throw it over like a
grappling hook until you get the bear. So that would be longer, but then you
could tie the end of that line to the end of the mop, so you get the mop then
the end of the clothesline, then some coat hanger construction whatever you
want. Then you could throw it like a ﬁshing rod.”
P8 - Dust the clock - multiple plausible solutions given in 10 m. Diﬃculty rated by
participant as 3.
After reading P8, mb8 got quiet. Upon prompting he said he was “thinking about the
objects we have available”. He proceeded to initially focus on the duster, and to re-
state the key requirements of the problem. He then asked about height properties of
Johnny, which the experimenter was not allowed to provide in a quantitative manner.
Without this data, mb8 proceeded to make a height estimation (which prepared him for
an approach of compensating for lack of height through making a construction of other
objects to put Johnny on top of):
“He looks like he’s about there, so that’s like what? ... That is that plus his
height, so that puts him here, then his little arm will reach up and he can
dust the face.”
Mb8 then proposed a variety of constructions to put Johnny on top of. First, he proposed
to put Johnny on the table. However, as this was still lacking in the height aﬀordance,
he switched to an elongating arm approach, adapting objects to this template. Thus,
the duster was tied with the shoelaces (which were disassembled from the skates) to the
tennis racket, in order to elongate Johnny’s reach. The participant then switched back
to considering what objects he could use to ﬁll the construction template. He considered
stacking the chairs and discarded that option, because of lack of stability aﬀordance of
said chairs, estimated based on experience: “I’ve stood on chairs like that before and
they’ve just broken”. He considered and discarded using the globe as a ﬁller for his
construction. He then proceeded on a new path, adapting the construction template to
a platform template. This template was then reﬁned to include another object, which
has already been considered:
“You could put these two chairs on each end of the room, put the surfboard
over the arms of them and stand on that or put the table on top of the
surfboard and then stand on that.”
Mb8 then integrated the extending arm construction into this new solution path.
When asked by the experimenter whether he could consider other solutions, mb8 focused
on the clock and asked if it could be moved. Then proceeded to search for suitable
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objects with the aﬀordance of moving the clock. Objects considered where the globe,
the chessboard (being thrown at the clock) and the surfboard. The skates were also
considered and discarded, because of running through the possible consequence of them
sticking in the wall. The participant then returned to the former template, and voiced
it in terms of a table Object-Template rather then platform template, which hints at
seeing the surfboard as a table surface: “Putting the surfboard over two arms of the
chair so that the arms of the chair are basically formed legs of the surfboard table, then
you could stand on that...”
Mb8 then proceeded going through his previous strategies and evaluating them, re-
iterating them, and sometimes modifying them. For example, he considered the arm
elongation template with a new object in - the surfboard, but discarded it in favour of
the racket, because of an analysis of properties of the end part of the surfboard and
previous experience:
“I woud’ve suggested tying the duster to the end of the surfboard, but I don’t
think that would work, because the end of the surfboard is round like that,
not like a cone but it’s kind of rounded, so I don’t know if you’ve ever tried
tying a string around an end like that. It just doesn’t work, like the tie just
slips oﬀ. But the tennis... the tennis racket would be perfect. I mean I have
tied shoelaces around - I have - the end of tennis rackets before because the
grip is squish, it just tightens right there.”
Mb8 then considered disassembling the table and using the legs of the table to build
something long, at the end of which the duster could be attached (this is still the elongate
arm template). However, this is dependent in his assessment upon Johnny’s strength
property, and will have as consequence the destruction of the table.
The participant then switched focus between diﬀerent other objects, perhaps considering
whether they trigger new solving templates, or at least new meaningful aﬀordances
that can be used for ﬁnding such templates, or integrating the objects with previous
templates: “I was just thinking about the chandelier, and whether or not it’s possible
bringing that into play, but I don’t think so. It’s not possible to bring it into play in an
eﬀective way”. He then considered the skates in the context of the previous knocking
down the clock template. The participant then got stuck in functional ﬁxedness, iterating
only through already proposed strategies, with the only novel improvement being his
realization that surfboards have a ventral ﬁn on which the duster could be attached in
a more stable manner.
7.3.2 The case of fb6
Participant fb6 is a female Business Psychology graduate student, with advanced English
skills. Her estimate of her problem-solving and creativity skills were 6 and 5 respectively
pre-test, and 5 and 4 post-test. She rated her performance as 4 and considered she had
enough time. Fb6 solved 5 problems, provided a partial solution to the hat rack problem,
and multiple solutions to the Dusting the Clock problem.
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P1 - Jack and Jill weight problem - solved in 2m 40s, diﬃculty rated by participant
as 4.
Fb6 read the problem, then proceeded directly to a solving path which focused around
the small swimming pool, involving implicitly Archimedes’ principle. The solution state
was then compared to constraints: “Then they would know how much the volume is there
...” (intonation emphasis on word volume) “I don’t know if that helps for the weight,
but it should, kind of...”. After switching attention to other objects, fb6 redeﬁned/reit-
erated the key requirements of the problem, trying to ﬁnd a path to a solving template.
Then she made comments attempting to determine the aﬀordance of using Archimedes’
principle as a template, comparing volume of water (aﬀordance of said template) to
requirements of the problem: “If I have a certain amount or volume of water, will it
weigh as much as a certain amount of human? I’m not entirely sure”.
Fb6 then applied the same template to other objects, showing some possible process of
search for suitable objects with the same template. Still, a gap remained between the
aﬀordance of the template and requirements of the problem:
“Same you could do with the little shovel and the bucket like (laughs)... bury
yourself in the sand an see how much sand is coming out and then weigh the
... they don’t have a scale to weigh the sand, but they can see how much sand
there is...”
After comparing solution state with constraints again, fb6 continued with determining
template aﬀordance: “But still, it doesn’t mean... that just helps me to see who’s...
who’s bigger. That doesn’t help me see who’s heavier”. Discarding the template for the
moment, fb6 started switching to other objects as focus. The object chosen was the
surfboard, on which fb6 proceeded on a object based search of template. The initial
template yielded by that search was a traditional one - standing on the surfboard. Fb6
attempted to adapt this to the context of the problem: “Stand on the surfboard and
see how far it... yeah... it goes down in the water”. Fb6 then compared the solution
state to goals of the problem, evaluating, determining template aﬀordance, and trying
to further adapt the template to the goals of the problem by putting both Jack and Jill
on the surfboard. After this, using the surfboard as a focus object for a template search
and to build a solution around yielded the solution:
“Or... I don’t know if that works but like... switch the bucket around, put a
surfboard on it, they both stand on a side. It might work as the - how is that
called - like on a play slide?”
P2 - Attach pendulum - solved in 8m 5s, diﬃculty rated by participant as 6.
After reading the problem, fb6 started taking stock of the problem objects, and de-
termining some object aﬀordances: “I got a sock, this is the pendulum, I got nails. I
got ... umm... glasses and what’s that? A string. So I got a ladder so I can reach the
ceiling. That is good already”. She noticed the need for the hammer straight away, while
checking the joints in her plan. She then proceeded to construct a partial solution, using
the objects she already knew were part of the solution. She then proceeded to search
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for a hammer replacement based on properties (something she called “stability”, but
can be inferred to represent solidity/hardness of the object, as the participant is not a
native English speaker). She focused on various objects, trying to use them as replace-
ment, and showing a particular ﬁxation with the sock. Fb6 attempted to improve/adapt
replacement objects as to ﬁt her property criteria:
“Maybe if ... I mean I could wrap them (the sunglasses) in this sock like help
for stability, and then use that if I like fold them together and wrap it in the
sock, use that to hammer in the... the nail [...] what is this sock doing there?
[...] or if I ... wrap the sock around the... the ball of wire, will that be hard
enough to use it as a kind of hammer thing?”
Continuing the use the object template of a hammer: “So let’s go on with my idea to
try to build a ... a hammer”, fb6 attempted to let go of the red-herring sock object: “I
just don’t understand what the sock will help me for, it’s... or maybe not every object is
important for me. That could be, too. I just... They’re just there to confuse me, so... ”
After checking the other parts of her template construct of attaching the pendulum to
the wall and re-determining object aﬀordance in the current plan, fb6 showed all signs
of being stuck for a while, with statements like: “I feel like I can’t really ﬁgure it out in
another way. Or if I just... I don’t know ... I don’t know. I don’t see another way.”
and “I am ... kind a... at a dead-end here I feel”. Fb6 attempted to exit this state by
focusing on diﬀerent objects, and checking whether objects she was already using were
necessary in her solution construct, or could indeed have diﬀerent aﬀordances. This
helped her see the double use of the pendulum, as a consequence of the property of its
material: “I can use the pendulum if it’s hard enough to hammer the nails in the ceiling.
I mean it looks like it’s (giggle) made of metal.”
P3 - Blown away teddy - solved in 4m 40s, diﬃculty rated by participant as 3.
Fb6 read the problem, mapped the problem formulation to objects (bear, garden), then
focused directly on the stick of the broom and started constructing solutions around
it, along it’s length property. When prompted that this might not be long enough to
reach the bear, fb6 continued searching for objects with the length property: So wow
now I can take the clothesline because it’s a long wire. Fb6 then proceeded to attach
the clothes hanger at the end of her construction, and considered this similar to a lasso
in it’s uses. Then the object template was adapted to the hook of the clothes hanger:
“throw it and hope that with the hook of the cloth hanger might grab one of his arms or
legs or his head and then pull it to me”.
At further prompting that this might not be long enough, fb6 proceeded to make other
constructions: using the clothesline and the broom, with the broom end “shoveling” the
teddy (deﬁnitely not the traditional use for a shovel, but apparently in the participant’s
template). Fb6 then switched focus to other objects, by taking again stock of the objects
presented in the problem scene: umbrella, sunglasses, bucket. The same shovel object
template was then used with other objects, like the clothesline and the umbrella. The
participant then investigated the properties of the clothes, discarded their use, and then
proceeded to determine aﬀordance and uses of objects she deemed more suitable:
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“I got this clothes hanger which I really like where I think I would like to do
something with them. So if I maybe... open up, I mean they like like they’re
just made from wire like metal wire. Can I open them up, tie them together
somehow they’re a long line, and just make a hook at the end and then grab
it like this.”
This together with a comparison to goal state allowed further construction until some-
thing like a ﬁshing rod template solution was built from the umbrella stick, the clothesline
and a clothes hanger, cast as a hook.
P4 - Attach to loop - not solved, diﬃculty rated by participant as 5.
After reading the problem and taking stock of problem objects, fb6 proceeded on a
solution path which involved putting a paperclip around the loop. She then persisted
in this template, attempting to improve it with various nail constructions and then
manifesting functional ﬁxedness. She attempted to force the solution by nailing the
cardboard to the ceiling. When exiting functional ﬁxedness, fb6 had two other template
switches: she attempted to build some short form of paperclip chain, or to use the
hammer itself for attaching to the loop. She then attempted to force the solution again
by folding the cardboard and putting it on the loop.
Finally, she admitted to being stuck and made remarks on her own process about func-
tional ﬁxedness and only coming up with diﬀerent ways of modifying the attaching point
to the loop: “Everything that comes to my mind are almost the same things that I’ve
already said, like just a diﬀerent... where I’m framing them... to the loop in the ceiling”.
She proceeded to reiterate the paths she could think of, until the time allocated for the
problem run out.
P5 - Dusting the clock - multiple plausible solutions provided, diﬃculty rated by
participant as 6.
Fb6 read the problem, then framed the key requirements as Johnny’s property of being
too small to get to the clock. She then took stock of part of the objects in the scene, and
determined the lack of aﬀordance of stacking on the chairs, from what she later revealed
to be personal experience. She then made a ﬁrst attempt to attach the dust cleaner to
the tennis racket, possibly based on their length property which translated into an arm
elongation aﬀordance, without ﬁnding any object suitable to produce such attaching.
Fb6 proceeded to search for objects to construct a platform or a high construction to put
Johnny on in parallel with searching for objects to elongate his arm. She thus realized
she could disassemble a part of the ice skates to use for this purpose:
“Okay, I can use the laces of the... ice skating shoes to attach the duster to
the tennis rack. Should be possible, so I’ve got a longer duster, and... so that
is already a little bit of... that is already closer.”
She then constructed in parallel a platform made of a chair and the table, to make
Johnny taller. Fb6 then started taking stock of the problem objects again, switching
between them and determining their aﬀordance in the context of the constraints. She
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thus discarded the surfboard “I’m not sure you can really climb on it”, the globe, the
chessboard. Fb6 then made meta-remarks on her own process: “Okay, right now I’m
just looking at all these diﬀerent things, trying to ﬁgure out how... which combination
can be of any help.”. Fb6 then focused again on the surfboard, using it in the context
of a platform template, with the two chairs arm rests as support. Commenting on the
new straight surface property obtained, she proceeded on inferring more aﬀordances,
and considering what other objects she could put on top.
After focusing on diﬀerent objects, she proceeded on object-based searches of template
- leaning the surfboard on the wall under the clock, swinging on the lamp on the ceil-
ing using the shoelaces, which she evaluated as very dangerous and “not good for little
Johnny”. Fb6 then got in a functional ﬁxedness place, and continued to iterate previ-
ously oﬀered paths, and slightly improve on some - for example using the surfboard as
a platform on top of the two chairs, then putting the table on it, then the globe, made
unmovable by using the shoelaces, etc.
After attempting this problem, fb6 showed some signs of tiredness, which generally
manifested in her stating the goals or key requirements of the problem at hand much
more often, possibly in an attempt to refresh her own memory and keep her attention
processes directed on the goal.
P6 - Candle problem - solved in 3m 10s, diﬃculty rated by participant as 3.
After reading the problem, fb6 deﬁned its key requirements, and proceeded directly on
the path of using the box of thumbtacks under the candle to protect from drips on the
ﬂoor. Thus she has seen the box as a possible container for wax drips, but not for the
candle itself. She then proceeded to ﬁnd a way to attach the candle to the wall, which
she reiterated as a key requirement. For this, she considered using the wax, which she
discarded, using the thumbtacks for their piercing aﬀordance on the candle, which she
again discarded. After searching for more objects to ﬁt the ﬁxing to wall requirements,
she focused on the matches, on which she then composed fuller results:
“So there’s the candle... and with the tacks and the matches I feel like I want
to build a little holder to the wall, so take four of these so that they make a
... a little thing that I can put the candle in, so that the matches are around
it [...]” etc
Fb6 then proceeded to evaluate her construction, comparing it to the key requirements
of the problem: “Will that hold or will it fall out? Or would it even be too big! I don’t
know. It should not drip on the ﬂoor”.
Upon returning to the mechanism which she set up for wax dripping (the thumbtacks
box, which she called the cardboard in this case - possibly by appeal to a familiar
template), she fully realized the solution:
“Yeah, there’s a cardboard for that. But maybe that’s not the solution. Ah!
Can I attach it to the wall? Yeah, can attach the cardboard to the wall with
the tacks, so that is it attached to the wall on one side, then just stand the
candle in there after dripping some wax so that it stands.”
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P7 - Hat rack - not solved (partial solution), diﬃculty rated by participant as 6.
Participant fb6 read the problem, then deﬁned key requirements of the problem, and
proceeded on taking stock of the measurements oﬀered. Returning to the requirements
of building a hat rack, fb6 seemed to start looking for an object template: “Okay, hat
rack... So how is that supposed to look like?”.
The participant then started focusing on the beams in the ceiling as a pre-existing
construction, and aimed to use the planks on the ﬂoor to reconstruct a shelf object
template with the beams. She proceeded on this path, considering using the walls as
part of the shelf sides, and determining whether she could make the assumption of the
planks on the ﬂoor being long enough to ﬁt between the beams on the ceiling in a shelf
construction. She then proceeded on an aﬀordance based search for an object to attach
the two planks, which revealed the G-clamp as the only possibility. The participant
further determined a lack of aﬀordance in using the G-clamp for this purpose on the
ceiling beams, because of their size. Fb6 then further inferred that the G-clamp could be
used for its attaching aﬀordance on the planks on the ﬂoor, from the measurement of the
G-clamp opening and the size of the planks. However, this lead to the further inference
that only a certain type of attaching the planks was possible, thus constraining further
templates: “If I just put them like a T together (the planks on the ﬂoor), that won’t
work because I can’t use the G-clamp then, so they kind of have to be both horizontal or
vertical”.
Switching back to the previously used template, she reconsidered her assumption over
the length of the planks: “This time I can’t just assume they are very long”. Fb6 then
assumed she might be able to infer the length of the gap between the ceiling beams, and
then ﬁt her already made ﬂoor plank construction between them as to bridge the gap.
Prompted to try in a diﬀerent way, fb6 switched template and considered using the planks
upright, but evaluated this as not working, and then got stuck in functional ﬁxedness on
the beams in the ceiling. She tried refocusing on the measurements, however this didn’t
break her functional ﬁxedness, with her bridging template becoming clearer: “Let’s
assume it all comes down to just slamming planks between one of the spaces for me. I
don’t see another way of doing it.”. She then persisted in this template and functional
ﬁxedness, attempting to bridge under various places around and under the beams, and
in the corners of the room. She considered and discarded making a hat rack that laid
on the ﬂoor: “My hat rack can’t just be laying on the ground because it’s a hat rack. I
have to have it somewhere up...”.
Backtracking into meta-reasoning seemed to help break the functional ﬁxedness. First,
fb6 made the following meta-remark on her own process:
“I’m just staring at the plank, some of the measurements, adding them alto-
gether and trying to search for something that ﬁts to it because I hope that
that might help me to ﬁnd the perfect spot for the planks...”
This brought about a new consideration of the key requirements of the problem, this
time retreating from some of the already made assumptions of what type of template to
use, having a template switch and the markers of an insight moment:
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“A hat rack. A hat rack (intonation emphasis on rack), so that is not really
a hat shelf... And if I just... a hat rack is something where it hangs on. I
know! If I just.... put one of those, lean it up the wall, put the clamp on it
or both of them if I can so that it’s ﬁxed. Then use the end of the clamp to
hang my hat on it.”
Fb6 then had just enough time left do detail this solution. She thus had part of the
insight required to solve the hat rack problem - using the G-clamp as a hanger. However,
she did not provide the full solution of an upright hat rack between the ﬂoor and the
ceiling, making the hat rack lean against a wall.
P8 - Two strings problem - solved in 8m 30s, diﬃculty rated by participant as 5.
After reading the problem, fb6 started on a path of using the chair to stand on to attempt
to hold both ropes. When this solution was rejected, she backtracked into taking stock
of problem objects. She then switched to attempting to attach the two strings to the
middle of the ceiling, as to have one ﬁxed. Fb6 thought of using the pliers as a hammer
to ﬁx a string in the ceiling (with one of the nails on the ﬂoor), thus showing some
clear inﬂuence of the already solved Attach pendulum problem, in which she created a
hammer out of the pendulum.
Under the further constraint that she couldn’t reach the ceiling, fb6 switched to a tem-
plate of elongating the strings, as a prerequisite for reaching both of them. “Then I have
to make the string somehow longer, so that I have more .... that I have at the end the
opportunity to reach them both with my hands while standing on the ground”. For this
purpose she decided to use the paper sheets to make a tube and the nails to attach it.
Considering this might not make a long enough construction, she focused on the pliers,
used for the ability to elongate one’s arm and thus grab one of the strings. Fb6 then got
stuck in functional ﬁxedness, running through the solving paths visited before, attempt-
ing combinations of them for their various aﬀordances and even attempting to force a
solution by ripping the strings of the ceiling.
She then attempted a template switch to exit functional ﬁxedness (attaching the chair
to the string), then started considering the various objects again and attempting to ﬁnd
(other) ways in which she could use them (object based search of template). Then a
new remark on her own process and the nature of the problem seemed to bring her close
to switching to a new template:
“I really just feel like attaching diﬀerent things that I got here to the wire to
make wires longer. Maybe that’s not the problem. Maybe I’m (not) supposed
to make the wires... the strings longer, but... to ﬁnd the possibility to reach
them both, or do I even have to reach them both? Is that even necessary?...”
After another round of functional ﬁxedness, and considering the previous solution, fb6
ﬁnally switched template and came by the correct solution, using for the “heavy” part
of the pendulum the pliers “Put something heavy like attached to the pliers with a knot
to the wire ... to string to make it swing like this [...] Then when it swings, it should at
some point the pliers should reach my hand”.
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7.4 Analysis of process and codes in the context of CreaCogs
In the following, the codes and their observed functioning in the protocols of human
participants will be analysed in the context of the CreaCogs framework and processes,
as to bring them closer to a possible future computational model of human practical
insight problem solving. Each code will be described in turn with this purpose.
Problem solving general process codes:
PSP - Reading the problem In CreaCogs, this code would correspond to a read-out
of the problem environment given as input. This would be a mix of inputting the main
objects and requirements of the problem statement, which would need supplementing by
the objects and relations in the picture representation of the problem, as not all objects
are given in the problem text. Some relations between objects would be provided either
via problem text, via analogical representations (e.g. pictures) or via a mix of such
means. Most importantly, the problem makes a request of what is to be done. All this
of course needs to be interpreted in terms of the knowledge the agent already has. For
example, the statement of the Two Strings problem could be translated for CreaCogs
as follows:
Objects (or concepts): (Person, String1, String2)
Relations: Attached(String1, ceiling), Attached(String2, ceiling), Hanging(String1, ceiling),
Hanging(String2, ceiling)
Goal: T ied(String1, String2)
The problem also provides the constraint that if Hold(Person, String1), then
¬Reach(Person, String2).
PSP - Comprehending This might correspond to building a mental model of the
relations the various objects are in, and of the goals. Various stages of comprehending
the problem might happen, as the relationships are understood at a deeper level. In a
model of human cognition, this would correspond to mapping the problem statement
and requirements to items in the KB, then loading a model of the problem in the working
memory.
PSP - Deﬁning key requirements of the problem This corresponds in CreaCogs
to reﬁning the goals and constraints of the problem. In a model of human cognition,
this would mean selecting the goals and constraints to focus on from the given text, and
the participant building them in the internal model of the problem.
PSP - Mapping problem formulation to objects In CreaCogs this might imply
mapping concept names to positions in the image representation given as a scene of the
problem. Also, at this point, some of the other objects which are not presented in the
problem statement, but are present in the picture, might be implicitly integrated in the
problem statement. In the context of the two Strings problem, some such new concepts
and relations could be:
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Objects or concepts (from picture): Jar of nails, Chair, P liers, Sheets of Paper
Relations (from picture): Contains(jar, nails)
Spatial relations (from picture): onF loor(Sheets of Paper), onF loor(Jar of nails) etc.
Other details about parts of objects could also be obtained from inspecting the pic-
ture, for example, the fact that the person is clothed, which yields new concepts, like
Shoes, Shirt, Pants, but also new relations, like clothedIn(Shirt, Person), which then
require an explicit move on the part of the solver to remove(Shirt, Person) in order to
gain access to said objects, the aﬀordances of which can then be used. The model of the
problem can then be expanded to contain the Shirt object, and it’s aﬀordances.
PSP - Taking stock of problem objects This is an iteration strategy of going over
the objects in the room, until an interesting aﬀordance is observed (which triggers a
template), or in order to make sure that everything was noticed. This might yield
explicit aﬀordances or not (by explicit we mean those referred to in verbalized protocols).
However, it is sensible to assume that once an object has been truly noticed, it has been
mapped to a representation of the concept in the KB of the agent. Thus it is possible that
aﬀordances of the object can be activated with much more ease, and such an activation
process might start covertly the moment the objects are noticed. In the context of
CreaCogs, this would mean activating the concepts corresponding to the problem in the
KB.
PSP - Proceeding on path In CreaCogs, this would be the equivalent of having se-
lected a PT to build the solution around, and then trying to build it, with the given
objects, until either the solution or a more complex impasse is reached. Proceeding
on path can happen either instantly, with focusing on speciﬁc salient objects and af-
fordances, or the most KB-salient yielded PT, or after having selected such objects
through cycles of Taking stock of objects, Focus, Determining Aﬀordance, De-
termining template, Searching for template, case in which the codes PT-Use and
Composing fuller results based on previous exploration are more suitable.
PSP - Backtracking In CreaCogs, backtracking can happen on two levels. One is the
classical problem solving level, on which a previous state of the problem is revisited,
and an attempt at solving the problem proceeds forward from that place again. In the
creative problem-solving paradigm, backtracking can also be seen as corresponding to
abandoning a problem template, which has been deemed unproductive, and backtracking
to a state in which a PT can still be chosen. The abandoning of a PT can happen through
a fast assessment and ﬁtting of existing objects, or through a thorough construction
proceeding on the path or set of paths (code PSP - Proceeding on path) aﬀorded by
a certain template. In this case, such “meta-backtracking” would correspond to changing
the state of one’s working memory to a state in which restructuring, or a Template
Switch is more easily possible. Sometimes, being stuck in a problem template for a while
or seeing no possible solutions (and thus not verbalizing anything new) can also yield
such a working memory state, possibly through a decline of the activation of a speciﬁc
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template. Sets of roles assigned to objects can also be abandoned, while backtracking
to the state of deciding what to ﬁll the PT with.
For example, let’s say the PT used for solving the Dusting the clock problem is that
of building a construction of a certain height. Thus a CreaCogs agent can attempt
to solve the Goal: reach(Johnny, clock) and Constraint: height(Johnny) = small
by increasing Johnny’s height using PT: on(construction, Johnny), until the height
attribute of Johnny’s arm is deemed suitable to fulﬁll the reach goal. The construction
automatically inherits the requirement of matching heightx = heightclock−heightJohnny.
Objects which would help match that height are required to ﬁll in such a template; the
template PT on(construction, Johnny) also brings about implicit stability constraints
for the construction object. Let’s envision a CreaCogs agent which attempts to ﬁll
the construction element with a chair object. The height argument is not matched
upon further evaluation. Backtracking in this case would be to retreat from previous
construction arguments and choose other objects, or another object arrangement. For
example, an attempt at ﬁlling construction = chaira, reverse(chairb) can be made.
However, this might not match the stability constraint, thus further backtracking to the
abstract level and considering anew the other possible objects is required.
PSP - Evaluation
In CreaCogs, this could correspond to mapping the constructed solution to other known
templates or situations, to check if, at the end of deploying a solution path, the key
requirements of the problem are satisﬁed. Also, implicit requirements might be checked
for. For example, in the case of the Dusting the Clock problem, some implicit require-
ment that the construction has a property of being stable might be analysed, because
of known consequences of people falling when attempting to climb unstable construc-
tions. Also, requirements for height might be analysed - in order for Johnny to reach
the clock, his height plus the height of the construction plus, if the construction allows
it, the height of his stretched arm plus the length dusting object he is currently holding
might be taken into account when evaluating whether they match the height of the clock.
Aesthetic preferences would imply matching the construction to a problem template or
object template as close as possible. Thus, the constructed hat rack might be compared
to some held template of how a traditional or fashionable hat rack might look like.
Other aesthetic properties might be also taken into account here - cleanliness of lines,
simplicity of solution, other preferences for what objects should look like, etc.
PSP - Running through consequences This means applying a chain of aﬀordances
after building a new solution composition, and then inferring further consequences and
side eﬀects of that partial solution composition. This happens along the course of
building a solution, after having put together some elements. For example, in the Candle
problem, a CreaCogs agent could construct from PT light(matches, candle, lit candle),
for the side result of getting wax which can be used for its gluing properties, or could
use melt(candle, fire) to get slimmer candle, thus adjust the width property of candle
so that it can ﬁt the PT pin(thumbtacks, ox). However, for the latter, a side eﬀect is
melted candle, thus the requirements of the problem can’t be achieved anymore.
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Aﬀordance related segments (Aﬀ)
Aﬀ - Determining object aﬀordance In CreaCogs, this corresponds to explic-
itly retrieving an object aﬀordance, iterating through object aﬀordances, or apply-
ing an object aﬀordance to another object. For example, a CreaCogs agent which
has activated the object Pliers could retrieve aff(Pliers, to hold objects with). As
we see from the case studies of human participants retrieving such aﬀordances, these
are not always retrieved in the abstract, but more often the aﬀordance of an object
that has gained focus is already projected through an instantiation of the object’s
possible interaction with another object. In CreaCogs, this would mean linking the
object aﬀordance to another object, thus already creating mini compositions of two
object interactions, or the action of an object upon the other. For example, this
can refer to the instantiation of the above case aﬀordance as the mini composition
holdWith(Pliers, Sheets of Paper). An aﬀordance thus becomes a mini-template for
a tuple of objects, thus the to hold objects with aﬀordance is expanded, when starting
from the Pliers as a focus object, to holdWith(Pliers, ox), in which ox has to correspond
to some size/weight constraints to ﬁt the template.
Aﬀ - Inferring more aﬀordances Inferring more aﬀordances in CreaCogs implies
interpreting the current context of objects through existing knowledge as to yield new
aﬀordances, or building longer aﬀordance chains. For example, given that in the Two
Strings Problem the relation hangingFrom(ceiling, String1) is provided, this could lead
to further inferences like attachedTo(ceiling, String1). Upon consulting such further
properties of PTs of Strings attached to ceiling from one’s commonsense KB, a CreaCogs
agent should ideally provide further inferences (which come from commonsense assump-
tions) nailedTo(ceiling, String1) or attachedTo(ceiling, String1, nail). This allows for
further construction and use of objects, upon retrieval of their aﬀordances. For example
aff(Pliers, remove nails) can be used to interact with the previous stated assump-
tion attachedTo(ceiling, String1, nail). Thus, if the aforementioned Pliers aﬀordance
is developed to its action template form of remove(hard surface, nail, P liers) by ap-
plying remove(ceiling, nail, P liers), the new state would be onF loor(String1), and the
problem environment can then be updated to include String1 as a non-attached, freely
usable object.
Aﬀ - Determining template aﬀordance is generally done in the context of the
goals and key requirements of the problem. Thus if a PT’s aﬀordance shows promise in
matching the goal, or bringing the agent closer to applying another PT the aﬀordance
of which is the goal, that speciﬁc template might be selected. PT s can also be applied
and then discarded, after the agent has attempted to bridge the gap towards the goal
unsuccessfully. Productive PT s can also be discarded at a shallow glance, though in
fact they might have enabled the solution. PTs can also be discarded not because of
their lack of a goal matching aﬀordance, but because of an inability to adapt them to
the objects at hand.
Aﬀ - Determining lack of aﬀordance Lack of aﬀordance of an object in this con-
text might mean a lack of ability to apply said object aﬀordance to another object.
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Thus, in the case of the Candle problem, a CreaCogs agent could initially retrieve
the aﬀordance aff(thumbtacks, to pin with). However, the action template of this
aﬀordance - pinWith(thumbtacks, ox,medium hard surface), would have constraints
regarding the size of ox that are depending upon the size of provided or prototype
thumbtacks. Thus, in the context of the size of a prototypical candle, aﬀordance
aff(thumbtacks, to pin with) would be rejected, as size(ox) > size(thumbtack pin),
if ox takes candle as a ﬁller.
Problem template use category (PT)
PT - Requirement-based search of template An initial search of useful PTs can
be triggered by a CreaCogs agent using key problem requirements which have been
determined. For example, if the goal G of a particular problem is to reach a particular
high object, PTs which oﬀer this aﬀordance or have it as a side eﬀect might be searched
for, for example PTx| affa(PTx) = extend arm or PTy| affd(PTy) = get higher.
PT - Determining PT to use This can be done in a variety of ways in CreaCogs,
by object-based search, property-based search, requirements-based search, or by simply
triggering the most salient templates which come to mind from the most salient objects.
PT - Adaptation of PT to problem (goals) In CreaCogs, this means modifying a
pre-existing PTx to ﬁt goals G of the problem, be it by changing parts of PTx, or by
linking/expanding or combining PTx with another template PTy as to aﬀord G.
PT - use to search for suitable objects In CreaCogs this means using a PT to
search for objects similar in properties or aﬀordance to the inital objects for which the
PT was used. This might involve further reﬁnement of various objects of the PT being
used as further OT.
PT - Adaptation of problem template to objects A PT can be adapted inherently
when various non-traditional objects are cast in it, because of the diﬀerences between
the new objects and the objects speciﬁed by the template. However, these diﬀerences
can be so large that, after adapting a PT, the agent becomes aware its realization is
closer to other PTs than the PT which was adapted, or that the PT resulting after the
adaptation is diﬀerent enough that it can be encoded as a new example in the KB. For
example, using a platform PT with the box and the candle (in the candle problem)
results in creating a construction which is closer to a partial container template.
PT - use of PT construct In CreaCogs this means applying or re-applying a PT to
the set of problem objects. Thus, given PTx, problem objects {c1, c2...cn} ∈ CP , and
problem goals G, ﬁx PTx in various ways to problem objects CP so that G becomes
possible.
PT - use of PT construct with reaching solution path In CreaCogs this would
mean reaching a point in which the solution state matches the goal state of the problem,
and optionally external feedback has been gathered on the correctness of the solution.
PT - Rejecting template In CreaCogs, this would come about either after a) in-
ferring not enough objects can be matched to the currently used PT from the given
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problem environment (Statement + Picture); b) determining a lack of aﬀordance of the
template; c) attempting to use the template in various ways without reaching the goal.
For example, let’s say an initial template PTx is being used, and Envz is the environ-
ment of the problem, composed of its given objects, the relations between them, etc.
PTx = {ca, cb, cc}; cd, ce, cf ∈ Env However if cx|cx ∈ Env ∧ (ca sim cx) might result
in PTx being abandoned.
PT - Template Switch A PT switch in CreaCogs might happen through: a) abandon-
ing a previous PT, which is considered unproductive; b) a chain of previous aﬀordance
inferences or object constructions linking associatively into a promising PT; c) consid-
ering a new set of objects as the main focus, or noticing a new object; d) considering
a diﬀerent context for what the goal or its property might mean; e) noticing new aﬀor-
dances or properties of the given objects, or diﬀerent ways in which these can be linked.
A template switch means projecting a new PT on the existing object set, which might
involve the required use of certain objects, or their saliency, with the further work of
considering what other objects or actions to use to reach the full PT.
Assessment category
A - Checking joints in plan In CreaCogs, checking joints in plan is related to the
simple machines example. In the simple machines analogy, motion is being passed
between the diﬀerent machines, and one can check whether a certain simple machine
sm1 can take said motion from a machine sm4 and pass it further to machine sm5. In
this case, a matching of aﬀordances between objects within a template or a solution plan
is checked for. Thus object o2 is checked for ﬁtting the aﬀordance of object(s) o3, o4,
etc.
A - Checking object against constraints Objects can be checked property-wise
against constraints or goals of the problem in CreaCogs.
A - Comparing solution state to constraints Comparing a solution state to problem
constraints or to key requirements in CreaCogs means comparing current aﬀordance
yielded by the template used or the object construction to the problem goal.
Focus changes
F - Focusing on object In CreaCogs, focusing on an object when solving a prob-
lem would mean starting the search or construction processes based on this object, its
properties or aﬀordances, sometimes by creating chains of aﬀordances starting from the
object in question. Sometimes, the aﬀordances of the object, and the associate PTs it
triggers are the most salient to the agent, and also seem to match some direction of the
required goals.
F - Switching to new object as focus means iterating this process with a new
object and its associated aﬀordances, templates and properties as the main center of
attempting to derive a solution.
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Creative problem solving process speciﬁc
Composing fuller results based on previous exploration After triggering the
aﬀordances of various objects, and checking whether a certain aﬀordance chain holds to
get closer to the goal, the entire solving path could be deployed in more detail, and its
inferences explored. For example, triggering property (paper, foldable) and the OT of a
(tube, has length) on it, together with noticing ﬁxing together aﬀordances of the nails,
under a general PT with aﬀordance elongate might motivate an agent to further explore
this path in more detail.
Insight marker expressions These could be triggered in CreaCogs when a new tem-
plate which matches the goal and can be deployed on existing objects has been discov-
ered, to check for consistency with human data.
Making assumptions While matching objects to some problem template, not only
other objects need to be ﬁlled in, but also other relations and properties. In CreaCogs,
making assumptions is a matter of transferring such properties and relations (or other
pre-existing requirements) in order to be able to apply said template.
Stuck or functional ﬁxedness In CreaCogs, this would apply to moments in which
a template or set of templates are applied over and over with diﬀerent objects, with no
actual progress in bringing the aﬀordance of that template closer to the goal.
Forcing solution in CreaCogs would mean: a) applying a PT even if it is not entirely
suitable; b) breaking some of the key requirements/constraints or givens of the problem,
or modifying them in such ways as to ﬁt a template that is used, rather than attempting
to adapt the search for a template to them (approximating solution too low); c) making
constructions which are too complicated and too far removed from the initial templates,
or from the properties of the objects; d) applying various objects in an OT or PT despite
them lacking some of the properties needed, or having other properties which interfere
with the smooth creation of said template.
Object (O), Object templates (OT) and object use (OU)
O - Disassembles object In OROC, OTs are disassembled in the KB when attempt-
ing to make new composed objects. For the realization of this code, objects in the
environment can be disassembled when only a subset of their particular parts is consid-
ered useful for the problem at hand, even if the other parts are not used and the object
is broken - thus unavailable for its previous aﬀordances. A decision to disassemble an
object can follow a property-based search of the object parts.
O - Property-based search of object In OROC, this is one of the mechanisms which
powers object replacement. Property-based searches can be done on both simple and
composed objects, or on composed object parts, if knowledge of those parts is available
to the agent. Properties are searched for in objects generally because it is assumed such
properties would provide a certain aﬀordance. Thus a property-based search is also a
form of an implicit aﬀordance search in many cases.
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O - Adaptation of objects to template This might imply changing an object to
ﬁt a particular OT or PT, by either modifying properties - like length, orientation -
or using the object for its non-traditional aﬀordances. For example object matchstick
could be used not for its direct aﬀordance of setting on ﬁre, but for it’s length, width,
solidity. The matchstick could also be broken, a string cut, a paperclip bent, etc. Some
such physical modiﬁcations can be done with an agents’ hands, some require the use of
other objects. In CreaCogs this requires a set of object transformations, which can be
projected from knowledge of what can be done with thin metal wires, ceramic objects,
thin wooden objects, etc.
O - Object used to search for template In CreaCogs, this corresponds to the process
of triggering the PT associates of a given object in the KB, and expanding that search
to include the PT associates of similar objects, if necessary.
OT - Object template use The use of an object template is similar to OROC’s object
composition, taking objects as possible object parts of a previously known object, based
on object similarity (similarity of property). This also accounts for OT - Object
template adaptation, as using the parts at hand to compose a particular object from
a previously known OT might yield a somewhat diﬀerent object to the initial OT. Such
an object might maintain the initial aﬀordances for which the parts where selected;
however, it might also inherit new aﬀordances from these parts. This might produce
completely new objects, with new aﬀordances, and sometimes new OT. It is also possible
that in the process of creating such an object, the construction itself might be evaluated
as being more similar to another OT altogether.
OT - Object template rejection In the context of CreaCogs, rejecting an object
template can be done for various reasons: a) because the object parts cannot be found;
b) because the OT aﬀordance, though initially salient, has proven not to lead to a
productive path; c) because the OT doesn’t ﬁt well into the context of the larger PT
applied; d) the parts are required for their other uses in diﬀerent constructions, thus the
OT cannot be applied anymore.
OU - Object used in novel way This is similar to OROC’s object replacement
processes, and also to the answers in the Alternative Uses Test. The process of using
an object in a novel way can thus be done via: a) projection of property similarity
from another object, which allows the inheritance of new aﬀordances; b) implicitly by
applying a speciﬁc OT, in which a speciﬁc object is matched to take the role of a speciﬁc
part or c) implicitly by applying a speciﬁc PT in which the role of the object has been
selected based on one of its properties, but it’s not traditionally its most salient role or
aﬀordance.
Meta-cognitive
Meta - remark on own process Meta-cognitive remarks on own process could be
made available in CreaCogs by simply reporting on the processes used and on the state
of the problem-solving process per se.
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Other codes
Other - aﬀective state CreaCogs does not include a model of human interest or
pleasure in dealing with a challenge. However, such a model could be implemented
based on assumptions of what a challenge can be translated to, in computational terms.
For example, use of multiple objects in a way which is far removed from their initial use
but aligns well in a PT might yield excitement, joy, playfulness, or a sense of freedom.
Requirements to go through multiple PTs might yield a sense of challenge through
mental stimulation. Reaching a possible solution - thus aligning objects in a PT which
provides an end state that overlaps all or parts of the problem requirements might yield
contentment, joy at one’s success, excitement. Failing to ﬁnd a suitable PT even after
multiple manipulations, or generally being stuck in one PT and following the same path
to no avail for a long time, without the ability to switch to a more productive one, might
yield frustration, or a desire to abandon the problem altogether. Agents with diﬀerent
personalities and reactions to diﬀerent levels of challenge, and with diﬀerent abilities
of perseverance, ﬂexibility in switching between templates, ﬂuency in proposing new
applications of a template, would need to be implemented to model such aﬀective states
and individual problem solving courses in a more diverse manner.
Other - talking about previous experience In the case in which CreaCogs’ problem
templates would not be implemented directly, but would be a function of abstracting
over a number of problem situations, then a CreaCogs agent could talk about these
situations as “previous experience”.
7.5 Order of process for modeling in CreaCogs
As it could be seen from the analysis of the think aloud protocols with human partici-
pants, variations of the order in which the various processes happen in creative problem
solving is likely. Also, some participants seem more inclined to use certain processes
more than others. For example, mb8 showed a strong propensity to break objects, and a
high ﬂuency in switching between various templates, while fb6 showed a relatively high
use of refocusing on new objects and object aﬀordances to get herself on a new, more
productive path.
In the context of CreaCogs, such observations are important in determining a possible
order or ﬂow of running such processes, for a future computational solver. Thus, after
certain processes have been run in CreaCogs, the application of other processes should
be made possible, in accordance to the empirical observations made in the think aloud
protocol.
Though all processes explained in relation to CreaCogs and deﬁned as codes seem impor-
tant for creative problem solving, various process ﬂow paths can be taken, depending on
the individual cognitive agent and their propensity to rely more on a process or another,
and of course the content of their KB, the objects they focus on initially (or that seem
more salient to them), the OT and PT they associate to various objects.
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We will present some of these possibilities of process ﬂow in the following as a list of
code implications, sketching various types of process order. The sign → should thus be
interpreted in the following as “can lead to”. Figure 7.11 represents a non-exhaustive
summary of these possibilities of process, as detailed below.
The process starts with PSP-Reading the problem → {PSP-Comprehending,
PSP-Deﬁning key requirements of the problem, PSP-Mapping problem for-
mulation to objects, PSP-Taking stock of objects}. This implies making an initial
model of the problem - which might be precise or imprecise, deep or shallow.
Other codes correspond to starting to build a possible solution. This can be done by:
a) using initial salient templates and objects: PSP - Proceed on path → PSP-sol,
PSP-Running through consequences, PT-Rejecting template, PT-template
switch. A rejection of an initial template, or abandoning of a problem path, can lead
the agent to backtrack to b) or c);
b) building from the object level, by determining and inferring aﬀordancesPSP-Mapping
problem formulation to objects, PSP-Taking stock of problem objects → {F-
Focusing on object, PSP-Aﬀ-determine object aﬀordance, Aﬀ-determine lack
of aﬀordance, Aﬀ-inferring more aﬀordances }
c) attempting to determine a PT to use PSP-Taking stock of problem objects,
Deﬁning key requirements→ PT-requirement-based search, O - object search
for template, Aﬀ-Determine PT aﬀordance
An initial selection of a PT can lead to attempts to apply it or adapt it: PT-Determining
PT to use → PT-adapt PT to objects or problem, PT-use PT search for ob-
jects. This leads to further ﬁlling in the template with objects, via Disassembles
object, O-property-based search of object, A-checking object against con-
straints, O-Adapt object to template, OU-object used in a new way and
to processes of partial construction and evaluation: PSP-Running through conse-
quences, A-comparing solution state to constraints. If the so constructed path
does not lead to a solution, functional ﬁxedness ensues, or an attempt at restructur-
ing by going back to previous processes of switching to new objects to build from or
determining a new PT to use.
In the cases in which this leads to a satisfactory solution sketch, this yields to fuller de-
scriptions of solution attempts PSP-Proceed on path, PSP - Composing fuller so-
lution. If this is still satisfactory, a solution is obtained, and if time is left an evaluation
follows. If this is not satisfactory, functional ﬁxedness or new attempts at restructuring
occur.
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7.6 Towards modeling practical object insight problems in
CreaCogs
In order to be able to model insight problems, knowledge pertaining to insight problems
needs to be formalized as to be given to the system. A strategy for doing this is to deﬁne
each practical insight problem as a scene. Each scene contains a set of objects and some
particular relations between objects. The following section describes such a set-up in
terms introduced in Chapter 4, and possible knowledge required by an agent in order to
solve practical object insight problems in a cognitive manner using CreaCogs processes.
Two problems are described: the candle problem (section 7.6.1) and the Two Strings
problem (section 7.6.2).
7.6.1 Modeling the candle problem
In the candle problem [36], the initial state of the problem contains the following objects
and relations (which could be recognized as concepts and relations by the solver upon
inspection of the problem):
• C1 – matchbook
• C2 – candle
• C3 – box of thumbtacks OR box of nails
• C4 – wall
• C5 – table
• C6 – thumbtacks OR nails
• R1 – contains(matchbook, matches)
• R2 – contains(Box of Thumbtacks, Thumbtacks) OR contains(Box of Nails, nails)
Each problem has a goal - which is about achieving a certain composed object, a certain
set of relations, or performing some action. For example, the candle problem [36] has as
a goal:
• Cx = candle lit
• Rx = on(wall, candle)
• ¬Ry = on(table, wax)
The object in each insight problem can be described in terms of its properties, and
relations between its parts if the object is a composed object - as for the OROC system.
A set of known problem and action templates can be deﬁned for the KB of a CreaCogs
agent. These templates consist of commonsense knowledge about actions which could
be performed using the objects in the problem. The formalization of these problem
templates can be done in terms of participating concepts or objects, relations, actions to
do and solution states (consequences of action), as described in section 4. For example,
the following templates are suitable for the candle problem:
PT1 - how to take matches out of a matchbook: PT1 = {c={matchbook}, r = {contains
(matchbook, matches)}, h=take out(matchbook, matches), sol = {c= matches}}
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PT2 - how to light a match: PT2 = {c={match, lighting strip}, r={brushes(match,
striking strip)}, h={swipe(matches, striking strip)}, sol={c=match on ﬁre}}
PT3 - how to light a candle: PT3 = {c={candle, ﬁre}, r={touches(candle tip, ﬁre)},
h={light(candle, ﬁre}, sol = {c=candle lit}}
PT4 - how to attach poster with thumbtack to wall: PT4 = {c={poster, pin, wall},
r={touches(poster,wall)}, h={push(thumbtack,(poster,wall))}, sol = {r=attached
(poster,wall)}}
PT5 - using a container to catch drips: PT5 = {c={leaky radiator, water, container},
h={put(on ﬂoor(container), under(leaky radiator, container))}, sol = {r=catch drips
(container,water)}}
PT6 - shelf with vase on wall PT6 = {c={shelf, nails, wall, vase}, h={attach (on nails(shelf,
wall)), put(vase,shelf)}, sol = {r=on(wall,shelf), on(shelf,vase), on(wall,vase)}}
CreaCogs will then use the problem objects and the goals to search in its KB for the
most suitable templates to reach the desired state. Parts of the goal can be reached
with various aﬀordance chains. For example, PT1-PT3 can be chained to reach the ﬁrst
goal - Cx=candle lit. PT4 can be used to attempt to attach the candle directly to the
wall, if a search from problem requirements ﬁnds that template, by replacing the candle
object in the poster slot. However, a property search would show a candle is too thick
for the use of this template.
PT5 could be used by replacing the box object in the container slot (as it was the case
with participant fb6, and dripping water with dripping wax. If the object box was not
salient before because of it being part of the C3 (the box of thumbtacks composed object
assembly), this can be salient upon a new search of objects triggered after ﬁnding PT5
with the third requirement of the problem. This solves the ¬Ry = on(table, wax) goal.
PT6 could be triggered as a response to the relationship goal Rx = on(wall, candle),
though it is an indirect way of attaching something to a wall. The object shelf could
be created out of matchstick parts, which could be found as suitable based on their
material (wood) property. Their size would of course prove unsuitable for creating a
shelf. However, the application of template PT6 would allow the agent to understand
the entire goal Rx = on(wall, candle) in a diﬀerent light, thus restructure the problem
under a new set of templates, and attempt to make a platform for the candle rather than
attach it to the wall directly. Such a restructuring allows the larger use of the object
box, and can produce its saliency in the problem space, even if this requires a new
adaptation of the general template of using a platform, as box would provide a mixed
platform-container aﬀordance. If the box was already used to stop drips, a reuse might
become cognitively harder as it requires re-parsing already applied templates to their
containing elements, and backtracking from already achieved problem goals - operations
which are most likely cognitively expensive. An understanding that the box in this case
would provide both container and platform aﬀordances, thus answer both the second
and third problem requirements, would make the use of PT5 unnecessary, supporting an
evaluation for restructuring.
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7.6.2 Modeling the Two Strings problem
The initial state of the Two Strings problem contains the following objects and relations,
part of them oﬀered in the problem statement and part in the problem picture:
• C1, C2 – String1, String2
• C3 – Person
• C4 – Chair
• C5 - Pliers
• C6 - Jar of nails
• C7 - Sheets of paper
• C8 - Nails
• R1, R2 - hanging(String1,ceiling), hanging(String2,ceiling)
• R3, R4, R5 - onFloor(Chair), onFloor(Sheets of paper), onFloor(Jar of nails), on-
Floor(nails)
• R6 - holds(Person,String)
The goal of the problem is Hx=tie(String1, String2), and the constraint that in the
present object conﬁguration, ifRx=holds(Person,String1), then ¬Ry=reach(Person,String2).
Upon closer inspection of the problem, C3 can be inferred to contain other objects,
which may only become salient when a search for objects to elongate strings with is
performed: dressed(Person(Pants, Shoes, T-shirt). Also, the opposite of the constraint
will be inferred, thus if Ry =holds(Person,String2), then ¬Rx= reach(Person,String2).
The agent might inspect the components of C6 - Jar of nails.
At the beginning of solving such a problem, various objects can be taken as a focus.
A focus on the Chair object would trigger its aﬀordance to be climbed upon, which is
generally associated with reach higher templates, the activation of which might also be
primed by a previous problem like Dusting the clock.
The goal action Hx=tie(String1, String2) can trigger diﬀerent templates. The more
general template of tying things together (out of which one is a string), might look like
the following:
PT1 = {c = {o1, String}, r = {overlap(o1, String2)}, h = {tie(o1, String)}, sol = {r =
tied(o1, String)}}
In order to ensure the overlap or closeness of the two objects, two paths might be
taken. Templates of elongating the String might be triggered, if the lack of aﬀordance
perceived in order to satisfy the tying things together template is that the objects are
not long enough. Templates of bringing things closer together might also be triggered,
as a prerequisite applying the tying aﬀordance.
Goal(tie(S1, S2)) =⇒ close(String1, String2) =⇒ PT − bringing closer
Goal(tie(S1, S2)) =⇒ tooShort(String1, String2) =⇒ PT − elongate(String1)
Templates like the following might thus be triggered:
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• PT2 - bring objects closer: PT2 = {c = {objx, objy)}, r={far(objx, objy)}, h =
{move(objx, pointx), move(objy, pointx)}, sol2 = {r = close(objx, objy)}}
• PT3 - elongate string: PT3 = {c={String, objz},r={close(String, objz)}, h={attach
(String, objz)}, sol3={c=longer String}}
The application of a template of elongation would yield an object search on what objects
could be used to elongate the String. In this case, various objects might be used in
alternative ways: the clothes of the person; the sheets of paper on the ﬂoor, folded as to
resemble a string in width and ﬁxed together; pulling one of the strings itself from its
ﬁxed place (though this could also be triggered by a bringing objects together template);
the pliers, jar and even chair. When using the pliers or jar, the insight that the object
thus obtained would move like a pendulum can emerge from the agent’s commonsense
knowledge.
Another template which could be used might be reﬂective of the constraint of the prob-
lem - which is a lack of ability to reach the other object. Other than elongating the string
so it can be reached, this, together with the aﬀordance of the pliers object to be held
in one’s hand and to grab onto objects with, might yield the special case of elongating
one’s hand and thus using the pliers in order to reach further. A possible development
of the template in that direction which we haven’t yet seen in human participants would
be, for example, to attach the open pliers to the chair and attempt to reach further
when grabbing the other string.
Bringing things together can in itself be done in various ways: (i) moving both objx, objy
at once, which is made impossible by the constraint of not reaching the second string
when holding the other; (ii) moving one object at a time, but only if the object remains
ﬁxed, which would trigger other ﬁx object to pointx templates - which are visible in
the human participants’ attempts to ﬁx one of the strings to the ceiling or to one of
the walls; (iii) through personal motion; (iv) through the motion of a second agent
that accomplishes that task (sometimes human participants ask if they have someone
else to help), or the motion of the object itself - a reframing which generally triggers
a productive template, if a way to make the object move by itself in a suitable way is
found.
7.7 Discussion and future work
The think aloud protocol set up in this section with practical object insight problems has
shown that: (i) new practical object insight or creative problems with one or multiple
solutions can be created following a strategy; (ii) a set of codes corresponding to the
CreaCogs framework can be derived to suitably analyze such data and (iii) the CreaCogs
framework shows promise in modeling the processes used by human participants when
solving such problems.
An initial question was whether the human participants will consider the created prob-
lems to be problems which require insight and/or creativity. In terms of them requiring
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insight, only an fMRI scan could issue a strong answer on this matter. However, the
various codes which we used for marking restructuring and insight showed that partic-
ipants manifested both in the context of the newly created problems. The Jack and
Jill Weighting problem comes perhaps closest to classical insight problems, in terms of
requiring one speciﬁc type of restructuring to solve. The Dusting the clock and Blown
Away teddy problems were built to allow for multiple solutions, and thus prompt the
participants to deploy a variety of composition and restructuring processes in a rich
problem environment which allowed it. In order to have turned these latter two prob-
lems to a form closer to classical insight problems, we would probably need to remove
many objects and allow for one possible reliable solution. In terms of future work, these
problems could be given with one solution only, and in various conditions which would
trigger more or less functional ﬁxedness and diﬀerent ways of (unproductively) structur-
ing the problem. A strong control over such variables would allow the further study of
structuring and restructuring costs. These costs might be diﬀerent for diﬀerent individ-
uals, however this could be accounted for by deploying other creativity tests previously.
For example, the Alternative Uses Test, and measurements in Fluency and Flexibility
might correlate with the number of restructurings over solving period per participant.
In terms of future work, a larger battery of such problems could also be created, and
used for gathering normative data, and for the knowledge acquisition of systems aiming
to solve such problems or to work with creative uses of object aﬀordances.
The set of codes described in 7.2 shows that there are diﬀerences and overlaps between
classical and creative problem solving. Classical problem solving is generally seen as
the search for a path in a problem space, using operators or functions which move the
solver from one state to another. Creative problem solving shares evaluation (looking
at the goal to check if one is approaching the solution, or has reached it), backtrack-
ing and the exploration of one already framed problem space with classical problem
solving. However, the problem space can be restructured in creative problem solving,
thus yielding a possible diﬀerent (interpreted)“initial state” depending on what objects
are considered salient in the environment, and what object templates, aﬀordances and
problem templates are activated in the KB of the solver. The problem goals can also be
restructured in creative problem solving, as they are sometimes ambiguous and there-
fore can be interpreted in a variety of ways by the solver. During such creative solving,
objects which did not exist in the given environment can be brought forward from the
KB of the solver, and then created in the problem space. This changes the problem
space, and the possible states to be reached from it. The operators in classical problem
solving correspond loosely in practical object insight problems to: a) object moves; b)
projection of object aﬀordance on other objects and c) composition of new objects and
templates using object property and aﬀordance chaining.
For future work, a computational prototype of the CreaCogs framework will be imple-
mented to solve the set of practical object insight problems described in this chapter.
This requires the formalization of a set of problem templates, which could be acquired
directly or indirectly from human data. A direct strategy would be to ask human par-
ticipants to provide such templates regarding a set of objects. An indirect one would be,
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for example, to analyze, extract and formalize part of the templates used by participants
in this think aloud protocol, and use the rest of the sessions as comparative data points
to the prototype’s solving process.
Such a system could further be used to automatize the creation of practical object insight
problems. This could be done, as shown in section 7.1.2, by reversing the process of
creative problem solving, as follows: (i) using object and problem templates to generate
problems and solutions; (ii) creating the possibility for the solution to be found by
placing objects with similar aﬀordances as to ﬁt the object and problem templates in
the problem environment and (iii) adding diﬀerent other objects to the problem scene
which would provide an interference eﬀect by triggering diﬀerent templates.
7.8 Conclusion
Three new practical object problems were designed, and a think aloud protocol of a
collection of 5 classical insight problems + 3 newly created problems were given to
human participants. A set of codes reﬂecting the CreaCogs framework was deployed
to analyze the think aloud protocols. Two case studies of highly performant human
participants solving these problems were presented. The codes and their correspondence
to processes which already exist or can be implemented in CreaCogs was explained. A
summary of process ﬂow was analysed. Two such problems where worked manually to
show how they would be solved under CreaCogs. The framework shows promise in an
ability to model the solving of practical insight problems. As future work, this analysis
will be used to implement a computational model for solving such problems. For this
purpose, a set of PT s need to be formalized and added to the KB. The data obtained
from human participants can further be used for such cognitive knowledge acquisition.
Chapter 8
Discussion, Conclusions and
Future work
An overview of the contributions of this thesis will be presented in Section 8.1. The ex-
perimental contributions will then be discussed in the perspective of the larger framework
in Section 8.2. A general approach to modeling systems from a cognitive comparability
approach will be proposed in Section 8.3. The conclusions are then presented in Section
8.4 and the future work perspective in Section 8.5.
8.1 Overview of contributions
The main contributions of this thesis have been the following:
1) A theoretical framework of the creative problem-solving process has been proposed in
Chapter 3. This is cognitively-inspired and aims to enable AI agents with a wide scale
of creative problem-solving capabilities. The framework proposes that certain types of
knowledge organization might help enable creative processes.
2) A formalization of the representations and processes of this theoretical framework
has been presented in Chapter 4, together with examples of how these processes can
describe creative problem solving in various domains.
3) Experiments have been conducted on prototype implementations of these processes
in diﬀerent problem domains. These prototype implementation contributions are as
follows:
(a) A Remote Associates Test computational solver was implemented (comRAT -
Chapter 5), which oﬀers correct and plausible results to the RAT creativity test,
and has been compared to human data;
(b) A proof of concept expansion of the Remote Associates Test to the visual domain,
and of the computational solver comRAT-C to comRAT-V has been performed in
Section 5.9;
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(c) A creative object replacement and object constructor in an everyday object domain
has been implemented (OROC - Chapter 6) and evaluated with human judges and
categories from a think aloud experiment
4) Empirical data has been gathered and analyzed on the human creative solving of var-
ious tasks, and on the comparability between human data and data from the prototype
systems. This has taken diﬀerent forms:
(a) Comparability data between the performance of the comRAT-C system and nor-
mative human data when solving compound RAT queries;
(b) An initial prototype of a visual variant of the human Remote Associates Test was
set up and related data on human performance was collected;
(c) Comparability data has been obtained between the object replacement system and
human answers to the Alternative Uses test. Likability and Usefulness metrics
of human appraisals of performance on AUT where investigated together with
the traditional Novelty metrics. Data on property use in new answers to the
Alternative Uses test has been analyzed;
(d) A process for developing practical insight and creative object problems has been
explained, a think aloud study has been conducted and think aloud protocols
have been encoded in a model shown to correspond to processes in the CreaCogs
framework in Chapter 7.
8.2 Experimental work and the CreaCogs framework
The CreaCogs framework aims to provide theoretical support of knowledge organization
for the enabling of creative processes across a variety of tasks. The experimental work
performed has shown that the CreaCogs principles of knowledge organization can enable
creative processes, with results comparable to those of human participants to a variety
of creativity tasks.
The prototype comRAT-C system has shown that associative convergent processes can
be used by a computational solver to successfully match human performance in the
compound Remote Associates Test. The use of frequency of expressions in a proba-
bility of ﬁnding the answer algorithm has correlated with human performance in such
problems, thus providing further validation that the principles used here reﬂect some of
the cognitive reality of solving such tasks by human participants. This correlation can
further point the way towards developing comRAT-C as a model for solving the RAT,
and exploring various hypotheses in order to further understand cognitive solving. Fur-
thermore, comRAT shows promise to become a generative system, which can be used
for further cognitive investigation of the RAT task with controlled variables.
The construction of a visual RAT test for humans enables further comparison of cross-
domain process in solving the RAT. This is the only creativity test that we know of which
can be administered in two diﬀerent forms, corresponding to two diﬀerent modalities.
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Such cross-domain investigation will enable further diﬀerentiation between modality spe-
ciﬁc proﬁciency and creative process proﬁciency when solving the RAT. The implemen-
tation of comRAT-V has shown that the same computational principles can be applied
to both variants of the RAT test. More data is needed to make a strong argument about
a correlation between comRAT-V’s probability of solving queries and human cognitive
diﬃculty in solving the same queries; however, the analysis with current data shows that
this correlation will be achieved with the visual test as well as the compound verbal one.
The prototype OROC system implements use of property similarity between concepts, to
enable object replacement and object composition, which further allows creative transfer
of aﬀordance between diﬀerent objects, as posited by the CreaCogs framework. OROC
shows that such processes can yield creative answers similar to those made by humans,
and which can be evaluated with similar metrics as human answers using the Alternative
Uses Test. Such answers have been appreciated as on Novelty, Usefulness and Likability
by human judges. A comparative analysis to human processes of solving the Alternative
Uses Test from a think aloud protocol has shown that property use and disassembly are
some of the main strategies which enable humans to solve such problems. Both of them
can be accounted for by OROC. Further analysis of the answers given by our participants
to the same objects as OROC to the Alternative Uses test have indicated that shape
and material are the most used such properties when making a creative inference about
the ability to use an object with a new aﬀordance.
The think aloud experiment performed on human participants with insight and cre-
ative object problems has shown that their solving processes ﬁnd correspondence in the
CreaCogs processes of object replacement, composition, and restructuring using objects
and templates.
The creation of a few new practical creative problems has helped us propose a set of
strategies for building such problems. These strategies can in the future can be used
for building a larger set of problems, on which normative data could be obtained, and
which could be studied in varied conditions (with various interfering objects, with one or
multiple paths of solving, with the solution split over a smaller or larger set of objects,
made more or less salient, etc.). Furthermore, the existence of such strategies enables
the further computational implementation of a system that can generate such problems.
The creation of a set of codes for analyzing these think aloud protocols has shown that
human participants indeed apply many of the processes posited by CreaCogs when solv-
ing such problems, for example: (i) they focus on various sets of objects and object
aﬀordances when solving such problems; (ii) such aﬀordances are linked into a construc-
tive whole; (iii) they use property-based search to select replacements for missing objects;
(iv) they search for objects with a problem template in mind; (v) problem templates are
searched for and adapted in order to ﬁnd something templates corresponding to problem
requirements and problem objects; (vi) problem elements can be restructured under var-
ious templates brought from the KB, which sometimes adds the creation of new objects
to the initial problem elements, etc. The same processes for object replacement and
object composition can be used for implementing a CreaCogs prototype computational
Chapter 8. Discussion, Conclusions and Future work 172
solver of practical insight problems, together with other processes posited by CreaCogs
related to problem template search and re-representation of the given problem objects
under various templates.
The principles proposed by CreaCogs thus show (i) validity for a uniﬁed implementation
which will enable artiﬁcial cognitive systems to perform a wide variety of creative solving
tasks and (ii) promise in terms of developing tools which can further be used for the
cognitive modeling and exploration of such tasks in the wider goal of understanding
human creative cognition.
8.3 Towards generalizing a comparability approach in cre-
ative computational cognition
A general approach for the building and assessment of further systems which yield
comparable results to humans in creativity tests and tasks can be extrapolated from our
previously described work. Such an approach would involve the following steps:
1. Choosing a human creativity test the results of which are to be replicated via an
artiﬁcial cognitive system, or choosing a creative problem-solving skill that is more
general and enables some adjacent empirical validation1.
2. Obtaining human normative data or using such data from the literature, where
available.
3. Finding a source of knowledge for cognitive knowledge acquisition (like the n-grams
from a balanced language corpus used for the KB of comRAT-C), or establishing
forms of knowledge acquisition and organization which are cognitively inspired.
Such forms of cognitive knowledge acquisition and organization which might yield
further validating cognitive results. For example, the OROC solver demonstrates
other cognitive eﬀects, like shape bias [72, 88], comRAT-C correlates to human
diﬃculty, etc.
4. Implementing a system which uses cognitive processes, like association, use of
similarity and structure, re-representation, etc.
5. Evaluating the results of the artiﬁcial cognitive system using either or both of
the following: a) human normative data and b) evaluation techniques used for
assessing the human creativity task.
6. Deploying data analysis measures to observe new possible relations of scientiﬁc
interest.
7. Aiming to model such tasks in multiple sensory domains, if possible, as to gather
uniﬁed data of the creative process.
8. Aiming to enable the artiﬁcial cognitive system with generative abilities for that
particular test or task (if possible), as to allow for new empirical testing of human
participants with controlled variables. This will lead to both further reﬁnements
1In the example of our previously described work, the general creative problem-solving skill was
creative object replacement, and the speciﬁc human test used for validation of part of the processes
implemented was the Alternative Uses test.
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in the hypotheses about cognitive creative processes, and the enabling of better
systems.
8.4 Conclusions
A theoretical framework called CreaCogs was proposed for creative problem solving.
The processes types of knowledge organization in this framework have been formalized.
A computational solver for the compound Remote Associates Test was implemented
using CreaCogs (comRAT-C). The agreement of response between comRAT-C and the
human data was 97.92% in the cases in which the 3 query items plus answer were
present in its KB, and 30.36% in the cases in which only 2 query items plus answer were
present in its KB. comRAT-C showed an ability to give other plausible answers than
the ones considered correct. A moderate inverse correlation has been observed between
time taken to solve a query by humans and the probability of ﬁnding a speciﬁc answer
by comRAT-C. A moderate correlation has been observed between the percentage of
participants solving the test and the probability of ﬁnding a speciﬁc answer in the
comRAT-C KB. Both correlations proved highly signiﬁcant. A method for empirically
investigating preference of answer in the case of multiple possible answers and its relation
to frequency were proposed.
A visual variant of the Remote Associates Test has been constructed and explored em-
pirically with human participants. Visual associates given by human participants were
used as cognitive knowledge for the KB of comRAT-V, a prototype system meant to
solve visual RAT queries. The vRAT queries constructed showed diﬀerent degrees of
diﬃculty. Human participants have solved successfully 63% of the given queries, and re-
ported to have ﬁrst perceived the answer visually in 56.6% of the cases. The comRAT-V
prototype solved 72.73% of the given queries. Analysis on the limited amount of data
showed a correlation between comRAT-V’s ability to solve queries with given visual
associates and the diﬃculty of the queries as appraised by human participants which
might prove of future investigative interest. The process of creating vRAT queries which
has been established as part of this work can be generalized and applied to construct
a larger set of visual queries, on which normative data can be obtained. The cognitive
acquisition of more visual associates could also enable the production of a set of such
queries, using the generative properties of comRAT-V.
An Object Replacement and Object Composition (OROC) system was also implemented
using CreaCogs. The system was shown to solve the Alternative Uses Test - a creativity
divergent thought test used for humans. An evaluation of the results of OROC was
carried out using the same methods used to assess human performance in the Alterna-
tive Uses test. Part of this evaluation was done using human judges which assessed the
Novelty, Likability and Usefulness of OROC’s alternative use answers. This assessment
has shown a reasonable amount of inter-agreement, and Likability and Usefulness were
shown to positively correlate with each other. OROC’s processes were also evaluated
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taking into account analyses performed on human data obtained from think aloud pro-
tocols. Human answers were analyzed to determine most important properties when
making creative aﬀordance inference.
Five classical practical insight problems and three newly created practical problems
where given to human participants to solve in a think aloud protocol. A set of codes
was developed to analyze the think aloud protocols of the participants. Two case studies
of the best performing male and female participants have been described. The developed
set of codes shows many of the CreaCogs processes can be found in the human solving
of such problems. The various possibilities of process ﬂow during such solving have
been explored, and two problems have been described in the context of CreaCogs, in
preparation for a prototype solver of such problems. The strategies described for building
new insight and creative practical problems can be used in a further computational
implementation to generate such problems.
This thesis has shown that a uniﬁed framework for modeling diverse creative tasks and
processes is possible. The proposed theoretical framework - CreaCogs - and its pro-
cesses have been shown to reﬂect interesting creative properties and the implementation
of various creative tasks has further conﬁrmed the validity and usefulness of the proposed
framework. Furthermore, the application of these principles has shown that computa-
tional cognitive systems which give answers similar to those given by humans in creative
tests can be built and evaluated in the same way as human answers.
8.5 Future work
The breadth of this thesis opens a wide avenue for further work. Main directions of
further work are presented in the following list, part of which are elaborated below:
• evaluating and informing more parts of the model with quantitative and qualitative
human data;
• improving the OROC model by adding a subsymbolic layer, learning directly from
sensory data stimuli and producing metric distances;
• developing a practical insight problem solving system;
• using the generativity part of these systems to reﬁne cognitive hypotheses;
• developing and implementing more of the constructive creative processes posited
by CreaCogs (like concept creation, PT creation, etc.)
• further work in the direction of classifying creative problem-solving types depend-
ing on the processes they employ;
• philosophy of information work on the impact of structured cognition on informa-
tivity measures (for a position paper on this see [120]);
• applying the principles deployed here to make creative assistive systems.
The comRAT-V system shows promise in terms of extrapolating the same principles
to a multimodal series of the Remote Associates Tests. However, only 20 queries have
been designed so far, in comparison to the 144 queries for the linguistic compound RAT
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provided by the literature [11], together with normative data. A larger set of visual
queries needs to be constructed. More visual associates need to be gathered either by (i)
asking human participants to provide them or by (ii) establishing a way to automatically
extract visual associates from images of groups of objects or scenes. More such data
will enable stronger conclusions to be drawn regarding the correlation between human
participants solving the RAT-V and the processes employed by comRAT-V.
The diﬀerence between functional and compound Remote Associates can further be
explored by implementing a comRAT-F system which takes as knowledge base a set
of functional associates. Part of this could be done using an ontology, and diﬀerent
relations could be obtained by other means. The relations between functional and com-
pound items in terms of the visual variant of the RAT test can also be further explored.
The relationship between visual, semantic and linguistic items can further be explored
through a paradigm which employs a mixed version of the test, which we will call RAT-
CV. Participants to such a version can previously be tested for both language and visual
skills with established tests. Then their performance in RAT-CV together with data
in their performance in language and visual tests can be analyzed in order to discern
between creative ability of bringing forth associates, and speciﬁc ﬂuency in a particular
modality.
A strategy could be developed to enable comRAT to solve, on its part, visual and lan-
guage mixed queries. This could be done by either (i) improving the visual associates
database or (ii) using the semantic web and/or data mining strategies. The relation
between processes using visual and language queries could then be studied further com-
putationally.
Further comparison of performance and response times across compound and functional
versions of the RAT will allow for a better understanding of the processes deployed in
such a test.
The generativity properties of comRAT-C can be explored in order to create well con-
trolled Remote Associates tests to further investigate various cognitive hypotheses, in-
cluding but not-restricted to: (i) human preference of response in the case of queries with
multiple answers; (ii) inﬂuence of query and answer terms order on query diﬃculty; (iii)
inﬂuence of frequency of items over human appraisals of queries as more or less creative
or surprising; (iv) inﬂuence of semantic domain on diﬃculty.
Adding diﬀerent knowledge bases to comRAT-C in collaboration with linguists might
help generate Remote Associates Tests in languages in which such tests are non-existent.
A subsymbolic implementation of the proof of concept OROC system will add to its
cognitive validity, would permit further development of the system and the further in-
vestigation of the impact of property similarity on creative processes. The subsymbolic
layer could be developed as to learn from given sensory data, case in which the similarity
functions over feature spaces could be implemented at a subsymbolic level too. The re-
ﬁnement of such similarity functions in comparison to human performance might enable
Chapter 8. Discussion, Conclusions and Future work 176
further models which aim at explaining why certain objects are triggered as answers in
the Alternative Uses test more than others.
Designing an Alternative Uses test of a larger scale, meant to gather normative data
for human performance with a set of everyday objects will have an important impact
on: (i) further understanding of the importance similarity of property has on creative
processes; (ii) ﬁnding out how often composition and decomposition strategies are used;
(iii) performing knowledge acquisition for the development of an everyday object domain
creative problem-solving system, which could aim to solve ampler problems involving
the creative use of objects.
Designing a multiple condition Alternative Uses test might help determine the impor-
tance of shape and other feature similarity for humans, and the inﬂuence this can have on
the creative object uses they come up with. This will allow integrating more ﬁne-grained
knowledge about shape and size into OROC, and modeling more reﬁned hypotheses
about the inﬂuence of property similarity and composition-decomposition strategies in
object replacement and object composition.
Further increasing and reﬁning the knowledge base of OROC with more objects and
more ﬁne-grained properties will probably allow it to perform the Wallach-Kogan test
successfully, thus establishing a new comparison point with normative empirical data.
An object composition creative test can be designed in order to establish normative
points of reference in human performance in this task, and further evaluation and devel-
opment of OROC’s object composition module. Computational investigation of shape-
based composition, use of object templates,“ﬁtting” of new objects to older templates
and investigation into what shapes seem more suitable than others for composition might
bring further advances for AI and robotics.
A computational proof of concept system needs to be constructed for solving ampler cre-
ative problems and practical insight problems. With the knowledge gathered in chapter
7, this is now possible. However, a mechanism of performing knowledge acquisition of
problem templates from human participants needs to be designed.
Our theory of how insight problems can be created can and should also be tested. A
possible way of doing this, if a computational system able to solve such problems and
with enough knowledge has been built, would be to automatically generate such problems
using the hypotheses presented in 7.1.2 and empirically evaluate such problems with
human participants. fMRI or EEG techniques could be used in order to check in which
cases such problems come closer to the category of insight problems.
Various processes of the posited theoretical framework have been implemented sepa-
rately. The various parts of the framework need to be integrated in a larger system,
adding all these processes together, and investigating their uniﬁed properties, beneﬁts
and power in solving the tasks detailed above.
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Considering the amount of further work which is now possible in order to reﬁne this
cognitive framework for creative problem solving and the state of the art in understand-
ing the creative process via both computational and empirical means, we consider the
current work has fully reached its purpose.

Appendix A
comRAT Human and System
Answers
Table A.1: List of Compound Remote Associate Test Queries, Human and Solver
Answers for comRAT v1
No. Query System Human Correct Plausible
1 Cottage Swiss Cake Cheese Cheese Yes -
2 Cream Skate Water Ice Ice Yes -
3 Loser Throat Spot Sore Sore Yes -
4 Show Life Row Single Boat No Yes
5 Night Wrist Stop Surgery Watch No Partial
6 Duck Fold Dollar Fat Bill No Yes
7 Rocking Wheel High Chair Chair Yes -
8 Dew Comb Bee Honey Honey Yes -
9 Fountain Baking Pop Soda Soda Yes -
10 Preserve Ranger Tropical Forest Forest Yes -
11 Aid Rubber Wagon Station Band No Partial
12 Flake Mobile Cone Homes Snow No No
13 Cracker Fly Fighter Freedom Fire No No
14 Safety Cushion Point Road Pin No Partial
15 Cane Daddy Plum Sugar Sugar Yes -
16 Dream Break Light Bad Day No Partial
17 Fish Mine Rush Gold Gold Yes -
18 Political Surprise Line Party Party Yes -
19 Measure Worm Video Tape Tape Yes -
20 High District House School School Yes -
21 Sense Courtesy Place Common Common Yes -
22 Worm Shelf End Short Book No Yes
23 Piece Mind Dating Brilliant Game No Partial
24 Flower Friend Scout Girl Girl Yes -
25 River Note Account Book Bank No Partial
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 Continued from previous page
No. Query System Human Correct Plausible
26 Print Berry Bird Blue Blue Yes -
27 Pie Luck Belly Pot Pot Yes -
28 Date Alley Fold Blind Blind Yes -
29 Opera Hand Dish Soap Soap Yes -
30 Cadet Capsule Ship Space Space Yes -
31 Fur Rack Tail Coat Coat Yes -
32 Stick Maker Point Decision Match No Partial
33 Hound Pressure Shot Put Blood No Partial
34 Fox Man Peep Show Hole No Partial
35 Sleeping Bean Trash Bag Bag Yes -
36 Dust Cereal Fish Bowl Bowl Yes -
37 Light Birthday Stick Coming Candle No No
38 Food Forward Break Movement Fast No Yes
39 Shine Beam Struck Support Moon No No
40 Peach Arm Tar Muscles Pit No No
41 Water Mine Shaker Salt Salt Yes -
42 Palm Shoe House Tree Tree Yes -
43 Basket Eight Snow Ball Ball Yes -
44 Wheel Hand Shopping Going Cart No Partial
45 Right Cat Carbon House Copy No Partial
46 Home Sea Bed Water Sick No Yes
47 Nuclear Feud Album Family Family Yes -
48 Sandwich House Golf Playing Club No Partial
49 Cross Rain Tie Blue Bow No Partial
50 Sage Paint Hair Green Brush No Yes
51 French Car Shoe Company Horn No Yes
52 Boot Summer Ground Glass Camp No No
53 Chamber Mask Natural Death Gas No Yes
54 Mill Tooth Dust Fine Saw No No
55 Main Sweeper Light Street Street Yes -
56 Pike Coat Signal Green Turn Yes No
57 Oﬃce Mail Hat Box Box Yes -
58 Fly Clip Wall Art Paper No No
59 Age Mile Sand Stone Stone Yes -
60 Catcher Food Hot Dog Dog Yes -
61 Wagon Break Radio Station Station Yes -
62 Tank Hill Secret Top Top Yes -
63 Health Taker Less Risk Care No Yes
64 Lift Card Mask System Face No No
65 Dress Dial Flower Blue Sun No Yes
66 Force Line Mail Service Air No Yes
67 Guy Rain Down Just Fall No No
68 Eight Skate Stick Shift Figure No No
69 Down Question Check Able Mark No No
70 Animal Back Rat House Pack No Yes
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 Continued from previous page
No. Query System Human Correct Plausible
71 Oﬃcer Cash Larceny Petty Petty Yes -
72 Pine Crab Sauce Apple Apple Yes -
73 House Thumb Pepper Green Green Yes -
74 Carpet Alert Ink Red Red Yes -
75 Master Toss Finger Station Ring No No
76 Hammer Gear Hunter Box Head No No
77 Knife Light Pal Hot Pen No No
78 Foul Ground Mate Water Play No No
79 Change Circuit Cake Design Short No Yes
80 Way Board Sleep Deep Walk No No
81 Blank List Mate Check Check Yes -
82 Tail Water Flood Control Gate No Yes
83 Marshal Child Piano Grand Grand Yes -
84 Cover Arm Wear Political Under No Partial
85 Rain Test Stomach Acid Acid Yes -
86 Time Blown Nelson Glass Full No No
87 Pile Market Room Small Stock No Yes
88 Mouse Bear Sand Deep Trap No No
89 Cat Number Phone House Call No Yes
90 Keg Puﬀ Room Powder Powder Yes -
91 Trip House Goal Field Field Yes -
92 Fork Dark Man Green Pitch No Yes
93 Fence Card Master Post Post Yes -
94 Test Runner Map Road Road Yes -
95 Dive Light Rocket Engine Sky No Partial
96 Man Glue Star power Super No Yes
97 Tooth Potato Heart Sweet Sweet Yes -
98 Illness Bus Computer Terminal Terminal Yes -
99 Type Ghost Screen Silent Writer No Yes
100 Mail Board Lung Service Black No Partial
101 Teeth Arrest Start False False Yes -
102 Iron Shovel Engine Old Steam No Yes
103 Wet Law Business Suit Suit Yes -
104 Rope Truck Line Tight Tow No No
105 Oﬀ Military First Duty Base No Yes
106 Spoon Cloth Card Table Table Yes -
107 Cut Cream War Cold Cold Yes -
108 Note Chain Master Key Key Yes -
109 Shock Shave Taste Treatment After No Partial
110 Wise Work Tower Clock Clock Yes -
111 Grass King Meat Dead Crab No Yes
112 Baby Spring Cap Blus Shower No Partial
113 Break Bean Cake Coﬀee Coﬀee Yes -
114 Cry Front Ship War Battle No Yes
115 Hold Print Stool Silver Foot No No
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 Continued from previous page
No. Query System Human Correct Plausible
116 Roll Bean Fish Sauce Jelly No Partial
117 Horse Human Drag Sense Race No No
118 Oil Bar Tuna Salad Salad Yes -
119 Bottom Curve Hop Level Bell No No
120 Tomato Bomb Picker Cherry Cherry Yes -
121 Pea Shell Chest Nuts Nut Yes -
122 Line Fruit Drunk Star Punch No No
123 Bump Egg Step Small Goose No Yes
124 Fight Control Machine Political Gun No Yes
125 Home Arm Room Free Rest No Yes
126 Child Scan Wash Body Brain No Yes
127 Nose Stone Bear Cold Brown No Partial
128 End Line Lock Dead Dead Yes -
129 Control Place Rate Actual Birth No Yes
130 Lounge Hour Napkin Cocktail Cocktail Yes -
131 Artist Hatch Route Escape Escape Yes -
132 Pet Bottom Garden Rock Rock Yes -
133 Mate Shoes Total Work Running No Yes
134 Self Attorney Spending Defense Defense Yes -
135 Board Blade Back Wall Switch No Partial
136 Land Hand House Just Farm No Yes
137 Hungry Order Belt Money Money Yes -
138 Forward Flush Razor Straight Straight Yes -
139 Shadow Chart Drop Eye Eye Yes -
140 Way Ground Weather Stations Fair No Yes
141 Cast Side Jump Diﬀerent Broad No Yes
142 Back Step Screen Door Door Yes -
143 Reading Service Stick Man Lip No Yes
144 Over Plant Horse Dear Power No No
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Table A.3: Using comRAT for query generation - Some examples of using the Answer
item to navigate to the possible query items
An-
swer
Candidate query items w1, w2...wn
Health care, insurance, problems, services, beneﬁts, professionals, oﬃcials, issues,
eﬀects, risks, plan, department, system, status, home, food, problem, club,
coverage, risk, policy, departments, education, plans, reform, maintenance,
programs, conditions, information, outcomes, promotion, experts, workers,
agencies, centers, community, state, issue, needs, concerns, clinic, service,
clinics, center, hazards, hazard, professional, consequences, program, clubs,
costs, reasons, authorities, government, heart, crisis, treatment, practition-
ers, insurers, threat, bone, providers, questions, child, disparities, condi-
tion, research, quality, agency, systems, school, county, impacts, concern,
behaviors, organizations, ﬁeld, facilities, community;
care health, child, day, reform, system, providers, costs, patient, home, plan, ser-
vices, unit, bill, workers, center, professionals, centers, facilities, provider,
coverage, industry, needs, programs, quality, program, settings, plans, skin,
facility, delivery, insurance, physicians, debate, products, organizations,
hospital, beneﬁts, hospice, emergency, systems, physician, legislation, units,
charity, worker, crisis, companies, issues, spending, policy, doctors, hair;
room living, dining, temperature, hotel, locker, emergency, waiting, conference,
dressing, back, family, operating, control, Table, guest, sitting, hospital,
drawing, laundry, service, motel, weight, dorm, engine, ﬂoor, door, meeting,
jury, chat, storage, war, wiggle, music, delivery, rest, window, reception,
breakfast, rec, interrogation, hearing, press, brieﬁng, breathing, screen-
ing, training, reading, wall, standing, couch, recovery, examination, break,
game, powder, rates, board, throne, computer, exam, number, mail, air,
basement, interview;
law enforcement, school, ﬁrm, state, professor, ﬁrms, degree, schools, immigra-
tion, practice, case, tax, student, students, oﬃce, family, labor, canon, prac-
tice, rights, election, professors, clerk, partner, copyright, reform, clerks,
tort, antitrust, review, oﬃces, books, counsel, competition;
parking lot, garage, space, area, spaces, spot, valet, tickets, ticket, street, place;
family members, member, life, values, history, planning, room, business, friend,
income, support, man, tree, name, structure, farm, relationships, reunion,
doctor, tradition, unit, ties, time, problems, vacation, issues, size, aﬀair,
law, therapist, leave, car, photos, farms, background, physician, therapy,
practice, dinner, system, court, environment, gatherings, dog, friends, re-
sponsibilities, crime, dynamics, systems, involvement, violence, connec-
tions, relations, groups, matters, reuniﬁcation, stories, counseling, busi-
nesses, situation, fortune, photo, activities, incomes, medicine, reunions,
photographs, drama, farmers, budget, doctors, obligations, vacations, pic-
tures, portrait, home, estate, entertainment, caregivers, trip, group, needs;
ice cream, water, cubes, vanilla, age, sea, hockey, sheet, cube, crystals, pack,
chest, storm, rink, cap, sheets, water, caps, creams, chocolate, ages, bucket;
call phone, wake-up, conference, telephone, roll, information, center, judgment,
wakeup, house; etc.
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(a) Training query 1
(b) Training query 2
(c) Q1
(d) Q2
(e) Q3
Figure A.1: vRAT training and test queries (continues on next page)
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(f) Q4
(g) Q5
(h) Q6
(i) Q7
(j) Q8
Figure A.1: vRAT training and test queries (continues on next page)
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(k) Q9
(l) Q10
(m) Q11
(n) Q12
(o) Q13
Figure A.1: vRAT training and test queries (continues on next page)
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(p) Q14
(q) Q15
(r) Q16
(s) Q17
(t) Q18
Figure A.1: vRAT training and test queries (continues on next page)
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(u) Q19
(v) Q20
Figure A.1: vRAT training and test queries
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Table B.1: More examples of Object Replacement made by OROC with a knowledge
base that includes items from a household domain.
More object replacement results with OROC
Maybe Book can be used as decoration
Maybe Newspaper can be used as decoration
Maybe Newspaper can be used to wipe dishes with
Maybe Newspaper can be used to wipe kitchen surfaces with
Maybe Newspaper can be used to wipe your hands with
Maybe Newspaper can be used to dry oﬀ your body
Maybe Newspaper can be used to write on
Maybe Newspaper can be used to wipe shoes on
Maybe Newspaper can be used to hang in front of window in order to shade window with
Maybe Bucket can be used to drink from
Maybe Bucket can be used to put ﬂowers in
Maybe Bucket can be used as food container
Maybe Bucket can be used to hold earth and plants
Maybe Bucket can be used to cook in
Maybe Vase can be used to drink from
Maybe Vase can be used to carry water
Maybe Vase can be used as food container
Maybe Vase can be used to hold earth and plants
Maybe Shelf can be used to surf on
Maybe Surfboard can be used as support
Maybe Bowl can be used to drink from
Maybe Bowl can be used to carry water
Maybe Bowl can be used to put ﬂowers in
Maybe Bowl can be used to hold earth and plants
Maybe Bowl can be used to cook in
Maybe Nail can be used to separate objects
Maybe Nail can be used to pin object in place
Maybe Nail can be used to separate wood
Maybe Nail can be used as a weapon
Maybe Nail can be used to scratch with
Maybe Nail can be used to stop door from closing
Maybe Flowerpot can be used to drink from
Maybe Flowerpot can be used to carry water
Maybe Flowerpot can be used to put ﬂowers in
Maybe Flowerpot can be used as food container
Maybe Flowerpot can be used to cook in
Maybe Flowerpot can be used to keep things in
Maybe Pot can be used to drink from
Maybe Pot can be used to carry water
Maybe Pot can be used to put ﬂowers in
Maybe Pot can be used as food container
Maybe Pot can be used to hold earth and plants
Maybe Pan can be used to defend from rain
Maybe Pan can be used to put on top of a pot so that the warmth stays in
Maybe Rubber band can be used to hold hair with
Maybe Tree stumps can be used to support tabletop
...
Appendix B. OROC Results 191
Table B.2: Evaluation of 30 alternative use statements from OROC on Novelty,
Likability, Usefulness (mean) by human judges.
No. Statement Novelty Likability Usefulness
1. A cup may be used to carry water 1,68 4,53 5,53
2.
A Newspaper may be used to wipe kitchen
surfaces with
3,03 2,85 3,65
3.
A toothbrush may be used to brush a coat
with
4,44 2,91 3,03
4. A cup may be used to store food in 2,65 3,88 4,47
5.
A newspaper may be used to hang in front
of a window in order to shade window with
2,97 3,06 4,56
6. Dental ﬂoss can be used to tie things with 4,65 3,38 4,50
7. A carpet may be used as wall decoration 2,12 3,71 5,00
8. A cup may be used to put ﬂowers in 1,88 4,53 5,03
9.
A newspaper may be used to wipe dishes
with
4,26 2,00 2,74
10.
A toothbrush may be used to brush shoes
with
3,50 3,97 4,41
11.
Dental ﬂoss can be used to hang objects on
the wall with
5,03 3,53 3,76
12.
A carpet may be used to wrap self with
and warm up
4,44 2,88 3,50
13.
A newspaper may be used to wipe your
hands with
3,29 2,56 3,50
14.
A toothbrush may be used to sweep the
ﬂoor
4,44 2,12 1,88
15. Dental ﬂoss may be used for sewing 5,41 3,97 4,29
16.
A carpet can be used to cover and protect
the sofa
4,85 2,74 3,62
17. A cup may be used to hold earth and plants 2,91 4,59 4,85
18.
A newspaper may be used to dry oﬀ your
body
5,15 1,82 2,59
19.
A toothbrush may be used to clean the toi-
let with
4,21 2,53 3,03
20. A cup may be used to keep objects in 2,21 4,79 5,18
21. A carpet may be used as a bed cover 4,59 2,56 3,32
22.
Dental ﬂoss may be used to hang clothes
on to dry
6,00 2,68 2,06
23. A carpet can be used on the bed as a sheet 5,59 1,79 1,85
24. A cup may be used to cook in 4,38 3,12 2,94
25. A newspaper may be used to write on 1,65 3,91 4,32
26.
A toothbrush can be used to paint the wall
with
4,85 2,74 2,53
27. Dental ﬂoss can be used to tie shoes with 5,53 2,71 3,03
28. A carpet can be used to sleep on 2,41 3,47 4,29
29. A cup may be used to hold a candle 2,53 4,65 5,59
30.
A newspaper may be used to wipe shoes
on
3,03 3,71 3,94
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Table B.3: Other uses answers by human participants for 5 given objects
Object Other Uses Freq.
Cup
to put things in (dessert, pencils/pens/brushes, mix sauce, mix paint, coﬀee,
etc.)
9
for sound(speaker/headphone/musical instrumental,hear through a wall) 7
to draw shapes(shapes) 3
bird feeder 2
build a tower with other cups(incl sand) 2
hat 2
make a mosaic with a broken cup 2
to cook in 2
to throw with 2
to use as a decoration 2
use as a painting(canvas/) 2
as a bell 1
as a shelf separator (for identical one on each corner) 1
cap for a bottle 1
clay pigeon (shooting) 1
device for competitive sport 1
hammer 1
mortar to make allioli 1
paperweight 1
put publicity in it 1
shovel (dig on earth) 1
to eat from 1
to measure quantities 1
use it as a mace to smash a garlic using the basis of the cup 1
use it as a spoon 1
use it with a knife 1
Newspaper to make shapes and origami ﬁgures(boat/hat) 10
to wrap something 8
clean(glass/brush/toilet) 5
cover(tablecloth/bed/book) 5
to cut images/text from and make a collage/word 3
wall decoration 2
adjust one of the legs of a table 1
adjust the window or a pot that does not close hermetically 1
an umbrella 1
containers of grains 1
ﬁlling shoes to store for a long period 1
keep temperature of food 1
levelling material for tables 1
make baskets or containers hardening it with strips 1
preventing bleeding (as a plaster) 1
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 Continued from previous page
Object Other Uses Freq.
protecting against cold weather 1
protection when painting 1
rolled around a weak chair-leg or any weak tube to make it stronger 1
the newspaper can be applied to open a bottle of beer 1
to burn 1
to dry the ﬂoor 1
to protect the table when cutting using a cutter 1
to protect your hands when taking something from the oven or the cooker 1
twisting it to make a stick to mix paintings 1
wrapping a mommy for a fancy dress event 1
Toothbrush clean(small objects, parts, things, copper, corners) 16
brushing(car,hedgehog,eyebrows,hair,ceils) 4
combing 3
a toothbrush can be used to hang things 1
as a nail of a sundial 1
constructing funny animals 1
for dying your hair 1
making sand drawings 1
rabbets or splines in the windows 1
stabbing device 1
sticking holes into things 1
to exfoliate the skin making circles with the toothbrush 1
to put grease on it and use it to collect the hair and make a bun 1
to put soap and use it to remove something with water to make foam 1
to put wax and polish shoes 1
toy for children 1
tubes 1
weapon against raptors 1
Dental
ﬂoss
ﬁshing line 4
necklace,earring,bracelet like jewelry 4
crocheting something out of it 2
as a belt 1
as a police cordon 1
caress/massage 1
crafts 1
cutting soft materials (e.g. butter) 1
dental ﬂoss can be used as tripping hazard 1
dental ﬂoss can be used for painting 1
ﬁre starter (esp. waxed ﬂoss) 1
guitar string 1
hold a bikini 1
impregnated with glue can be a 3d printer wire 1
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 Continued from previous page
Object Other Uses Freq.
keyring 1
macrame 1
pack 1
to use as a rope to escape from jail 1
to cut soft things 1
to kill a person 1
to pull a tooth 1
to stimulate skin 1
to stop bleeding an injury 1
to tickle 1
to tie it to a tissue or handkerchief or scarf and make a bag 1
to tie it to the handle of a door to close it at a distance 1
to tie the curtain 1
to tie the kitchen paper so that it is perfectly folded 1
Carpet damping noise/vibrations 2
keeping ﬁre lit 2
to wrap objects 2
a carpet can be used as a curtain 1
as an umbrella to protect from the sun 1
build a tent for playing with children 1
carpets can be used to slide a slide 1
door 1
easing access to water on stony beach 1
hiding cleopatra 1
hieroglyphic drawings. 1
moving light furniture around with (or objects) 1
packing stuﬀ in 1
posters or drawing sheets by rolling them together 1
rolled can be a cushion or armrest 1
separation of spaces 1
small carpets are a good lying surface for pets 1
sunbathing on the beach 1
to add water to and plant seeds to germinate 1
to cut it and stick it to your shoes to get new soles 1
to ﬂy 1
to make spiral drawings by rolling the carpet and put it inside a bucket of
painting
1
to paint it and create a new carpet 1
to protect a piece of furniture from the dust 1
to protect against wind 1
to protect architectural drawings 1
to stick it to the wall of a bath to transform the bath in a seat 1
wall 1
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